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ABSTRACT

Over the last five hundred years, several conceptually incommensurable theories
of ethics have been promulgated. For some moral philosophers, this
incommensurability is a matter of deep concern because, in complex cases, there
is no tradition-independent method for resolving moral conflict. More recently, a
new discipline of applied or practical ethics has emerged. Practical ethics attempts
to fill the void between rival moral theories by appealing, first, to the role of
reason from an impartial observer perspective and, second, to decision making
protocols based on moral principles. This ―first generation‖ attempt at codifying
practical ethics failed to bridge the incommensurability gap because decisions
based on the application of principles turned out to be just as divisive, in complex
cases, as decisions made from a theory-centred perspective. This thesis
reconstructs and critiques two of the most prominent decision making protocols in
practical ethics.

For other philosophers, the diversity that one finds in ethical theory is precisely
what a moral agent ought to expect from a complex discipline such as ethics,
particularly in a pluralist society. These philosophers argue that the main problem
is not that philosophy failed to deliver a unified or standard model of moral
deliberation, but that philosophers took so long to appreciate why epistemological
certainty is an unrealistic goal for a discipline primarily concerned with human
behaviour.

4

This thesis argues that the moral diversity one finds in a pluralist society requires
moral agents to engage in two types of consensus about ethics. First, ethics
requires a thin consensus about the teleological imperatives that enable people to
live peaceably in the polis. This thin minimalist consensus engages moral agents
in a discussion about universals held in common, universals that sustain a civil
society, even while its moral agents hold incommensurable views on many other
things. A second type of thick consensus is found in the concept of a practice. As
defined by Alasdair MacIntyre, a practice is a long-lived coherent human activity
consistent with the telos of the whole human life. The concept of a practice can be
usefully employed in a pluralist society because it trades on a thick maximalist
consensus on the internal goods that sustain the activity. In this context, rational
agents who are separated by thick epistemological disagreement can be shown to
hold more things in common than is often appreciated.
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CHAPTER 1: ETHICS IN A PLURALIST SOCIETY

1.1 Introduction

People working in the natural sciences share in more or
less agreed-upon tasks, but the agenda of philosophy has
always been contested: its credentials have never been
agreed upon, even by its classic authors.1
As matters now stand, our need to reappropriate the
reasonable and tolerant (but neglected) legacy of
humanism is more urgent than our need to preserve the
systematic and perfectionist (though well established)
legacy of the exact sciences; but, in the last resort, we
cannot dispense with either. We are indebted to Descartes
and Newton for fine examples of well-formulated theory,
but humanity also needs people with a sense of how theory
touches practice at points, and in ways, that we feel on our
pulses.2
Stephen Toulmin

The central claim of this thesis is that in a pluralist society, a practice-guided form
of moral enquiry offers greater explanatory power for both the agreements and the
disagreements within practical ethics than other forms of moral enquiry. The
thesis will argue that a practice-guided approach to moral conflict enables theory
―to touch‖ practice in the sense that Toulmin refers to above because it focuses
attention on a type of consensus that transcends traditional theological and
1

Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1990), 10.
2
Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 180.
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philosophical conflicts. In short, this thesis will defend the idea that the consensus
that one finds in a practice (law, medicine, politics, etc.) has sufficient explanatory
power to transcend many of the controversial debates in practical ethics.

Practice-guided enquiry is an adaptation of a method of enquiry originally
advocated by Alasdair MacIntyre.3 MacIntyre uses the concept of practice as an
evaluative tool for analysing rival moral traditions, the aim of which is to defend a
tradition (Aristotelian Thomism) that he thinks best supports the teleological and
rational nature of human beings.4 The type of practice-guided pragmatism
advocated in this thesis has a more limited scope. The justification for this limited
claim is that a consensus over internal goods within a practice (i.e. medicine or
law) is self-authenticating in ways that MacIntyre does not seem to appreciate.5

The type of pragmatism advocated in this thesis trades on Aristotle‘s awareness
that the study of the Good is an imprecise science. In his Nicomachean Ethics the
search for the Good is intricately linked to the study of politics because in
Aristotle‘s mind ethics informs the political process. For Aristotle, ethics and
politics belong together because the natural state of mankind is to live in some
form of organised society.6 A rational agent, for Aristotle, is one who gives
serious consideration to a discipline because ―the man who has been educated in a
3

Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, third edition (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 187.
4
MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 52.
5
Chapter 5 of this thesis will outline both the strengths and the weaknesses of MacIntyre‘s
tradition-guided methodology.
6
Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ in Great Books of the Western World, ed., Mortimer J. Adler
(Chicago: William Benton, 1952), 1169 b, 423.
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subject is a good judge of that subject.‖7 However, because politics is not an exact
science, a rational agent should not expect to gain any more clarity than the
subject matter admits.8 The central focus of the Nicomachean Ethics is therefore
on types of behaviour (virtues) that moral agents ought to exhibit if they intend to
live well in a civilised society (polis).

By placing the search for the Good within the realm of politics, Aristotle links the
flourishing of an individual life to the success of the polis itself. Aristotle‘s
approach seems pragmatically useful for a modern pluralist society such as
Australia because moral agents can agree on the general idea of human flourishing
even when they engage in sharp disagreement over particular issues. Unlike some
liberal democracies, Australia does not have a legislative link with a particular
form of religious expression. The ―Preamble‖ to the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act 1900 asks for the blessing of God and entreats the proclamation
from the Queen, but the authority and influence of religious institutions and the
Queen have waned in the intervening years.9

This waning influence is not because those who hold religious or monarchist
views comprise an insignificant minority. The majority of Australians still seem to
lack trust in the formation of an Australian republic,10 and according to the
National Church Life Survey of 2001, more people attend religious services than
7

Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ 1095a, 340.
Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ 1094b, 339. See also J. O. Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1988), 109-10.
9
Parliament of the United Kingdom at Westminster, ―Preamble,‖ Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act 1900 (1901).
10
A constitutional amendment to change Australia to a republic was rejected in 1999.
8
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attend the most popular sporting pastime, the Australian Football League.11
However, people committed to a constitutional monarchy and those who attend
religious services do not present a united voice on many complex moral issues.
Prior to European settlement (1788) there were many indigenous forms of
spirituality and in the years since this diversity has been added to by people from
almost every nation, culture, and religious expression. Religious pluralism in
Australia is therefore an incontrovertible reality, and debates over complex moral
issues reveal that no single religious tradition trumps all others.

During this same time frame moral pluralism also became more widely
appreciated in philosophy. When Toulmin claims above that the ―credentials‖ of
philosophy ―have never been agreed upon, even by its classic authors,‖ he is
referring to the variety of epistemic claims that provided the foundation for moral
theories during the Modern period. Problems associated with the conceptual
incommensurability of rival moral arguments will be outlined in Chapter 2 so it
suffices to say at this stage that the absence of an agreed-upon foundation for
moral argument does not imply that the influence of any particular moral tradition
is necessarily negated.

A moral tradition is diminished, in a technical epistemic sense, if the premises on
which it rests turn out not to be as foundational as envisaged by its original
proponents. However, even in cases like this the practical applications that evolve
from these diminished theories can remain significant. The historical link that
11

National Church Life Survey, Occasional Paper 3: Church Attendance Estimates (NCLS,
2001).
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Australia has with English social policy, primarily through the legacy of British
utilitarianism, is a case in point. The distributive justice legacy of British
utilitarianism is most obvious in the social security and Medicare safety-nets, and
both of these policies are generally recognised as among the best forms of social
welfare.12 The consensus over the efficacy of cost-benefit analysis for social
policy breaks down, however, when it comes to specific moral issues because the
―cash value‖ or ―practical consequences for human conduct‖ of both Bentham‘s
hedonic calculus and Mill‘s higher quality pleasures is not as self-evident as they
assumed.13 Philosophical pluralism is now also an incontrovertible reality in
Australia because no single philosophical tradition trumps all others.

Australia‘s unique brand of representative democracy also includes a limited form
of political pluralism. Political parties that are not mainstream can become
politically significant if and when their advocates can create a perception among
Australian voters that the two-party system is lacking.14 In Australia the ballot box
is a significant force for change and politicians ignore this reality at their peril.
However, the political motivation to take heed of majority opinion has its own
problems. Mill‘s warning concerning the ―tyranny of the majority‖ is part of the
reason why Australia inherited from Britain a somewhat clumsy political
approach to dealing with complex moral issues.15 For some complex issues the
12

See Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), 1-27.
13
Pragmatists argue that a truth-claim should be analysed for its ―cash value‖ or practical
consequences for human conduct rather than for its epistemic certainty. See ―Pragmatism‘s
Conception of Truth,‖ Lecture 6 in William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways
of Thinking (New York: Longman Green and Co., 1907), 76-91.
14
The movements that led to the Australian Democrats (1977), the Nuclear Disarmament Party
(1984), and One Nation (1996) typify the type of niche politics possible in Australia.
15
John Stuart Mill, ―On Liberty‖ in Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government
(London: J. M. Dent, 1910), 73.
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Australian parliament takes heed of various points of view and on others it
mandates policy solely for reasons of political expediency.

Distrust over the tyranny of power was well entrenched in the minds of nineteenth
century British citizens, and Mill was concerned that the British public
acknowledge the destructive influence of democratic tyranny as well. He
advanced two maxims of the harm principle on which public interference with
private liberty ought to be based. First, individual citizens ought to be left alone as
long as their actions do not impact on others, and second, intervention (social or
legal punishment) is only permissible if actions of individuals are prejudicial to
the interests of others.16

Mill‘s argument for liberty of conscience illustrates the difficulty of merging
theory with practice in moral philosophy. The practical problem of deciding
which actions require interference by the State, and which do not, now seems selfevident. Mill‘s explanation of individual behaviours that should or should not be
constrained by the State reflects his own time and place. According to Mill, public
gambling houses should not be permitted but prostitution should be (but not in
brothels). Sellers of strong drink should have their liberty restricted and so should
those who have a conscientious objection to war.17 Mill‘s list of objections to
liberty seems incompatible with a twenty-first century context, and these
contingency problems highlight the practical difficulty of forming legislation
based on the harm principle. Mill seems to concede this point in the beginning of
16
17

Mill, ―On Liberty,‖ 149
Mill, ―On Liberty,‖ 65.
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On Liberty when he says that the practical issue over where to place limits is ―a
subject on which nearly everything remains to be done.‖18

The problematic shift from ethical theory to ethical practice in a pluralist society
is even more noticeable than it was in Mill‘s day because no single form of moral
philosophy or moral theology is dominant. For some complex moral issues,
Australia‘s parliament has acknowledged this plurality by attempting to reach a
political consensus beyond these competing voices. A pragmatic political
consensus of this type does not, and cannot, alleviate the concerns of all
stakeholders, but it does provide an opportunity for the stakeholders to be heard,
and it usually results in a political or legal resolution.

The most recent debates in Australia over bioethical issues are cases in point. Like
all other western democracies, Australia has been attempting to engage its citizens
in complex bioethical debates. In the initial stages of these debates, the Australian
government has engaged the various stakeholders by calling for expressions of
interest, by holding community consultation meetings, and even by using the
parliament itself as a forum for various points of view. Eventually, however, the
consultative process reaches an end-point and a decision is made or a vote is cast.

Australia‘s parliaments have arbitrated on some of the most controversial issues in
bioethics, including abortion, prenatal genetic testing, and more recently the use
of embryos for non-reproductive purposes. For some other controversial issues
18

Mill, ―On Liberty,‖ 25.
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this end-point is extended further through the judiciary, such as the High Court‘s
1983 decision to overturn the Tasmanian Government‘s decision to build a dam
on the Franklin River. For still other issues, this end-point is extended even
further and results in a referendum put to the Australian electorate, perhaps the
most significant being the 1967 vote that enabled Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Australians to be counted in the national census (approved 90.8%).19

This same consultative process has not been the case in Australia for all important
moral issues, however, and political expediency seems to determine how
consultative Australian parliaments will be. Over the last decade, for instance, the
Australian government conducted an intensive internment programme for asylum
seekers and other refugees who came to Australia by boat. This Federal
Government sponsored programme, known as the ―Pacific solution,‖ led to
several thousand refugees being interned in gulag style camps, both on Australian
soil and on surrounding island nations such as Nauru. During this period people
from divergent moral traditions railed against the inhumane Pacific solution but
with very little impact. Lawyers acted pro-bono in several court cases on behalf of
refugees, and on some occasions Federal Members of the Government made a rare
protest by crossing the floor of the House to vote against their own party.20

From a moral perspective, Australia‘s most high profile philosopher, Peter Singer,
had earlier co-authored a paper with Renata Singer that sought to show how the
19

Only four constitutional reforms have been approved by the Australian electorate since the first
in 1906 (forty-four in total).
20
See Michael Gordon, ―Risking Political Death but Undeterred,‖ The Age, August 10, 2006.
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principle of equal consideration of interests, a form of means-ends reasoning,
ought to be applied to refugee problems around the world.21 During this period the
Australian Catholic Bishops issued a paper that urged the Australian Parliament to
take seriously its international obligations in relation to asylum seekers and other
refugees. The Bishops argued that ―It is always unjustifiable to detain asylum
seekers in order to deter future asylum seekers from coming to Australia,‖
claiming that Catholic moral tradition ―has always insisted that it is morally
wrong to use unacceptable means even for an arguably good end.‖22 The Catholic
Bishops were unequivocally critical of the refugee policy, and they shared Singer
and Singer‘s moral judgment that interning refugees was wrong. However, Singer
and Singer argue that means-ends reasoning can resolve the problem whereas the
Catholic Bishops argue that means-ends reasoning caused the problem in the first
place.

In this case there was a consensus that the Pacific solution was unjust even though
the respective parties were in fundamental disagreement over their respective
epistemic justifications for that judgment. Consensus of this type is possible
because moral agents agree on what Michael Walzer and others call a thin moral
motivation.23 This thin moral motivation enables agreement on many moral issues
because it presupposes a moral awareness that transcends the tradition-based
contingency of the moral arguments concerned. Walzer is not suggesting that the
21

Peter Singer and Renata Singer, ―The Ethics of Refugee Policy,‖ in Mark Gibney ed., Open
Borders? Closed Societies? The Ethical and Political Issues (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988),
111-130.
22
Australian Catholic Bishops Conference, A Message from the Australian Catholic Bishops
Conference (May 2004).
23
Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 1-4.
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various moral agents accept, or even recognise, that the language they use has this
thin aspect to it. His point, rather, is that when moral maxims play themselves out
in practice they have both a thin (minimalist) expression and a thick (maximalist)
expression. For Walzer, moral thinness is the more vital aspect of moral discourse
because it allows for an ―intense unity‖ between various moral agents, whereas
moral thickness promotes ―qualification, complexity, and disagreement.‖24 Walzer
seems right about this because on many important ethical issues serious thinking
people agree; consequentialists agree with non-consequentialists, and theists agree
with atheists, because they recognise in the opposing argument a conclusion that
resonates with their own. In the asylum seekers case, the justificatory arguments
of utilitarian philosophers and Catholic Bishops revealed a shared thin agreement
that Australia‘s policy was unjust and needed to be changed.

For some moral issues, however, this thin consensus is not possible, and on these
occasions political expediency takes over. Disagreement of this type occurs when
the various discussants derive their respective moral imperatives from what
Walzer refers to as a thick maximalist morality.25 Using the same two moral
traditions from the asylum seekers case above, we can see how the standoff over
stem-cell harvesting exemplifies the type of thick moral disagreement that Walzer
refers to.

24

Walzer, Thick and Thin, 7.
Walzer, Thick and Thin, 4. See also ―Conflicts of Values‖ in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 71-82; and Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn,
―Morality and Thick Concepts,‖ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume
66 (1992): 267-283. The relationship between thin and thick moral evaluation will be analysed in
more detail in Chapter 2.
25
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In the asylum seeker case, the two moral traditions achieved a thin consensus
from arguments that are conceptually incommensurable. In the stem-cell case,
however, consensus is not possible because the defining issue, the moral status of
the embryo, draws opposite conclusions from the two moral traditions. From a
Catholic perspective, the moral argument against stem-cell harvesting is based on
a thick theological and philosophical tradition that promotes the claim that
because embryos have a significant moral status it would therefore be unethical to
use them for non-reproductive purposes.26

Utilitarian philosophers Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer take the opposite view
when they argue that stem-cell harvesting should be permitted because it raises
few moral issues. From their perspective, an embryo does not have a significant
moral status and therefore, as far as the principle of equal consideration of
interests is concerned, the utilisation of embryos for stem-cell harvesting raises
few moral concerns.27 In a case like this there is no epistemic mediation possible
because neither side is prepared to concede that its respective arguments, both the
premises and the conclusions drawn from them, are internal to particular traditions
and not the product of rationality qua rationality. The Catholic concern for the
high moral status of an embryo is contingent on a thick moral tradition that
incorporates the philosophical argument of natural law and the theological
premise that life is a gift from God. The opposing argument from Kuhse and
Singer, that an embryo has no inherent moral status, is contingent on an equally
26

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dignitas personae: on certain ethical questions
(Offices of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 8 September 2008).
27
Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, ―The Moral Status of the Embryo,‖ in H. Kuhse, ed., Peter
Singer: Unsanctifying Human Life (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 181-187.

18

thick moral tradition derived from utilitarianism that incorporates both the
nuanced perspective of preference calculus and the decision making protocol of
equal consideration of interests. Both arguments are coherent and reasonable but
they are also conceptually incommensurable.

This type of thick epistemic standoff occurs whenever the topic under debate is
complex and whenever a thin agreement between the stakeholders is not
forthcoming. Moral philosophers have long been aware of the epistemic
difficulties associated with converting a general theory of ethics into a specific set
of action-guides.28 This lack of consensus in moral philosophy has already been
well documented, primarily by showing how and why consensus is not possible,
given the incommensurable epistemological divide between competing moral
theories.29

Alasdair MacIntyre, one of the most vocal critics of applied moral philosophy, has
for

several

decades

now

focused

his

criticism

on

the

conceptual

incommensurability of rival moral theories. MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided response
to the incommensurability of moral theories will be analysed in detail in Chapter 6
of this thesis so a brief summary here will suffice to outline the problem as he sees
it. In the first of a trilogy of books that deal with the incommensurability problems
associated with rival moral traditions MacIntyre describes why he thinks moral
philosophy is in a state of crisis:
28

These epistemic difficulties will be addressed in detail in Chapter 2.
See ―The Archimedean Point‖ in Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
(London: Fontana Press, 1985), 22-29.
29
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Every one of the arguments is logically valid or can be
easily expanded so as to be made so; the conclusions do
indeed follow from the premises. But the rival premises
are such that we possess no rational way of weighing the
claims of one as against another.30

In the second book, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre extends this
critique and argues that the incommensurability problem is internal to philosophy
itself and not simply a problem between rival traditions.

Modern academic philosophy turns out by and large to
provide means for a more accurate and informed definition
of disagreement rather than progress toward its resolution.
Professors of philosophy who concern themselves with
questions of justice and of practical rationality turn out to
disagree with each other as sharply, as variously, and so it
seems, as irremediably upon how such questions are to be
answered as anyone else.31

In the third book, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, MacIntyre restates the
problem in even starker terms:

debate between fundamentally opposed standpoints does
occur; but it is inevitably inconclusive. Each warring
position characteristically appears irrefutable to its
adherents; indeed in its own terms and by its own
standards of argument it is in practice irrefutable. But each
warring position equally seems to its opponents to be
insufficiently warranted by rational argument.32

30

MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 8.
Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1988), 3.
32
Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and
Tradition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 7.
31
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MacIntyre argues that the frustration associated with contemporary moral debate
is because the types of debates we have are unsettlable at one level and
interminable at another.33

Over the last fifty years, a new discipline evolved within moral philosophy that
attempted to side-step the epistemic problems associated with conceptually
incommensurable theories. Known variously as applied or practical ethics, this
new discipline sought to overcome the theoretical divide by focusing on decision
making protocols. Most of these new protocols advocate a composite approach
whereby the rational agent takes on the role of an impartial moral agent and
incorporates aspects of both consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories of
ethics in the decision making process. Advocates of this approach argue that
practical ethics of this type can solve moral dilemmas in a way that had not been
possible using traditional ethical theories. These decision making protocols are
now referred to as common morality theories because they appeal to aspects of
moral enquiry that rational agents hold in common. In Australia, the two most
influential decision making models used in practical ethics are the four-principle
approach advocated by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, and the preferenceutilitarian approach advocated by Peter Singer.34

33

Alasdair MacIntyre, ―Why is the search for the foundations of ethics so frustrating?‖, Hastings
Center Report 9/4 (1979): 16-22.
34
See Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1979) with subsequent editions in 1983, 1989, 1994, 2001, and 2008; and
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979 and 1993) and The
Expanding Circle (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1981). Both decision making protocols
will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 4 (principles) and Chapter 5 (preferences).
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A central aim of this thesis is to show that the problem solving capacity of
common morality theories for complex moral dilemmas is overstated because the
practical consequences for human conduct of a decision making protocol is not as
systematic or as coherent as its adherents claim. The major epistemic problem
with decision making protocols is that they do not acknowledge the thin/thick
distinctions of moral enquiry referred to earlier. While there is a consensus that
moral principles or rules are useful (thin moral minimalism), there is no consensus
that these same principles or rules are definitive for solving complex moral issues.

The main practical problem with decision making protocols is that moral agents
use the principles or rules in ways that are consistent with their own moral
traditions (thick moral maximalism). This thesis will show how MacIntyre‘s
concept of a practice can be usefully employed for resolving moral disagreements
in a pluralist society, without the necessity for a thick teleological and theological
narrative that his form of Aristotelian Thomism implies. For MacIntyre, moral
enquiry requires an appreciation of what he calls the ―telos of the whole human
life,‖35 and this appreciation involves a ―fundamental contrast‖ between ―man-ashe-happens-to-be‖ and ―man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.‖36
The state of ―man-as-he-happens-to-be,‖ however, is not as stark as MacIntyre
thinks because the internal goods (standards of excellence) of a given practice are
more self-authenticating than he seems to appreciate. This is because the selfauthenticating thick standards of a good practice have positive practical
35
36

MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 187.
MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 52.
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consequences for human conduct even when there is only thin agreement over
how that practice fits into the telos of the whole human life.37

This thesis will endeavour to show, first, that the discontent within philosophy
over foundationalist assumptions was already well established prior to the
evolution of practical ethics (Chapters 2 & 3). Second, the thesis will reconstruct
three different types of moral enquiry (Chapters 4, 5, & 6) and show that, from a
pragmatist perspective, the practical consequences for human conduct are not as
significant as the various adherents of the respective theories claim. Third, the
thesis will show how the concept of a practice (Chapter 7) can be usefully
employed as an aid to resolving complex moral disputes by appealing to levels of
agreement or consensus that the various stakeholders share, even when they are in
serious disagreement.

1.2 Foundationalism: Discontent from Within

Chapter 2 of this thesis will show that the discontent within philosophy over
foundationalist assumptions was already well established in both the philosophy
of science and moral philosophy prior to the establishment of the discipline of
practical ethics. The history of scientific enquiry provides a neat comparison with
moral enquiry because Modern thinkers sought the same epistemic certainty in
ethics as they did in science. Unlike many scientific disciplines, however, moral
philosophy has never developed the concept of a standard model. In science a
37
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standard model is usually an open ended theory or set of laws that provide the
epistemological foundation for further thinking or experimentation. Philosophy
has never had a standard model for moral enquiry, so when philosophers were no
longer constrained by religious or civil authority it is not surprising that the
Modern period produced several distinct forms of moral enquiry. There seems to
be a more appreciative attitude among contemporary scientists and philosophers
of science to the evolutions and revolutions in scientific theories than is often
exhibited by critics of rival moral theories. It would seem odd to describe Isaac
Newton as a failure simply because Newtonian physics gives an inadequate
explanation for scientific evidence based on quantum physics. In the same way it
would be odd to describe Kant as a failure simply because the application of
moral duty is not as absolute as he seemed to think.

The consensus view that stems from the concept of a standard model provides a
useful paradigm for the type of practice-guided enquiry advocated in this thesis.
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic argues that the contemporary understanding of the
theory of science widens the scope of enquiry to incorporate a breadth of opinion
that would not have been acceptable in the Modern/Cartesian paradigm of
scientific method:

According to this approach, scientific knowledge is the
product of a collective human enterprise to which
scientists make individual contributions that are purified
and extended by mutual criticism and intellectual
cooperation. According to this theory the goal of science is
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a consensus of rational opinion over the widest possible
field.38

This same breadth of opinion seems applicable to moral theory in a liberal
democracy because both classic and contemporary liberalism accept that the twin
concepts of freedom and liberty are expressed within a social polis that engages
with people who have diverse and at times competing points of view.39 This
chapter will endeavour to show that moral foundationalism had already been the
subject of serious critique prior to the evolution of practical ethics.

1.3 Decision Making and Practical Ethics

Chapter 3 will examine the historical background that led to common morality
theories being overstated by their original proponents and thus subsequently so
heavily criticised by their detractors. Arguments over practical ethics break down
because they slide too easily from thin minimalist concepts to the thick application
of those concepts in particular cases. Common morality theories appeal to thin
principles or rules that many moral agents accept, and this level of argument is
relatively uncontroversial. The controversy erupts when practical ethicists
overstate the efficacy of these thin principles or rules for solving particular cases.

When John Harris argues that the proper business of decision making in medical
ethics is to resolve moral dilemmas he overstates the level of resolution that is
38
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possible for moral debate in a liberal pluralist society.40 Similarly, when Singer
addresses the abortion question and states, ―I shall show that, at least within the
bounds of non-religious ethics, there is a clear-cut answer and those who take a
different view are simply mistaken,‖41 he overstates the capacity of preference
utilitarianism to achieve moral consensus even when limited to a non-religious
perspective. These overstated claims highlight the major criticism that has been
leveled by some at so-called ―first generation bioethicists.‖42 This chapter will
argue that an anxiety over medical advances coupled with what Richard Bernstein
calls a ―Cartesian anxiety‖ over epistemic foundations43 produced a first
generation of bioethics text books that were too simplistic for the type of complex
moral dilemmas that moral agents face in a pluralist society.

1.4 Principle-Guided Enquiry

Chapter 4 will focus on the most popular non-consequentialist version of common
morality theory, the four-principle approach advocated by Beauchamp and
Childress. Now in its sixth edition, Principles of Biomedical Ethics is probably the
most successful text book on practical ethics ever written. However, it is also one
of the most heavily criticised and is seen by its critics as the prime example that
illustrates why ―second generation‖ bioethics is now necessary.44 This chapter will
40
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show that the four-principle model, based on autonomy, nonmaleficence,
beneficence, and justice, is usefully thin because it provides a common set of
terms that moral agents can utilise in complex moral debates. However, the
principles are not definitive enough on their own to solve complex cases, and this
failure illustrates a common problem for most forms of practical ethics. The thin
consensus over the four-principles breaks down when they are applied to
particular cases. This is because the application of the principles in complex cases
is thick with the ideological and philosophical concerns of the various
stakeholders, thereby making a resolution impossible.

To illustrate, the abortion debate presents straightforwardly in the four-principle
approach as a clash between autonomy and nonmaleficence. However, there is no
mechanism within the four-principle approach that serves to adjudicate why one
principle trumps another. Moral agents are therefore likely to choose whatever
principle best fits the position they held prior to the application of the principles.
The standoff over the clash of principles (autonomy vs. nonmaleficence) is as
divisive as the standoff arising from the utilisation of rights language (right to
choose vs. right to life) or that created by disagreement over whether the interests
of fetuses ought to count in the personhood debate. The standoff over an agreedupon set of principles is what MacIntyre refers to when he says that ―modern
academic philosophy turns out by and large to provide means for a more accurate
and informed definition of disagreement rather than for progress towards its
resolution.‖45
45
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The main epistemological problem for the principle-guided method of decision
making occurs when it is presented as a means of resolving debates in bioethics.
Bioethics is a general term that incorporates diverse issues and even more diverse
points of view because the rational discussants bring with them numerous
medical, religious, philosophical, and scientific points of view. A diverse group of
rational discussants is unlikely to agree on how to apply the four-principles in
complex cases because each moral agent approaches the issue from what
MacIntyre calls a ―story-filled‖ perspective.46 This epistemological divide is less
significant when the principle-guided approach is used within a particular practice
such as nursing. This is because nursing is a practice with a clearly recognised
telos (health) and with clearly defined internal goods that have been forged over
the course of the history of the practice. The individual nurse is not the arbiter of
―good practice‖ because he or she plays a role in a discipline with a much longer
and deeper history. In this context, the four-principle approach is pragmatically
useful because it provides a relatively straightforward set of action-guides in a
discipline with an agreed-upon telos and an agreed-upon set of internal goods
(standards of excellence).47
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1.5 Preference-Guided Enquiry

Chapter 5 will evaluate the most popular consequentialist form of common
morality theory, Peter Singer‘s Practical Ethics. Singer argues that many of the
difficulties associated with decision making in practical ethics can be overcome
when a moral agent takes on the role of an ―impartial spectator‖ or ―ideal
observer.‖48 This chapter will show that, as with the four-principle approach,
decision making based on equal consideration of interests can be useful as a
general guide to decision making but is not definitive enough to solve complex
problems.

Singer presents his version of common morality as emerging from within the
tradition of utilitarianism, but through a nuanced perspective of interest or
preference satisfaction rather than the more general pleasure/pain calculus that
Bentham and Mill used. The two main epistemological problems with Singer‘s
version of practical ethics is that he overstates, first, the role of an impartial moral
agent and, second, the uniformity of decision making based on equal
consideration of interests. He states at the beginning of Practical Ethics that his
concern is to show how a ―broadly utilitarian position‖ deals with some of the
more complex issues in bioethics.49 This chapter will show that Singer‘s broadly
utilitarian position breaks down on its own terms so that he has to incorporate
non-utilitarian thinking into his argument in order to sustain the conclusions he
draws. The practical consequences for human conduct of decisions based on
48
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equal consideration of interests are not as significant as Singer maintains because
interests or preferences are not self-evident in complex cases.

1.6 Tradition-Guided Enquiry

Chapter 6 will begin by showing why MacIntyre thinks that the discipline of
practical ethics rests on a fundamental epistemological mistake. The epistemic
problem for practical ethics is that it is presented through the guise of impartial
consideration on the basis of which a balanced evaluation of fundamental
principles or rules can be achieved. MacIntyre argues that because no objective
criterion exists on which this balancing can take place, the use of principles and
rules is itself empty of application:

the metaphor of weighing claims that invoke rights against
claims that invoke utility, or claims that invoke justice
against claims that invoke freedom, in some sort of moral
scale is empty of application. There are no moral scales …
hence moral arguments terminate very quickly and in
another way are interminable. Because no argument can
be carried through to a victorious conclusion, argument
characteristically gives way to the mere and increasingly
shrill battle of assertion with counter assertion.50

In another place he is even more dismissive of ―balancing‖ in practical ethics
when he states: ―there are no scales—and the metaphor of balancing, if thought of
as a rational process, is a misleading and disguising fiction… This is why these
are not genuinely moral principles or rules.‖51 For MacIntyre, the epistemic
50
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problems associated with decision making in ethics stem from a fundamental
teleological mistake. Because a moral agent cannot be removed from his or her
own personal history and sense of purpose, MacIntyre argues that moral enquiry is
primarily a teleological account of what it means to be human. Acknowledgement
of the telos of the whole human life is necessary, according to MacIntyre, because
it mediates between those practices that promote human flourishing (e.g.,
medicine) and those practices that do not (e.g., slavery). MacIntyre says that
moral enquiry from this perspective presupposes ―some account of potentiality
and act, some account of the essence of man as a rational animal and above all
some account of the human telos.‖52

According to MacIntyre, the success of a moral tradition depends on how well it
distinguishes between those practices that inform and nourish the essential nature
of a human being and those practices that are destructive of this end. For
MacIntyre, the internal analysis of a practice is the first stage of moral enquiry
because it provides the methodological framework for fair assessment and
because it evaluates a moral tradition from the inside. Once this first stage is
complete a moral agent can then advance to the second stage and compare one
tradition with another. Over a twenty-year period, MacIntyre used this traditionguided methodology to argue for a revised form of Aristotelian Thomism because,
for him, this tradition succeeds on its own terms when other moral traditions fail.
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MacIntyre asserts at the beginning of After Virtue that the language of morality is
in a ―state of grave disorder,‖53 but this assessment seems overly pessimistic at
one level and overly optimistic at another. It is overly pessimistic because his first
stage of moral evaluation, practice-guided enquiry, reveals a history of consensus
over moral issues that he seems to ignore. At the same time the conclusion he
draws from the tradition-guided comparison of rival moral traditions, that his
tradition (Aristotelian Thomism) succeeds where others fail, seems overly
optimistic.54 A significant discrepancy within MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided
account will be highlighted in this chapter. MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice is
self-authenticating (because internal goods of a practice are derived from
consensus) whereas his appeal to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition is not
(because no consensus has been forthcoming that this tradition succeeds on its
own terms when others do not). Many philosophers agree with MacIntyre‘s claim
that rival moral arguments are conceptually incommensurable, but they do not see
this as a major practical problem, particularly in a pluralist society. Bernard
Williams, for instance, argues that the contingency of a moral life has to be
perspectival and therefore disagreement is exactly what one should expect from a
complex discipline like ethics:

[O]ur ethical ideas consist of a very complex historical
deposit. When we consider this fact, and the relations that
this deposit has to our public discourse and our private
lives, there seems no reason at all to expect it to take, in
any considerable measure, the shape of a theory.55
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Williams is more concerned that moral philosophers do not sufficiently
acknowledge that the study of ethics, from an epistemic perspective, has limits,
and therefore a rational moral agent ought to explore ways of transcending these
epistemic limits. His preferred method, and here he agrees with MacIntyre, is to
give serious recognition to the thick ethical concepts within a practice:

One thing that will make a difference is the extent to
which ethical life can still rely on what I have called thick
ethical concepts … a practice that uses them is more stable
in face of the general, structural reflections about truth of
ethical judgements than a practice that does not use
them.56

1.7 Conclusion: Practice-guided enquiry

The final chapter of this thesis shows why moral enquiry that focuses on
principles, preferences, or tradition fails to achieve the level of certainty
advocated by the respective adherents, primarily because these models lack the
unifying consensus that a standard model has in other disciplines. Further, it
provides a justification for how and why practice-guided pragmatism offers
greater explanatory power for both the agreements and the disagreements within
practical ethics than other forms of moral enquiry in a liberal pluralist society. The
major justification for this central claim is that practice-guided enquiry sets the
standard of authentication at a level on which consensus has already been
achieved, the level of a practice. The three other types of moral enquiry –
principle-guided, preference-guided, and tradition-guided – fail on their own
56

Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 200.

33

terms, at least as far as reaching moral consensus in a modern pluralist society is
concerned. The failure of first generation practical ethicists to solve ethical issues
stems directly from the lack of consensus over how the four-principle approach or
the preference-calculus approach ought to be applied in complex situations.
MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided alternative has also failed, however, because it relies
on a comparative consensus, concerning the relative strengths and weaknesses of
one rival tradition over another, that has not been forthcoming.

Beauchamp and Childress, Singer, and MacIntyre share a common philosophical
goal, that is, they want to overcome the lack of agreement that epitomises debates
over complex moral issues. This goal sets the standard of authentication too high
within a modern liberal democracy because it relies on a level of consensus that
has not been forthcoming to date and is unlikely to be forthcoming any time soon.
Practice-guided enquiry avoids this problem because it accepts that a pluralist
society is made up of serious thinkers from diverse cultural, religious, and
philosophical traditions, each of whom can give a rational justification for the
position he or she takes on a given issue.

Given the lack of agreement over the foundations on which moral argument ought
to be based, the goal of finding an epistemic solution for complex moral dilemmas
seems unrealisable. However, the overriding significance of MacIntyre‘s work is
not the conclusion he has drawn from tradition-guided enquiry. Academics from
several distinct disciplines have adapted his concept of a practice, and this thesis
will argue that it is equally as useful in moral debates, perhaps even more than
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MacIntyre appreciates, because it helps to clarify reasons for both agreement and
disagreement in relation to complex moral dilemmas. MacIntyre describes a
practice as follows:

any coherent and complex form of socially established
cooperative human activity through which goods internal
to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying
to achieve those standards of excellence which are
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods
involved, are systematically extended.57

The overriding difference between the practice-guided approach and the other
three methods of moral enquiry is that it can be utilised whenever and wherever a
thin agreement about human flourishing is achieved. This thin agreement is
presumed whenever an appeal is made to concepts such as the rule of law,
universal suffrage, or civil society. For example, a thin teleological consensus on
concepts such as health or justice is strong enough to establish the thick internal
goods on which practices such as medicine and law are based. Practice-guided
enquiry takes for granted that moral agents share in a process of political, legal, or
social resolution of complex moral debates, even when their preferred moral
solution has been ignored. In a pluralist society a practice like medicine is selfauthenticating whenever its internal goods, as measured by its practitioners,
achieves its thinly recognised teleological imperative (health). Likewise, in a
pluralist society legal practice is self-authenticating whenever its internal goods,
57
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as measured by its practitioners, achieve its thinly recognised teleological
imperative (justice).

Practice-guided enquiry acknowledges the contingency of practical rationality
most cogently articulated by Aristotle. Aristotle uses the phrase pros ton kairon,
which usually translates as ―as the occasion demands‖ or ―with an eye to the
occasion,‖ to emphasise the temporal, local, and conditional aspects of practical
rationality. A rational decision for Aristotle is one made at the ―right time,‖ with
the ―right motive,‖ and in the ―right way.‖58 The major point of departure between
MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided enquiry and a practice-guided approach is that a
thick consensus is achieved among practitioners (man-as-he-happens-to-be) even
when they share only a thin agreement, or even when they disagree, on the
teleological purpose for human beings (man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-hisessential-nature).59 The internal goods within medical practice, for instance, are
knowable and attainable because they habituate a standard of excellence that is
independent of the individual medical practitioner‘s concern for whatever the
essential nature of human beings comprises. Even when medical practitioners
come from diverse cultural, religious, and philosophical traditions, it is possible to
discern good medicine from bad medicine (malpractice) because good medicine
has a history (time, place, and circumstance) that is not linked to the individual
beliefs of practitioners. The benefit of practice-guided enquiry is that it enables a
rational agent in a pluralist society to appreciate the contingency of decision
58
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making in its various forms. Practice-guided enquiry is a type of stakeholder
analysis which attempts to give a fair presentation of the various practices
concerned. A decision made from the perspective of preference calculus, for
instance, is contingent not only on the tradition from which it derives
(utilitarianism) but also on the cultural, psychological, and emotional aspects of
the decision maker. Similarly, a decision made from the perspective of Catholic
moral theory is contingent on a different philosophical and theological tradition,
but one that is no less rigorous.

1.8 Conclusion

The contention of this thesis is that practice-guided enquiry allows theory ―to
touch‖ practice because it aims for a pragmatic practice-guided resolution of
moral dilemmas in a pluralist society. Practice-guided enquiry trades on an
inherent appeal to authority and this will be defended. The history of many
practices reveals actions that were once considered to be internal goods but are
now considered to be harmful. It is the contention of this thesis, however, that
practice-guided enquiry provides a viable way forward that merits careful
consideration and cannot be readily or prejudicially dismissed. As with most
philosophical deliberation, a consensus of rational discussants is an appropriately
reasonable goal.60
60
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CHAPTER 2: FOUNDATIONALISM – DISCONTENT FROM WITHIN

2.1 Introduction

A note of urgency can sometimes be heard, even in
otherwise unhurried writers, when they ask for a
justification of morality. Unless the ethical life, or (more
narrowly) morality, can be justified by philosophy, we
shall be open to relativism, amoralism, and disorder.1
Bernard Williams

Williams‘ observation above refers to epistemological anxiety over moral claims.
Either we come up with an impartial philosophical justification for moral decision
making or we will collapse into relativism, amoralism, and disorder. This is a
false dichotomy, according to Williams, because it fails to take seriously the
epistemological limits of moral rules and maxims.2 Williams argues that there is
no ―self-contained‖ theory of morality because the empirical facts necessary for a
decision making protocol in ethics do not exist.3 He accepts that the rejection of
moral facts requires him to advocate a type of moral relativism, a ―relativism of
distance,‖4 about which more will be said later in this chapter.
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In a chapter entitled ―The Archimedean Point‖ Williams argues that the anxiety
over ―relativism, amoralism, and disorder‖ can be directly traced to the search for
a rational pivot point that provides a foundation on which to construct an answer
to Socrates‘ famous question, ―How should we live?‖5 This chapter will show that
discontent with foundationalist assumptions in philosophy was well entrenched
prior to the evolution of practical ethics as a distinct discipline in the second half
of the twentieth century. Much of this discontent is directed at what Stephen
Toulmin refers to as the ―hidden agenda of Modernity.‖6 This hidden agenda,
according to Toulmin, led Modern thinkers to take up the Cartesian ―quest for
certainty‖7 too uncritically, at least as far as the foundation of knowledge is
concerned.

Foundationalists argue that inferences about truth and knowledge are justified if
and only if they are grounded in non-inferential axioms that are properly basic,
that is, non-inferentially justified. Foundationalism appeals to a correspondence
theory of truth, wherein beliefs are held to be true just in case they correspond to
states of affairs in the world. The main problem with the correspondence theory of
truth, when used as a justification for moral claims, is that it relies on some moral
facts being knowable or real.

This chapter will reconstruct the significant level of discontent among
philosophers regarding the problematic assumptions that underlie the Cartesian
5
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quest for certainty. The primary reason for this reconstruction is to show how a
central concern of Enlightenment thinkers, that reason ought to replace appeals to
authority and tradition, was overstated. The purpose of this review is to show that
the discontent within philosophy concerning foundationalist assumptions – over
concepts such as rationality, truth, and objectivity – had been voiced long before
the various decision making protocols that now dominate practical ethics began to
emerge.

2.2 Foundationalism: The Standard Model in the Sciences

The Modern period produced several distinct forms of moral enquiry. The most
influential version of non-consequentialism was Kant‘s categorical imperative,
and the most influential version of consequentialism was Bentham‘s hedonic
calculus. At this early stage the two dominant theories were already conceptually
incommensurable even while independently satisfying the Modern agenda by
postulating a form of reasoning that did not require an appeal to authority or
tradition. MacIntyre argues that the conceptual incommensurability between rival
moral arguments dominates moral enquiry:

The most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance
is that so much of it is used to express disagreement; and
the most striking feature of the debates in which these
disagreements are expressed is their interminable
character.8
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The attempt to incorporate foundationalist thinking into moral claims, given the
historical setting in which Modern thinkers lived and worked, is hardly surprising.
In order to break the stranglehold that religious and civil authorities held over
truth-claims, moral philosophers had to circumvent the appeal to authority in
much the same way that Nicholaus Copernicus and Galileo Galilei did in
astronomy. The history of many scientific disciplines reveals that at various times
and places the explanatory power of a new discovery or theory is so significant
that a consensus develops within the discipline such that this new discovery or
theory supersedes what was previously held to be the case.

Among contemporary astronomers, for instance, there is a clear consensus that the
explanation of celestial bodies provided by Copernicus (1473-1543) and Galileo
(1564-1642) provides substantially more explanatory power than that offered by
Ptolemy and his contemporaries in the second century. Similarly, the explanation
proffered by Albert Einstein and Alan Guth far exceeds that of Copernicus and
Galileo. These dramatic transitions in astronomy exemplify the problems
associated with committing too readily to foundationalism in science or even to
the scientific method itself.

In astronomy the search for certainty led to several epistemological revolutions,
and even now astronomy is in the midst of a quantum-driven epistemological
crisis that may lead to major revision of the standard model of gravitation. In
scientific research the search for certainty evolved into what came to be known as
the scientific method, and this method of enquiry initially served humans well
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because it broke the influence that religious and civil authorities had on the
interpretation of scientific discoveries.

However, over the last several decades scientists and philosophers of science have
shown that the concept of scientific method is itself tradition-dependent because
many scientific theories are themselves based on ideas or assumptions that are not
derived from the scientific method itself.9 The attempt to establish a grand unified
theory or theory of everything in science illustrates this point. Scientists at the turn
of the twentieth century thought they were within sight of establishing a complete
view of the fundamental laws that govern the universe. There was little indication
of the tumult that the next thirty years would bring or that something like a
scientific revolution was going to be necessary in order to deal with this tumult.
This revolution in subsequent decades proved to be so profound that at the
dawning of the twenty-first century, the finding of a grand unified theory seems
more distant now than it ever was.

Many scientific disciplines now use the concept of a standard model to delineate
the foundational premises and boundary assumptions on which evidence derived
by means of the scientific method is evaluated. A standard model in science
provides the best explanation hypothesis10 for the discipline based on current
evidence but is open-ended to incorporate new evidence that can influence the
epistemological status of current theories. In cosmology and astronomy, for
9
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instance, the standard model concept is used to describe the different types of
matter in the universe and the influence that this diversity of matter has on the
theory of gravitation (baryonic matter makes up 5%, cold dark matter a further
25%, and dark energy the final 70%). This model has explanatory power because
the gravitational effect of baryonic matter alone is insufficient to explain evidence
of gravitation gleaned from the Hubble telescope and the WMAP.11 Physicists
also use a standard model of particle physics to explain how three of the four
fundamental forces of the universe (electromagnetic, weak nuclear, and strong
nuclear) interact with all the visible matter in the universe. In an OECD Global
Science Forum report Sharon Butler states that ―the standard model has proved a
triumph of modern science, with enormous explanatory and predictive power.‖12

The explanatory power of a scientific theory is crucial to establishing the
epistemological status of the real-world facts on which the theory is based. For
biologists,13 anthropologists, and geneticists the theory of evolution by means of
natural selection serves as the standard model for explaining the origins of
biological life on planet Earth.14 The explanatory power of evolution by natural
selection is superior to other theories because it gives a more coherent account of
current scientific evidence. The concept of a standard model is based on a
consensus about the basic hypotheses and assumptions that govern a particular
11
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discipline. This consensus, however, does not imply agreement at all levels of
enquiry within the discipline. Contemporary biologists, for instance, agree on the
theory of evolution by natural selection but disagree over how this takes place
(punctuated equilibrium or phyletic gradualism).

The type of consensus one finds in a contemporary scientific discipline is often
derived from debates over many years, sometimes centuries, until one theory
finally takes precedence over all others. A classic example is the standard model
of geographical formation associated with Earth‘s lithosphere (crust), now known
as the theory of plate tectonics. As early as 1596 Abraham Ortelius noticed that
continents on opposite sides of the Atlantic Ocean seem to fit together on a map.
This initial observation was roundly rejected until it was revisited in the 1960s,
and subsequently the theory of plate tectonics became the dominant theory or
standard model of geographical formation.15

The concept of a scientific method post-Descartes was originally thought to
encapsulate observations about real-world experiences that were independent of
any appeal to tradition or authority. However, over the last hundred years the
concept of scientific method has changed considerably and the idea of an
impartial real-world experience has also been challenged.
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The history of science reveals two relatively recent developments that reformed
the narrow inductive description of scientific enquiry. The first of these is simply
an historical recognition that many scientific discoveries have either survived into
the present only with major modification or have long since been discarded
because they have been superseded by a better explanation for the way things
are.16 The naïve acceptance of the scientific method proved to be an oversimplification of what actually happens in scientific practice. The second
development concerns the acknowledgement that many important discoveries
were in fact serendipitous and not the product of the scientific method itself.17

Running parallel to interpretive problems associated with the naïve acceptance of
the scientific method was a more troubling realisation that the empirical
transparency of a real world was itself being challenged. In a 1927 collection of
essays, J. B. S. Haldane muses:

I have no doubt that in reality the future will be vastly
more surprising than anything I can imagine. Now, my
own suspicion is that the Universe is not only queerer than
we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose.18

Haldane‘s broad vision of science early in the twentieth century recognised the
revolutionary contribution of Einstein‘s theories of special relativity (1905) and
16
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general relativity (1916), but it best encapsulates the sometimes bizarre world
revealed by quantum mechanics.19 For all its strangeness, however, Johnjoe
McFadden states that ―quantum mechanics prevailed, even against Einstein‘s
intellect, because of its vast explanatory power.‖20 The problems associated with
the scientific method being interpreted too narrowly, combined with the
appreciation that the universe is itself strange, led several prominent philosophers
of science to posit a broader model of scientific enquiry.

Willard Van Orman Quine was one of the first scientists to link the problematic
assumption of scientific realism with epistemological foundationalism. He
rejected, first, the Kantian analytic-synthetic distinction and, second, the
empiricist argument that meaningful statements can be reduced to terms that refer
to immediate experience. He argued that both dogmas are ―ill founded‖ and that
the effect of abandoning them leads to both ―a blurring of the supposed boundary
between speculative metaphysics and natural science‖ and, just as importantly, a
―shift toward pragmatism.‖21 This blurring of the boundary between speculative
metaphysics and natural science also blurred the boundary between the role of
reason and the place of tradition in the philosophy of science.

A decade later another scientist, Thomas Kuhn, also acknowledged the role that
tradition plays in his incommensurability thesis and the concept of a paradigm.
Kuhn‘s concept of science is that it is a tradition in which progress is sometimes
19
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routine (normal) and sometimes revolutionary (abnormal). Kuhn states that ―the
normal scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only
incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which has gone
before.‖22 Kuhn proposed several forms of the incommensurability thesis and also
used the concept of a paradigm in such diverse ways that there is now little
agreement over how either concept should be understood.23 His explanation of
paradigmatic knowledge has therefore been the subject of extensive criticism,
particularly in the loose way he appropriates concepts like ―paradigm change‖ and
―conceptual scheme.‖24 However, even though much of this criticism is valid,
because Kuhn is fuzzy in the way he uses terms such as ―paradigm,‖ his
conceptual

scheme

for

scientific

practice

can

be

understood

more

straightforwardly in the sense of an explanation of what one believes to be the
case now, in comparison with what one took to be the case before.25

Rorty argues, for instance, that Kuhn‘s concept of a conceptual scheme refers to a
―collection of views which make up present day culture,‖ and he thinks that this
description of a conceptual scheme is also shared by Quine, Sellers, and
Feyerabend.26 Rorty‘s assessment here is not meant to imply that Kuhn and other
philosophers now agree on how scientific practice should be conducted, because
22
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they do not. Rather, Rorty is only suggesting that Kuhn‘s initial proclamation that
scientific knowledge is built around conceptual schemes rather than foundational
truths should not be overlooked.

During this same decade another philosopher of science, Karl Popper, argued that
there is nothing foundational about a scientific theory because a theory does not
rely on bedrock for foundational truths. Popper argues that the structure of
scientific theory is like a platform that rests on piles driven into a swamp. These
piles do not rest on a firm foundation but they are firm enough to get the job done.
In Popper‘s words, ―if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have
reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm
enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.‖27

More recently, Alan Chalmers has argued that the Modern claim that the scientific
method provides objective truth, because scientific knowledge is derived from
facts, can only be advocated in a highly qualified form. Chalmers suggests that a
strong case can be made, first, that ―scientific knowledge can neither be
conclusively proved nor conclusively disproved by reference to the facts,‖ and,
second, that even when ―facts are assumed an increasing attention is being paid to
the history of science.‖28 This pragmatic shift in science has taken various forms
and its most recognisable legacy is the standard model approach outlined above.
27
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Arthur Fine also advocates a similar approach when he argues that the goal of the
scientific enterprise is empirical adequacy or appropriate reasonableness because
prevailing beliefs are relative to particular social circumstances and the narrative
context in which scientific enquiry takes place. For Fine,

The realism/antirealism debate largely sidesteps science.
The debate over a constructive reshaping of
constructivism may be more important… This seems to
me the heart of the program, the right corrective to
philosophical (especially realist) distortions of science,
and the place where lots of good work can be done too.
Among the work to be done is to achieve some
understanding of what is actually involved in the rational
acceptance and proof in science… This job involves
exploring the diverse range of contexts, historical and
contemporary, in which inquiry is carried out.29

2.3 Moral Philosophy Without a Standard Model

In spite of Kant‘s claim to the contrary, moral philosophy never had a
Copernican-style revolution in which an ancient theory of the moral life was so
thoroughly superseded by a Modern moral theory. As a result moral philosophy
never developed a consensus-based standard model of moral enquiry. When Kant
claimed that knowledge ―begins with experience‖ but is not derived ―out of
experience,‖30 he thought that this new account of knowledge was like a
Copernican revolution in philosophy. While contemporary philosophers
appreciate the contribution that Modern philosophers like Kant made to moral
29
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philosophy, there is no consensus among philosophers that his concept of moral
duty, via the categorical imperative, provides substantially more explanatory
power than the explanation of the moral life posited by philosophers of the
Classical Period, such as Plato and Aristotle. Many contemporary moral
philosophers still trade on a foundationalist legacy whenever appeals are made to
concepts such as inalienable31 or basic human rights, moral duties, moral
absolutes, the impartial spectator, the universal point of view, or fundamental
moral principles. The search for certainty in ethics during the Enlightenment
shared a common epistemological vision with the new science that was being
done, namely, to establish a rational foundation on which to ground claims that do
not rely on appeals to authority or tradition.

When MacIntyre argues that professors of philosophy ―disagree with each other as
sharply, as variously, and so it seems, as irremediably … as anyone else,‖32 he is
referring to the lack of agreement over foundations, the fundamental premises on
which moral debate is conducted. The lack of a standard model does not imply
that moral philosophers always disagree, however, and MacIntyre‘s criticism of
the absence of agreement with respect to epistemological foundations for moral
theory seems overstated. As the discussion in Chapter 1 has shown, thin moral
agreement is possible on many moral imperatives. Careful thinkers in a modern
liberal democracy, for instance, do not usually debate the epistemological status of
claims such as ―torture is wrong‖ or ―a person should be considered innocent until
31
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proven guilty.‖ Clearly this type of thin agreement can break down when moral
maxims are applied to particular cases, but this does not diminish the value of thin
agreement in a pluralist setting.

While MacIntyre‘s criticism seems overstated, his critique of practical ethics
seems legitimate because the focus of many practical ethics texts is to provide
rational solutions to particular cases by means of easily understood decision
making protocols. Wherever and whenever moral enquiry is conducted solely
from this perspective, like an on/off toggle switch that supplies right or wrong
answers, it is diminished by epistemological pluralism. This is because the
decision making protocols are not derived from a consensus or standard model of
moral theory, leaving moral agents to apply them in a way that corresponds to the
premises and conclusions of their own respective traditions.

For MacIntyre, moral pluralism is deeply problematic because he seems to want
more out of moral theory than it delivered during the Enlightenment period. For
other moral philosophers (Williams and Walzer), moral pluralism is not
problematic because it is precisely what one ought to expect from a complex
discipline like moral enquiry. Many moral philosophers now advocate a nonfoundationalist approach to moral enquiry. This non-foundationalist emphasis has
taken various forms. Some philosophers adopt a hermeneutical approach to moral
enquiry (Bernstein), others argue for a return to casuistry (Toulmin), and still
others argue for a type of moral prescriptivism.33 The following reconstruction
33
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highlights the discontent over foundationalist assumptions of the Modern period.
This reconstruction will serve as an introduction to the critique of the raison
d’être of practical ethics in general (Chapter 3) and of the two dominant decision
making protocols currently influential in Australia (Chapters 4 and 5).

The critique of theological foundationalism began as Modern biblical scholars
began to appreciate the hermeneutical dimensions of interpreting ancient biblical
texts.34 Biblical scholars recognised that a foundationalist approach to textual
analysis is too narrow because it ignores the Sitz im Leben (life situation) of the
original authors. For several decades now theologians and biblical scholars have
incorporated non-foundationalist emphases into various theological disciplines
apart from biblical studies, including theological ethics.35 The legacy of Cartesiantype foundationalism in theology was systematically critiqued in a 1994 collection
of essays entitled Theology without Foundations: Religious Practice and the
Future of Theological Truth.36 In her introduction to this collection, Nancey
Murphy claims that the theological preoccupation with Cartesian-type
foundationalism was a mistake made by both conservative and liberal interpreters
of biblical texts.37 The conservative appeal to an inerrant biblical text fails because
it appeals to what Murphy calls a first-floor foundational presupposition that the
biblical material is in fact revelation of a particular sort. She further claims that
when faced with the new historical-critical method of studying scripture, some
34
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theologians sought another form of foundationalism in the guise of religious
experience, and thus theological liberalism was born.38 The future of theological
truth, according to Murphy, is a theology without foundations based on the
concept of a practice as a ―vehicle for community self-assessment‖ and a storyfilled approach to theology and ethics.39 Murphy argues for a pre-modern
theological epistemology in which the paradigm for knowledge is articulated
within a particular community.40 This story-filled understanding of theology
involves a serious consideration of biography as a form of theology, and the role
that stories play in religious life.41

Contemporary pragmatists argue that something like Fine‘s concern for
appropriate reasonableness in science is also necessary in moral philosophy.
Vincent Colapietro argues that traditional philosophy and contemporary bioethics
lack the vocabulary to deal with the ―highly dynamic character of our modern
technological culture.‖42 A modern technical culture, within which genomic
research is but one of several big science projects, is also likely to identify itself as
a pluralist multicultural society. For pragmatists, the ―cash value‖ of a
philosophical idea or a theory operates in ways similar to the standard model
approach used in science because in both cases it is the explanatory power of the
idea or observation that is significant. Colapietro argues that pragmatism of this
38
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sort does not reduce theory simply to the ―handmaiden of practice‖ because
pragmatism conceives theory itself as a form of practice. Pragmatism is therefore
heuristically self-conscious and self-critical, according to Colapietro, because
pragmatism is itself a practice and therefore necessarily linked to its own narrative
account but also to resources outside of pragmatism that might impact on how
pragmatists get the job done.43 In this historicist sense, truth-claims are
acknowledged not because they are self-evident truths independent of tradition but
because they are consistent with internal goods that mediate what truth means, in
the context of particular traditions or practices.44 A consensus such as this goes
beyond both naïve objectivism and pessimistic relativism, as the following
discussion of major voices in recent philosophical discourse reveals.

2.4 Richard Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)

Richard Rorty is even more dismissive of the Modern project than most. He
argues that the legacy of Descartes was responsible for the failed Kantian attempt
to ―render all knowledge-claims commensurable.‖45 For Rorty the problem is
epistemology itself, or at least the style of epistemology that dominates the
Cartesian quest. He uses Descartes to illustrate the failings of the Modern project
and he refers to the Cogito as the ―original sin of philosophy.‖46
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In the introduction to a collection of essays devoted to The Linguistic Turn, Rorty
argues against the Modern assumption that philosophy ought to transform itself
into a science. New methods such as Descartes‘ ―clear and distinct ideas,‖ Kant‘s
―transcendental method,‖ and Husserl‘s ―bracketing‖ all failed, according to
Rorty, because all attempts to find a starting point without presuppositions are
doomed because in order to know what method one is going to adopt one must
already have presupposed ―some metaphysical and some epistemological
conclusion.‖47 The linguistic turn was coined to refer to a type of nonfoundationalism that focused on the link between philosophy and language.
Among pragmatist

philosophers,

however,

the ―pragmatic turn‖

more

appropriately describes the search for a language that deals with what James refers
to as the ―cash value‖ or practical consequences for human conduct.

Rorty rejects Descartes‘ suggestions that one should withdraw from history and
tradition, first, because he thinks it is a bad idea, and second, because he argues
that it is impossible. Rorty argues that any description of how things are from a
―God‘s eye point of view‖ does not ―free us from the contingency of having been
acculturated as we were.‖48 It is this acculturation that determines why some
theories about the real world are accepted and some rejected. He emphasises that
the historical or hermeneutical dimension of truth is pivotal because truth is based
on an inter-subjective agreement or consensus among members of a community.49
47
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He adopts what he refers to as the ―Quine-Sellars‖50 approach to epistemology
and argues against the correspondence view of truth primarily because there is no
way to get outside existing beliefs and language. This is because nothing would
count as justification without reference to what was already being taken for
granted.51 For Rorty the Modern anxiety over relativism should be seen as a desire
to preserve existing habits of contemporary European life that were ―nurtured by
the Enlightenment‖ and justified ―by it in terms of an appeal to reason.‖52

Rorty agrees with Williams that foundationalist assumptions concerning the need
for universals and the subsequent desire for impartial detachment should be
rejected.53 Following Nietzsche, he describes this desire for objectivity as a
―disguised form of the fear of death‖ and ―an attempt to avoid facing up to
contingency, to escape from time and chance.‖54 He accepts Foucault‘s analysis
that science and philosophy produce usefulness rather than truth. As new theories
and discoveries unfold, ―objectivity‖ is that which serves as a means for
grounding further theories and further discovery.55

Rorty aims to replace Enlightenment rationalism with a general turn away from
theory toward a more pragmatic, holistic and narrative account of knowledge.56
The pragmatic reality of moral claims, according to Rorty, is that they are not
50
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universalisable: thus objectivity is best understood as a consensus of rational
discussants because this is the most objectivity we can hope for. 57 The consensus
referred to here is not universal because the aim is to achieve limited consensus
among rational discussants with respect to particular practices. This pragmatic
approach to objectivity, based on consensus, is both more practical and realisable
than theory-centred objectivity. This type of consensus aims to achieve
perspectivally good decisions rather than universally right decisions. A good legal
decision, for instance, would be one that conforms to the history and practice of
law. A limited teleological consensus develops between rational discussants
(lawyers, judges, politicians, legal academics, etc.) over actions, protocols, and
behaviour that is consistent with good practice and therefore consistent with the
teleological goal of law, namely, justice.

A pragmatic appreciation for truth and justification, with a commitment to rational
consensus, is more edifying for Rorty than the attempt to update or modify
foundationalist truth-claims every time they fail.58 Rorty prefers James‘
description of truth, a truth which is ―better for us to believe,‖ rather than some
representational version of truth.59 He acknowledges that the ―holistic, antifoundationalist, pragmatist treatments of knowledge and meaning‖ found in his
own work and in the work of Dewey, Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellars, and Davidson
is offensive to many philosophers because by abandoning the quest for
57
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commensuration they become relativists.60 Like Williams, however, Rorty is not
inclined to give much credence to the charge that he is a relativist:

In short, my strategy for escaping the self-referential
difficulties into which ‗the Relativist‘ keeps getting
himself is to move everything over from epistemology and
metaphysics into cultural politics, from claims to
knowledge and appeals to self-evidence to suggestions
about what we should try.61

This charge of relativism has come even from philosophers who are in general
agreement with Rorty‘s non-foundationalist stance because they are concerned
with how his rejection of foundationalism will cash out in disciplines like ethics
and politics. In a collection of essays devoted to Rorty‘s work, Charles Guignon
and David Hiley suggest that the consequences of taking a non-foundationalist
stance is deeply troubling for moral and social thought. They claim that Rorty‘s
non-foundationalist stance results in some form of moral relativism because it
would be difficult to discern ―why we have the commitments we have‖ or why
―we should take one path into the future rather than another.‖62 Rorty‘s response
is to argue that in the history of Modern philosophy one often finds philosophers
who resemble each other in their distrust of the idea that ―man‘s essence is to be a
―knower of essences,‖ and he claims that Goethe, Kierkegaard, Santayana, James,
Dewey, the later Wittgenstein, and the later Heidegger are ―figures of this sort‖
who were also accused of relativism or cynicism.63
60
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The charge of relativism often misses the point that pragmatists such as Rorty
make. The pragmatist is cynical of foundational versions of truth but not to truth
that is perspectival, a truth that is relative to particular traditions with particular
justificatory processes. For Rorty, truth is perspectival because ―We cannot justify
our beliefs (in physics, ethics, or any other area) to everybody, but only to those
whose beliefs overlap ours to some appropriate extent.‖64 For Rorty one can be an
epistemological relativist, because truth does not mirror nature, without being
either a scientific or moral relativist. This is because truth is understood as a
concept with a history or, in his words, ―a consensus chosen by rational
discussants.‖65 Rorty contends that Dewey was an edifying philosopher because
Dewey incorporates the concept of philosophy as conversation when he writes
about philosophy being a mentoring exercise rather than an exercise in the
transmission of knowledge.66 For Dewey, mentoring is a purposeful activity in
which people ―strive for the realization of ends‖; when people are asked why they
behave as they do, Dewey says the only answer, apart from blind custom, is that
―they strive to attain certain goals because they believe that these ends have an
intrinsic value of their own; they are good, satisfactory.‖67 Thus the realisation of
ends and attainment of goals is only possible when there is a broad agreement
about what those ends or goals are.
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The critique of foundationalism has gathered momentum over the last fifty years
and many critics use Descartes as a paradigm for what has gone wrong. According
to this view, Descartes‘ attempt to ground theological and philosophical truths on
self-evident principles failed because no agreement has been forthcoming in
philosophy over what these first principles comprise. ―Non-foundationalism‖ has
therefore come to refer to various theories that advocate taking a more historicist
view of knowledge.

2.5 Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985)

The impact that the Cartesian quest for certainty has had on moral thinking can be
seen in the way various Modern theorists have sought to overcome moral
relativism. This chapter opened with Williams describing an epistemic anxiety
over relativism. In Morality: An Introduction to Ethics Williams was already
rejecting the attempt by practical ethicists to simplify moral enquiry. He rejects
foundationalism in ethics primarily because it attempts to simplify what cannot be
made simple. Simplification is a mistake, according to Williams, because
complexity and conflict is a basic fact of moral deliberation. He prefers to see
moral deliberation as a complex mix of local and universal concerns that includes
the psychological and emotional concerns of the moral agent. 68 In Moral Luck
Williams again rejects the idea that a completely impartial position is possible for
any ethical theory, though his primary target is the alleged impartial consideration
advocated by Henry Sidgwick and other utilitarian philosophers. Williams argues
68
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that the desire for a discrete moral theory, and an accompanying decision making
protocol, is misguided.

There cannot be any very interesting, tidy or selfcontained theory of what morality is, nor, despite the
vigorous activities of some present practitioners, can there
be an ethical theory, in the sense of a philosophical
structure which, together with some degree of empirical
fact, will yield a decision procedure for moral reasoning.69

Williams returns to this theme in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, in which he
asks why moral reductionism arose in the first place and why simplification in
ethics is wrong.

If there is such a thing as the truth about the subject matter
of ethics – the truth, we might say, about the ethical – why
is there any expectation that it should be simple? …
Perhaps we need as many concepts to describe it as we
find we need, and no fewer?70

Williams says that the fact that we appeal to a variety of ethical considerations is
precisely what one would expect to find in the complex world we inhabit. Ethical
considerations, according to Williams, are ―genuinely different from one another,‖
and this is precisely what moral agents should expect because all of us are ―heirs
to different long and complex ethical traditions, with many different religious and
other social strands.‖71 Williams argues nonetheless that a moral agent can be an
epistemological skeptic without being an ethical skeptic:
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In my sense, to be skeptical about ethics is to be skeptical
about the force of ethical considerations; someone may
grant them force, and so not be a skeptic, but still not think
that they constitute knowledge because he does not think
the point lies in their being knowledge.72

Williams argues that Sidgwick‘s requirement that rational agents ought to
examine ethical issues from a point of view of the universe is wrong because
―neither psychology nor the history of ethical reflection gives much reason to
believe that the theoretical reasonings of the cool hour can do without a sense of
the moral shape of the world, of the kind given in everyday dispositions.‖73
Williams claims that Sidgwick‘s point of view of the universe is nowhere to be
found,74 and he refers to this type of thinking as government house
utilitarianism.75 He suggests that rather than concentrating on a non-existent point
of view of the universe, a moral agent should be more concerned with the point of
view of here and now and with ―how a practice hangs together in comparison with
other practices.‖76 Williams argues that the justification for rejecting the
foundationalist enterprise in moral philosophy, in favour of practice-guided
enquiry, is the same justification for rejecting it in the philosophy of science.

No process of reason-giving fits this picture, in the
sciences or elsewhere. In theoretical connections, the
foundationalist enterprise, of resting the structure of
knowledge on some favored class of statements, has now
generally been displaced in favor of a holistic type of
model, in which some beliefs can be questioned, justified,
or adjusted while others are kept constant, but there is no
process by which they can all be questioned at once, or all
72
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justified in terms of (almost) nothing. In Neurath‘s famous
image, we repair the sea while we are on the sea.77

A moral agent, according to Williams, ought to be concerned with how a practice
―hangs together in comparison with other practices in a way that makes social and
psychological sense.‖78 Because Williams argues that a moral agent is necessarily
conditioned by culture, psychology, and history he has also been labeled a moral
relativist. This is a tag he eventually came to own, or perhaps reform, because he
argues that from the point of view of a moral objectivist, he is indeed advocating a
type of moral relativism. However, he claims that the moral objectivist is simply
wrong to think that the key aspect of moral deliberation is avoidance of relativism.
He uses the phrase, ―relativism from a distance,‖ to show that moral deliberation
is always perspectival, always local, and therefore by definition always relative to
the types of people we are.79

In the opening chapter to his last book, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay In
Genealogy, Williams argues that the commitment to truth and the suspicion of this
commitment still dominates the cultural scene.80 In this book he further articulates
what was for him a familiar theme, namely, Nietzsche‘s concept of genealogy.81

Our ethical ideas are a complex deposit of many different
traditions and social forces, and they have themselves
been shaped by self-conscious representations of that
history. However, the impact of these historical processes
is to some extent concealed by the ways in which their
77
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product thinks of itself. The most general reason for this is
that a truthful historical account is likely to reveal a radical
contingency in our current ethical conceptions.82

2.6 Jonathan Dancy: Ethics Without Principles (2004)

Another philosopher who rejects foundationalist moral philosophy and thus has
also been labeled a moral relativist is Jonathan Dancy. In his Introduction to
Contemporary Epistemology, Dancy contends that the focus of foundationalism
was to satisfy the demands of epistemology in order to avoid skepticism. He
argues that the research programme of classical foundationalism fails to show how
beliefs about an ―external world,‖ or about ―past and future,‖ or about ―other
minds‖ is justified on the basis of ―infallible beliefs about our sensory states.‖83

This failure to secure epistemic foundations for truth-claims subsequently impacts
on issues associated with moral foundationalism, at least as far as universalisable
moral principles are concerned. Dancy argues that the search for moral
universalisability is itself mistaken because it ignores the possibility that a new
case may throw up alternative properties of sufficient importance to defeat
previously held universalisable moral principles.84 Dancy also uses the
assumptions of scientific foundationalism as a paradigm for exposing the type of
epistemological problems found in moral philosophy. In the same way that one
can never be certain that experimental probability leads to scientific facts, a moral
agent can never be certain that moral principles or rules can be adequately applied
82

Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 20.
Jonathan Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985),
54ff.
84
Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 240.
83

64

to all particular cases. In Ethics Without Principles Dancy argues that ―morality
has no need for principles at all,‖85 and he advocates what he calls an extreme
form of particularism:

we can perfectly well rely on people by and large to do
what is right in the circumstances. We don‘t need
principles to tell them what to do, or to determine what is
right, or to tell us what they are likely to do.86

Dancy is referring here to the type of reliance one concedes to practitioners within
a particular practice. The rules and principles that govern a practice are particular
to that tradition and not universally shared by others.

2.7 Richard Bernstein: Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1983)

Richard Bernstein, in Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics,
and Praxis, also advocates for a practice-guided hermeneutic awareness of
epistemological claims. Bernstein is a relativist as far as truth-claims are
concerned because he agrees with Rorty that there is no grand narrative or
overarching framework that can mediate between alternative foundationalist
arguments:

there is no substantive overarching framework in which
radically different and alternative schemes are
commensurable—no universal standards that somehow
stand outside of and above these competing alternatives.87
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Bernstein agrees with Rorty that the Modern attempt to replace the contingency of
social practices with a more solid and substantial epistemological objectivism has
failed.88 He argues that in spite of several decades of debate over concepts like
rationality, truth, and knowledge, contemporary discussion still takes an either/or
approach to what he calls traditional extremes. Bernstein‘s either/or approach to
epistemological arguments closely resembles that same comparison referred to
earlier by Williams. Bernstein argues that a Cartesian either/or anxiety exists
because moral agents are informed that they either adopt forms of ―objectivism,
foundationalism, ultimate grounding of knowledge, science, philosophy, and
language‖ or society collapses into ―relativism, skepticism, historicism and
nihilism.‖89

Bernstein also argues that Descartes‘ search for certainty produced an overriding
―intellectual confidence‖ that the ―secure path for philosophy‖ had been
discovered, a ―right method‖ that would yield ―genuine intellectual progress‖
because it turned philosophy into a discipline that yields knowledge (epistēmē)
rather than a discipline based on the ―endless battleground for competing and
shifting opinions (doxai).‖90 The belief in a ―permanent, ahistorical matrix or
framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of
rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness‖91 was driven by what
Bernstein refers to as a ―Cartesian anxiety.‖92
88
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Either there is some support for our being, a fixed
foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the
forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with
intellectual and moral chaos.93

Bernstein claims that the reason why the battle against relativism has been so
pervasive is because there may be nothing, ―not God, Philosophy, Science, or
Poetry—that satisfies our longing for foundations, for a fixed Archimedean point
upon which we can secure our thought and action.‖94 In the historical setting of
distrust toward traditional repositories of truth (church, state, culture, etc.), anxiety
might seem reasonable and perhaps even pragmatically necessary during the early
stages of the Enlightenment. Bernstein‘s suggestion is that we should now reject
the anxiety of both unsatisfied objectivism and pessimistic relativism. Like others
mentioned previously, he advocates a return to practice-guided decision making
contingent upon history and precedent. Bernstein cites MacIntyre‘s argument that
objectivity comes from knowing ―how and when to put rules and principles to
work and when not to‖ in disciplines like law, medicine, and science because
there are no set rules ―specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for large
areas of such practices‖ and because skills associated with practical rationality are
communicated ―partly by precepts‖ but much more by ―case-histories and
precedents.‖95

Bernstein says the twentieth century hermeneutic shift in philosophy began as a
Continental movement with the publication of Heidegger‘s Being and Time and
93
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Gadamer‘s Truth and Method.96 He follows Gadamer in claiming that rather than
attempting to escape relativism by continuing the fruitless search for theorycentred objectivism, that pursuit should be discontinued and replaced by a
practice-guided form of objectivity, following Aristotle.97 Gadamer and Bernstein
claim that philosophical hermeneutics is heir to the type of practical philosophy
that Aristotle advocates.

According to Bernstein, this old/new understanding of practical rationality is
―dialogical‖ because it places stress on the ―practical communal character‖ of
rationality.98 He acknowledges that this approach is pluralistic, but not in a flabby
or defensive sense of pluralism.99 Some moral claims are better than others in the
same way that some scientific claims are better than others, primarily because
they seem to work. Defensive or fortress-like pluralism occurs when disparate
groups work out their own isolated frameworks for ethics without communicating
with others.100 Bernstein rejects this approach as well and advocates a type of
―engaged pluralism‖ whereby multiple parties acknowledge their own fallibilities
and attempt to be responsive to each other. He argues for ―engaged fallibilistic
pluralism‖ because it represents what is best in the pragmatic tradition. It involves
vigilance against the dual temptations of ―simply dismissing what others are
96
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saying‖ and also of ―thinking we can always easily translate what is alien into our
own entrenched vocabularies.‖101

2.8 Stephen Toulmin: Cosmopolis (1990)

The final philosopher in this review is perhaps the most significant because he
was a genuine insider in the classic theory-centred view of Modernity. In
Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, Toulmin presents a stark contrast
from what he now calls the ―received view‖:
Looking back at the ―received view‖ of Modernity after
fifty years, my inclination is to retort, ―Don‘t believe a
word of it!‖ From the start, that whole story was one-sided
and over-optimistic, and veered into self-congratulation.102

Toulmin used this exaggerated claim deliberately because his main criticism of
the Enlightenment project was not the ideal of rational enquiry but the
exaggerated product and historical inaccuracy of many of its major advocates and
because the Modern project assumed too much. His change of mind begins with
what he refers to as the hidden agenda of Modernity, the ―Erwartungshorizonten,
or horizons of expectation,‖ that he says dominated Modernity.103 Toulmin uses
the term ―received account‖ to describe the confident assertion that human
rationality could transcend traditional presuppositions of religion and culture. He
101
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is not saying that the Enlightenment project itself was a failure because major
advances did occur in almost every field of human enquiry.

In choosing as the goals of Modernity an intellectual and
practical agenda that set aside the tolerant, skeptical
attitude of the 16th-century humanists, and focussed on the
17th-century pursuit of mathematical exactitude and logical
rigor, intellectual certainty and moral purity, Europe set
itself on a cultural and political road that has led to its
most striking technical successes and to its deepest human
failures.104

The first chapter of Cosmopolis describes an increasing distrust over the received
wisdom of Modernity. Toulmin says the scientific blessing of the Enlightenment
(especially in medicine) was that scientific enquiry has made significant progress
since Galileo and Descartes. However, this progress was itself a long-term product
of prior ―17th-century revolutions undertaken in physics by Galileo, Kepler, and
Newton, and in philosophy by Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz.‖105 Toulmin‘s
change of mind focuses on what he calls the ―shared assumptions about
rationality‖ as the starting point of Modernity.106 He claims that acknowledging
the limits of rational enquiry is less contentious now in science than it is in
philosophy because scientists ―share in more or less agreed-upon tasks‖ whereas
philosophers do not.107 The more or less agreed-upon task of scientific enquiry is
the standard model approach referred to previously.
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Further, Toulmin says the self-doubt of philosophy, and thus his own, necessitated
a fresh start because the ―burden of proof‖ shifted once the dream of finding a
scratch line for epistemic claims failed to materialise.108 John Dewey‘s Gifford
Lectures (1929) provide the starting point for Toulmin‘s critique. Taking his cue
from Wittgenstein, Toulmin suggests that the theory-centred focus of Modernity
is over and done with because the ―destructive work of Dewey, Heidegger,
Wittgenstein, and Rorty‖ has left philosophy with limited options. Toulmin thinks
there are three possibilities for philosophy:

[1] It can cling to the discredited research program of a
purely theoretical (i.e. ―modern‖) philosophy, which will
end by driving it out of business; [2] it can look for new
and less exclusively theoretical ways of working, and
develop the methods needed for a more practical (―postmodern‖) agenda; or [3] it can return to its pre-17thcentury traditions, and try to recover the lost (―premodern‖) topics that were sidetracked by Descartes, but
can be usefully taken up for the future.109

The Modern project, according to Toulmin, did not provide certainty for
―intellectual problems—let alone, practical ones,‖ and the claim that philosophical
or scientific problems could be de-contextualized was itself based on an historical
motivation. He uncompromisingly rejects the Modern assumption that rationality
was commonly available to anyone ―who sets superstition and mythology aside‖
in ways ―free of local prejudice and transient fashion.‖110 Toulmin‘s criticism of
108
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the false assumptions of Modernity has broadened to become a critique of
rationality itself.111

After fifty years of reflecting on the received view of Modernity Toulmin argues
that it was simply over-optimistic.112 He is not suggesting a rejection of all aspects
of the standard account but argues that it was simply over-optimistic and that its
worst defects are matters of historical fact. He highlights three basic historical
assumptions of seventeenth-century rationalism. First, he argues that general
historians have long since rejected the myth of social progress that many
philosophers still cling to. Second, also on historical grounds, he rejects the
assumption that the Enlightenment led to freedom from ecclesiastical tyranny.
Third, he claims that the assumption of a clean intellectual break with the Middle
Ages is at best a half-truth.113

At this point in his reconstruction for a modern Cosmopolis Toulmin sets the
scene for a re-evaluation of pre-Modernity because one aim of seventeenthcentury philosophers was to frame questions independent of context. Toulmin
claims that his task is now to ―recontextualize the questions these philosophers
took most pride in de-contextualizing.‖114 For Toulmin, the social implications of
the new Cosmopolis share one feature, which is that they foreshadow a notion that
has recently played a part in political and social rhetoric.
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Toulmin claims that throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, clerics and
educated laypeople understood that problems in social ethics were not resolved by
appeal to any single universal tradition so when they confronted serious moral
issues they appealed to multiple considerations and coexisting traditions that were
weighed against one another.115 For this reason Toulmin now argues for a return
to casuistry in ethics – to re-contextualise philosophical truth-claims for a modern
Cosmopolis:
Until the 17th century turned ethics into a branch of
theoretical philosophy, ―case ethics‖ was as intellectually
challenging as constitutional interpretation in the judicial
practice of the United States. It did not aim to provide a
unique resolution of every moral problem: rather, it
triangulated its way across unexplored ethical territory,
using all the available resources of moral thought and
social tradition.116

In a collaborative project with Albert Jonsen, Toulmin argues that a moral agent
can resort to type-cases or paradigm cases without becoming an absolutist.117 A
type-case uses standard principles as referential markers so that an individual case
can be compared and contrasted with the typical. Jonsen and Toulmin argue that
standard maxims such as ―don‘t use violence against innocent human beings,‖
―don‘t lie,‖ and ―don‘t take unfair advantage of other people‘s misfortune‖ serve
as ―markers or boundary stones that delimit the territory of ‗moral‘ considerations
in practice.‖118 A central concern behind Toulmin‘s recent work resembles
MacIntyre‘s reconstructive project when he suggests that because the criticism of
115
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leading philosophers ―undermines the whole ‗foundationalist‘ program,‖ a new
Cosmopolis is now required that favours a research program ―concentrated on
narrative and practice.‖119 Toulmin argues that the search for ―common
grounding,‖ based either on Cartesian rationalism (clear and distinct ideas) or on
Lockean empiricism, has not produced common results and a new ―grounding‖ is
required that focuses on the ―overall narrative of conceptual history.‖120

2.9 Conclusion

The seemingly secure path that philosophy embarked on at the start of the
seventeenth century had by the end of the twentieth century diverged into
numerous and often disparate versions of the original position. The various types
of moral enquiry advocated by Rorty, Williams, Dancy, Bernstein, and Toulmin
represent a non-foundationalist shift in emphasis, even though they provide a
diverse range of alternatives. This diversity, however, seems eminently
reasonable, given Aristotle‘s insight that ethics is a practical rather than a
theoretical science. In Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues that a
rational agent does not spend time deliberating about ends when he says that ―a
doctor does not deliberate whether he should heal, nor an orator whether he shall
persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order.‖121 For
Aristotle, a rational agent ought to be more concerned with practical intelligence
or prudence and thus the concentration of thought for doctors, orators, and
119
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statesmen is to ―assume the end‖ (health, persuasion, and law and order) and to
spend time contemplating ―how and by what means‖ the end ―is to be attained.‖122

Aristotle‘s concept of practical wisdom stands in stark contrast to the decision
making models currently being advocated in practical ethics. For Aristotle,
practical ethics is forged in a shared teleological activity of a specific practice
(i.e., medicine→health; law→justice; politics→civil society), and the virtues of
these practices are shaped by hands-on engagement of the practitioners concerned.
Doctors, lawyers, and politicians can and do achieve standards of excellence
sufficient to be labeled as experts in their respective fields. Aristotle‘s engaged
version of practical wisdom is very different from the most popular contemporary
versions of practical ethics that argue for a disengaged process of decision
making. The motivation for the contemporary focus on practical ethics was
driven, in part, by a level of anxiety over modern medical techniques and the
corresponding desire to be able to deal with these issues independently, free from
traditional moral divides, and with a level of professional expertise. Singer and
Wells make this claim when they argue that, when faced with complex ethical
issues, we should be ―a little more ready to gather together those [ethicists] best
qualified to consider the issues in an open and informed manner‖ because their
understanding and qualifications provide ―an understanding of the nature of ethics
and the meanings of the moral concepts‖ and ―a reasonable knowledge of the
major ethical theories.‖123 The overriding difficulty with this approach is that
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those people who are ―best qualified‖ in philosophy are no more likely to reach
agreement over complex moral issues than less qualified people from other
disciplines.

Clearly, as stated before, philosophers can and do reach thin agreement on moral
issues, but this type of agreement is also shared by many others who are not moral
experts. Even if it were true that philosophers derive common conclusions from
shared premises, this would still not help solve a significant practical problem
associated with ethical decision making in a modern liberal democracy. A modern
liberal democracy provides space for people from numerous cultural and religious
persuasions. The inherent pluralism of a modern democracy allows people to hold
to a variety of competing positions, and the search for an approach that ignores
this diversity is misguided. The next chapter will explore the historical and
theoretical background behind the types of justificatory arguments currently being
posited in contemporary practical ethics. The aim of this analysis will be to show
that the attempt to simplify the decision making process was misguided from the
start because the type of divisions one finds in connection with complex moral
issues is precisely what one ought to expect in a modern pluralist society.
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CHAPTER 3: DECISION MAKING AND PRACTICAL ETHICS

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted the criticism of Cartesian foundationalism in
general and the impact that this type of either/or thinking has on moral enquiry.
Most of the philosophers in the previous chapter adopt a Peircian-type response to
knowledge by arguing that the pursuit of knowledge is conducted from within a
―community of inquirers,‖1 although each understands this concept in his own
way.

The philosophers discussed in the previous chapter also share an initial agreement
that the pursuit of moral knowledge is in some sense tradition-dependent, but they
differ markedly over the consequences that they think flow from this. Williams
thinks that the variety of moral traditions in the Western philosophical canon is
precisely what one ought to expect from a complex discipline like ethics, and he is
not anxious about the diversity of moral claims that results from this mix.
MacIntyre, on the other hand, is deeply concerned because he thinks that this
variety, when it is not linked to a thick teleological imperative, leaves moral
philosophy in a state of crisis.2
1
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MacIntyre‘s claim that the Enlightenment period produced various forms of
emotivism seems too harsh, for reasons that will be explored later in this chapter,
but he is right that the Modern project did not produce a standard model for moral
philosophy. The lack of a standard model is implied in the ―disquieting
suggestion‖ to which MacIntyre refers in the opening chapter of After Virtue.3 He
asks the reader to imagine a world in which the tradition of scientific enquiry has
been lost and the scientific debates that do remain are fragmentary and have little
connection to a longer and deeper narrative of scientific enquiry.

Using this thought experiment, MacIntyre argues that a similar crisis exists in
contemporary moral enquiry. Moral debates cannot be resolved because the
proper context for moral enquiry has been lost and replaced by several discrete
theories of ethics, each of which is internally coherent. So a moral agent is
expected to weigh up the claims from various rival theories of ethics but is not
provided with the scales that enable this adjudication to take place. This moral
standoff is what MacIntyre refers to when he says that rival moral arguments can
be ―logically valid or can be easily expanded so as to be made so,‖ but there is no
way to adjudicate between them because ―we possess no rational way of weighing
the claims of one as against another.‖4

An example of this epistemological divide can be seen in the work of two
Australian philosophers. In Practical Ethics (1979), The Expanding Circle (1981),
and Rethinking Life and Death (1994), Singer posits that rational decision making
3
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in ethics is possible by rejecting the ―old ethic‖5 of ―traditional moralists‖6 and
replacing it with the ―new way‖ based on a version of preference utilitarianism
and the principle of equal consideration of interests. David Oderberg, in contrast,
argues in Applied Ethics that Singer is wrong because ―traditional morality is not
dead,‖7 and because the ―old way‖ of doing ethics still provides a coherent moral
system. Singer and Oderberg provide non-specialists with a good introduction to
the way a consequentialist and a non-consequentialist apply theory to practice in
ethics, but they are at odds on almost every practical issue they discuss. For
instance, Singer argues that abortion is morally right (in most circumstances) and
Oderberg argues that abortion is morally wrong (in most circumstances).8

In a pluralist society such as Australia this disagreement illustrates why complex
moral issues are so intractable and why MacIntyre claims that contemporary
moral debate is unsettlable at one level and interminable at another.9 This thesis
focuses on what pragmatists10 refer to as the cash value or practical consequences
for human conduct of moral claims. In a pluralist society, the most immediate
practical consequence of moral enquiry is that agreement is not possible for many
5
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issues in practical ethics because moral enquirers do not appeal to a standard
theoretical model.

Texts in practical ethics, such as those mentioned above, routinely begin with an
historical survey, often by introducing the main consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories. The authors then explain to readers why a particular
version of consequentialism or non-consequentialism is to be preferred and then
show how this preferred theory can be applied to particular cases. The aim of most
practical ethics texts is not simply to describe what ethics is but to provide readers
with rational objectivity in their decision making. In the previous chapter this
desire for objectivity was described by Toulmin as the ―hidden agenda of
Modernity,‖11 by Williams as a desire to simplify what cannot be made simple,12
and by Bernstein as an either/or attempt to overcome Cartesian anxiety over
relativism.13

At roughly the same time that theoretical objectivism in ethics was being
challenged, a new and different type of social anxiety arose which put extra
pressure on moral philosophers and theologians.14 As the twentieth century began
to unfold, a series of technical achievements in science caused a technical anxiety
that had hitherto been unknown. Two major developments serve as book-ends to
this twentieth-century period of technical anxiety, Einstein‘s theories of special
and general relativity (1905, 1916) and the completion of the human genome map
11

Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity.
Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, 23-24.
13
Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 16-20.
14
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(2000). One of the practical applications of E = mc2 was the development and use
of atomic weapons. For several decades after, the threat of a nuclear exchange
between feuding nations produced a social anxiety that psychiatrists labeled
―nuclear anxiety.‖15

At the other end of the century, advances in the genomic sciences produced a
technical anxiety over the hereditary risks associated with transgenic species, the
moral issues associated with cloning, and the ―big brother‖ risks associated with
genetic information. At the start of the Human Genome Project (1990),
researchers from the National Human Genome Research Institute acknowledged
public anxiety over genetic research and devoted US$18 million dollars annually
to what they refer to as the ―Ethical, Legal and Social Issues‖ (ELSI) associated
with mapping the human genome.16

The anxiety over modern technical developments drove some people working in
moral philosophy to endorse a more practical approach to ethics. While all of the
major ethical theories endorse decision making protocols, these protocols are
second order considerations for some. The first order of moral enquiry for a
Modern philosopher like Kant was to answer the epistemological question, What
foundations are required to ground ethical standards?17 Bentham, on the other
15

Stewart Meacham, ―The Social Aspects of Nuclear Anxiety,‖ American Journal of Psychiatry
120 (1964): 837-841.
16
Funding to the National Human Genome Research Institute for the ELSI program exceeds all
other funding that had previously been devoted to ethical, legal, and social issues in health care.
17
See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by H. J. Paton
(London: Random House, 1948) 77.
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hand, concentrated on a second order question, namely, How ought moral agents
to make decisions on the application of ethical standards to particular situations?

Over the last fifty years or so, it is Bentham‘s second order focus that has come to
dominate practical ethics.18 This dominance seems to have been for two reasons
already highlighted. First, the conceptual incommensurability of rival moral
theories is problematic if one thinks that the purpose of ethics is to resolve moral
issues and, second, anxiety over modern technical developments motivated
philosophers and theologians to concentrate on practical ethics.

This chapter will examine the link between technical anxiety and the emergence
of practical ethics in the twentieth century. The first section will outline how and
why technical anxiety influenced the current dominance of practical ethics. The
second section will explain why the lack of a standard model in moral philosophy
is not as stark as portrayed by MacIntyre. The third section will build on the
previous one by showing how thin agreement is possible even when people do
have conceptually thick incommensurable views over how ethics ought to be
applied. The fourth section will illustrate how decision making protocols slide too
easily between agreement on thin universals and disagreement over how thin
universals ought to be applied in complex cases.

18

Anne Maclean argues that bioethics is dominated by utilitarian sophistry in The Elimination of
Morality: Reflections on Utilitarianism and Bioethics (New York: Routledge Press, 1993), 1-16.
Maclean‘s description of utilitarianism as sophistry is clearly debatable but her analysis that
utilitarian thinking dominates bioethics seems valid. Utilitarian concepts such as cost-benefit
analysis, quality adjusted life year (QALY), best-interest of the child, and harm minimisation
dominate health care policy in many liberal democracies.
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3.2 The Twentieth Century: An Era of Technical Anxiety

Technical developments in the twentieth century produced rapid changes in the
physical and biological sciences, and these developments challenged traditional
models of moral enquiry. When German physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz
Strassmann discovered in 1938 that they could split a uranium atom by
bombarding it with neutrons, their discovery unleashed a series of events that led
seemingly ineluctably to the development and subsequent use of atomic weapons.
The destructive power of atomic weaponry, and the corresponding fear of
annihilation, caused many post-war people to exhibit a type of psychological
stress that psychiatrists named ―nuclear anxiety.‖19

Subsequently, technical developments such as kidney transplantation (1954), the
oral contraceptive (1960), heart transplantation (1967), the ability to fertilise a
human ovum in vitro (1978), and a cloned sheep named Dolly (1996) added to the
anxiety. Critics of the unbridled acceptance of technical progress coined the term
―technological imperative‖ to describe the uncritical application of new
techniques.20 In the 1990s various DNA-based research projects were instigated,
thereby, leading to a genomic revolution that soon turned into one of the bigscience projects of human achievement. By 2000 the first draft of the human
genome map had been completed, and now gene-splicing techniques allow
19

See James Thompson, ―Threat of Nuclear Warfare,‖ in George Fink ed., Encyclopedia of Stress,
Volume 3 (San Diego: Academic Press, 2000), 66-70.
20
French sociologist Jacques Ellul argued that the human race has become so enamoured by
technique that ―no human activity escapes this technical imperative,‖ in The Technological Society
(New York: Vintage Press, 1967), 6. Similarly, Ivan Illich argued that modern medicine has
become seduced by technique and misappropriated the original medical telos of health, in Medical
Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (London: Marion Boyars, 1975), 15-31.
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implantation of genetic material from one animal to another or even from an
animal to a plant.

In a White Paper produced for the United Kingdom House of Commons (2003)
health secretary John Reid argued that experts on the Human Genetics
Commission would ease the ―understandable public anxiety about the coming
revolution in health care‖ by ―ensuring public access to the information on human
genetics and the social and ethical issues involved.‖21 The alleged benefits or
harms resulting from the genomic revolution prompted a spectrum of claims
ranging from the eradication of gene-linked disease to a catastrophic genetic
accident. A sleeper issue in the controversy over biotechnology is the transfer of
genetic material from one species to another. Most of the controversy focuses on
genetic research on humans, but this type of research is, for the most part, tightly
regulated. The same caution is not the case for research on animals, and the
potential risks to humans from creating transgenic animals is arguably greater
because it bypasses the process of evolutionary fitness that prevents the
transmission of viruses and other pathogens from one species to another.22

In 1980 the European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN) developed an
―information matrix‖ that subsequently became the World Wide Web. This rapid
information-sharing environment produced another form of modern stress now
21

John Reid, White Paper: Our Inheritance, Our Future: Realising the Potential of Genetics in the
NHS (Department of Health, June 2003), 1.
22
See ―Possible Dangers: Unwittingly Selecting for Pathogens,‖ in Bernard E. Rollin, The
Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 114-117.
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known as the ―big brother complex‖ or ―information anxiety.‖23 Sometime in late2009 or early-2010 CERN will add to this stress when they fire up the Large
Hadron Collider (LHC), the most powerful particle accelerator ever built.24
Leading up to the first but unsuccessful attempt at starting the LHC in 2008,
anxiety over a runaway black hole led to a failed application in Hawaii‘s High
Court for a temporary restraining order on the LHC start date. Newspapers gave
up columns of space to people who argued that the scientists at CERN were going
to blow up the solar system. These concerned citizens seemed unaware that the
CERN accelerator was not the first particle accelerator, merely the most powerful,
and that experiments involving colliding particles had been going on for decades.

3.3 The Genesis of Practical Ethics

In the midst of this era of technical anxiety an academic offshoot from traditional
moral philosophy emerged. This academic discipline of practical ethics developed
over the past sixty years in order to simplify the process of moral deliberation.25
The justification for this simplified model of ethics was that a shared ―common
morality‖ theory was thought to be necessary in order to overcome the divisions
between consequentialists and non-consequentialists and between theists and nontheists.26
23

See Richard Saul Wurman, Information Anxiety (New York: Doubleday, 1989).
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This agenda has proved problematic for two reasons. First, it side-stepped
contemporary debates in epistemology over concepts such as reason and
objectivity and, second, the decision making protocols advocated in practical
ethics texts turned out to be just as disputatious when applied to practical issues as
the traditional theories they were trying to replace. The fixed divide between rival
moral theories is not solved by the application of decision making protocols. If
anything, it may even make the separation between rival points of view more
fixed than it needs to be. Decision making protocols quickly gained a legitimacy
that belied the infancy of practical ethics as a separate discipline.27

In the historical life setting into which philosophers like Kant and Bentham were
born, the ―flight from authority‖28 seemed warranted in order to find a
philosophical foundation for the moral life that did not rely on the authority of
religious or civil leaders. Problems associated with the appeal to traditional
authorities (Church and State) were obvious, and the Cartesian anxiety over
foundations was not unreasonable. Modern moral thinkers of this period wanted to
establish a rational foundation for ethics for the same epistemological reasons that
scientists of the period sought to establish a rational foundation for scientific
disciplines. The attempt to link the objectivity of scientific enquiry with the
objectivity of moral enquiry seems to be mistake, however. It is certainly a
mistake for teleological thinkers like Aristotle, virtue ethicists like MacIntyre, and
casuists like Toulmin because a sense of purpose or place, experience, awareness
27

Benefits and problems associated with two major common morality theories will be examined in
detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
28
See Jeffrey R. Stout, The Flight from Authority: Religion, Morality, and the Quest for Autonomy
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
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and development of habits of action, together with a partial consideration of time,
place, and circumstance are all necessary for practical wisdom.

The type of rational objectivity appealed to in science is referred to as
methodological reductionism29 because knowledge about a complex thing is
enhanced by understanding the interaction of its constituent parts. When it comes
to moral enquiry, however, there are good reasons to think that Aristotle was right
because a complex discipline like ethics is not reducible in the same sense.
Aristotle argues that scientific knowledge is derived from universals or first
principles that are demonstrable without variation (that which is true cannot be
made false). Practical wisdom (ethics and politics) cannot be scientific
knowledge, however, because ―that which can be done is capable of being
otherwise‖ and so for prudential reasons political and ethical decision making
involves an appreciation of life‘s variables.30

Aristotle suggests that the study of ethics is first and foremost a practical
discipline, but for him the object of this type of enquiry is not knowledge for its
own sake but rather for the practical benefits that flow from this type of enquiry
for the life of the polis.31 In the opening chapter to his Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle explains why politics is the ―master art,‖ primarily because ―politics uses
the rest of the sciences.‖32 In Book VI Aristotle expands on the intricate
relationship between politics and ethics by first showing the difference between
29

Reductionism in this context is empirically based and does not imply metaphysical or
philosophical reductionism.
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scientific knowledge and practical wisdom. For Aristotle scientific knowledge
involves ―judgment about things that are universal and necessary,‖ as derived
from ―first principles.‖33 Practical wisdom, on the other hand, is ―concerned with
things human and things about which it is possible to deliberate.‖34 Aristotle is
drawing from a tradition in which ethics (in the classical sense) is implemented
within the life of the polis and therefore ethics requires politics for its
implementation. This ancient link between ethics and politics was less significant
for Modern thinkers. Prudent thinkers will exhibit different types of excellences
because they have different ends in mind. In this respect Aristotle departs from his
mentors (Socrates and Plato) when he says that ―there is no such thing as
excellence in practical wisdom‖ because ―excellence‖ is a term that involves
comparison of particular activities that are variable with respect to time, place,
and circumstance, or as the occasion demands (pros ton kairon).35

3.4 The Standard Model and the Appeal to Authority

The conceptual incommensurability of rival moral theories negates the possibility
that moral enquiry will exhibit anything like the standard model approach used in
the sciences because the standard model is derived from a thick consensus that is
missing among moral philosophers. As stated previously, the standard model
concept is used in science to delineate the foundational premises and boundary
assumptions on which evidence derived by means of the scientific method is
33
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evaluated. In a pluralist society the standard model concept has vast explanatory
power and can therefore be used to evaluate other rival theories. In biology, for
instance, rival theories of the origin of life are evaluated against the standard
model of evolution by natural selection. The standard model in biology stands
above other rival theories of creation, intelligent design, or numerous indigenous
narratives because it has vastly greater explanatory power. As a result, policies
and protocols in a pluralist society can be developed in education and research by
evaluating them against the standard model of evolution by natural selection. In
other words, the justification for framing education policy, curricular
development, and research funding for the study of biology or anthropology on
the theory of evolution by natural selection, rather than any of the numerous
creation narratives, is that the standard model of biology has vast explanatory
power whereas other theories for the origin of life do not.

Similarly, theories for the origin of the universe can be compared against the
standard model of cosmology accepted by astronomers, cosmologists, and
physicists because this standard model has explanatory power and the others do
not.36 Preference for the standard model approach when framing policy decisions
in a pluralist society does not imply that other forms of cosmology have no value.
Australian indigenous cosmology (the ―Dreaming‖) has ontological value because
it provides an anthropomorphic context for the animistic narrative of indigenous
society. Also, when Kimberly aboriginals look into a dark night sky they see the
36

In cosmology there are rival theories to the standard ―big bang‖ model. A modified ―steady state
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Great Emu that nestles down toward the egg (Earth). Apart from the ontological
value that indigenous cosmology has, the names attached to different parts of the
night sky has practical benefits because it enables indigenous people to navigate.
So for sociological reasons, indigenous cosmology ought to be taught in schools
because it helps modern humans appreciate the narrative context within which
ancient societies understood the world around them.

The narrative of the Great Emu, however, or any narrative based on a
constellation of stars, has very little explanatory power for scientific disciplines
like astronomy and physics. The view from Earth of a pattern of stars that looks
something like a Great Bear (Ursa Major) is relative to an Earth-based observer.
If it were possible to swing the observer around ninety degrees, the observer
would see the same patch of sky from a different perspective and the Great Bear
would be gone. Stars that appear to an Earth-based observer to be fixed and on the
same plane are, from an astronomer‘s point of view, not fixed at all, and certainly
not on the same plane. The depth separation of stars that make up the Great Bear
is measured in thousands and sometimes millions of light years, and several of the
visible ―stars‖ are in fact galaxies.37

The type of appeal to authority in standard models differs from that which
concerned philosophers of the Modern period. In formal logic the appeal to
authority (argumentum ad verecundiam) is a fallacy because the appeal is made to
the authority rather than by the authority, in other words, an appeal without
37
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justification or argument. This is not the same as the appeal to the authority of
standard models in science because the vast explanatory power of the standard
model approach provides the necessary justification in a pluralist society.

From a pragmatist perspective, the appeal to authority in this context has cash
value or practical consequences for human conduct apart from the policies and
protocols for education. The genomic revolution that is unfolding in medicine, for
instance, is intricately related to knowledge derived from the standard model of
biology. One of the major benefits will be better targeted pharmaceuticals and
other forms of therapy.38 Similarly, the practical applications that flowed from
knowledge of the standard model of particle physics are in almost every modern
piece of machinery, including numerous household items. In the health sector,
MRI and PET scanners are now routine diagnostic tools, and Neutron Beam
therapy provides oncologists with an option for treating cancerous tumors other
than traditional chemical therapies.39

Rational discussants40 within a discipline use the standard model to make
decisions on things such as education curriculum, funding for research, drugs to
be listed on a hospital formulary, and what is and is not published in peerreviewed journals. In a liberal pluralist democracy, a consensus among rational
discussants within particular practices (science, law, politics, education, etc.) is
38
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pragmatically useful because it trades on agreement within a practice that defines
an internal good. This rational appeal to authority has limits, however, because
sometimes good practice in one discipline is bad practice in another.

A liberal democracy such as Australia allows people to hold a range of diverse
views and copes with this diversity when conflicts arise by applying the ―rule of
law.‖ The rule of law is a concept that describes the basic tenets of dispute
resolution in the Australian legal system. While the concept of the rule of law has
been,41 and still is,42 the subject of extended legal and philosophical debate, it
remains the primary vehicle for dispute resolution in Australia, via the legislature,
the judiciary, and a network of other dispute resolution institutions.

The rule of law operates to define general rules and policies, sometimes by
legislation, sometimes by case law, and other times by international covenant. An
example of this defining process can be seen in the way democratic countries deal
with the concept of free speech. Unlike the Constitution of the United States of
America,43 where the First Amendment directly prohibits the Congress from
passing laws that prohibit free speech, the Australian constitution has no such
prohibition. However, over the last several decades the Parliaments of Australia
and the High Court have established an implied Constitutional protection to
41
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freedom of speech.44 During the same period, both countries passed laws,45 and
become signatories to international covenants,46 that directly prohibit free speech
in specific circumstances. This defining process of the rule of law illustrates the
type of mediation and compromise that are routine in a modern liberal democracy
with international links.47

For much of the history of medicine the doctor-patient relationship was dominated
by the physician-knows-best maxim. This maxim is appropriate in most cases
because patients present themselves to doctors for diagnosis. In some cases,
however, the physician-knows-best standard has been shown to be incompatible
with best practice standards of other disciplines, notably law and politics. A well
known example of this clash of best practice occurred when Jehovah‘s Witness
people successfully challenged doctors who ignored repeated requests not to be
given emergency blood transfusions. Clearly, administering a life-saving blood
transfusion to a patient is good practice within medicine, but Australian courts
have established that in some circumstances this physician-knows-best standard
can be grounds for common assault.48 A series of legal decisions across the
Western world, based primarily on applications by Jehovah‘s Witnesses, has
44

See Section 109 of the Commonwealth of Australian Constitution Act, July 1900.
Laws of defamation and non-discrimination specifically prohibit particular types of speech in
the public domain.
46
See the United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), March
1976.
47
Other examples of mediation and compromise are restrictions on local trade due to international
trade agreements, and the economic restriction that the European Union applies to non-member
countries that have a capital punishment statute.
48
Pei-Teing Kee, ―Refusal to Consent to Treatment on Religious Grounds,‖ E-Law: Murdoch
University Electronic Journal of Law 2/2 (1995): accessed 17 December, 2008.
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n2/kee221.html.
45

93

established in both statute and common law that patients can refuse blood
transfusions, even if their decision results in death.49

Tangentially, the Jehovah‘s Witness decisions had wider implications, and many
jurisdictions now use Living Will or Advance Directive protocols that allow
competent adults to refuse medical intervention for a variety of reasons. 50 Even in
jurisdictions where this legal protection has yet to be established, the impact of the
Jehovah‘s Witness type decisions has changed medical practice. The beneficent
paternalism of physician-knows-best has been replaced by a more consultative
process known as the ―reasonable person‖ or ―patient-centred‖ standard of
consent.51

A second example of how practice-guided enquiry intersects with the rule of law
in a liberal democracy can be seen in the response to the complex issue of
abortion. The debate over abortion still weighs heavily on the minds of many
people, but in most Western democracies the application of the rule of law has
provided a partial resolution to the debate. The partial resolution process in the
USA and Australia is illustrative of what has happened in most Western
democracies.52 In 1973, the USA Supreme Court (Roe v. Wade) was asked to
49
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decide whether State-based laws that prohibited abortion were a violation of the
implied constitutional right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The justices of the Supreme Court decided by a 7-2
majority that abortion was a fundamental right under the United States
Constitution and that all past and future laws must adhere to this strict scrutiny.53

The political and legal resolution of the abortion debate in Australia is more
complex because abortion laws are the responsibility of the States and Territories,
and the Australian Constitution offers few grounds on which this can be
challenged. Abortion in Australia was originally prohibited by all States and
Territories, but over the last twenty years all have enacted legislation that allow
women safe access to the termination of a pregnancy, although there is variation
among the States over both the timing and the conditions that determine a lawful
termination. In Western Australia, for instance, the Act Amendment (Abortion) Act
1998 repealed the prohibition against abortion from the criminal code and
replaced it with a new section that allows termination of a pregnancy to be
governed by a new section 334 of the Health Act 1911. This had the effect of
allowing abortion on demand up to twenty weeks of gestation and restricting
abortion after twenty weeks to those cases in which either the pregnant woman or
the fetus has a medical condition that justifies termination to the satisfaction of
two doctors appointed by the Minister for Health.

53
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The type of resolution illustrated in the examples above is not one in which people
agree by reaching some middle ground because this is clearly not what has
happened. Opponents on either side of the debate have not given ground on the
moral issues associated with terminating a pregnancy. A pragmatic political and
legal resolution does not arbitrate on the moral issues but it does provide a
substantial end-point to the political and legal stand-off. This end-point is possible
because the rule of law trades on thin agreement between the disputants that due
process has been followed. In both Australia and the USA most people who
disagree with the resolution respect the process from which it has been derived.54
In some jurisdictions people opposed to the decriminalisation of abortion have
launched further legal appeals or appealed to statutory authorities to rescind or
override decisions made by the judiciary.55 This ongoing defining process is
consistent with political and legal liberty intrinsic to a modern pluralist society.

Although the end-point provided by the rule of law is substantial, it is by no
means final and moral theologians and philosophers who have argued against the
decriminalisation of abortion are unlikely to change their minds on this issue. In
the year that the Roe v. Wade decision was made, Australian philosopher John
Finnis wrote a vigorous defence for the moral and legal prohibition of abortion,56
54
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and he continues to publish material on related themes.57 Philosophers like Finnis
and Oderberg, mentioned previously, oppose abortion from a thickly nuanced
understanding of human purpose and they express this opposition by means of
standard academic procedure – books, articles, conference papers, etc. Finnis and
Oderberg‘s opposition to abortion is consistent with the type of academic freedom
that one expects within a liberal pluralist society.

In Western Australia the Act Amendment (Abortion) Act 1998 is a health policy
(harm-minimisation) compromise because the Parliament removed abortion from
the criminal code and provided restricted access to abortion under the Health Act.
This compromise position did nothing to solve the philosophical issues associated
with abortion because the Act was designed primarily to clear up a legal loophole
that placed doctors at risk of prosecution even though abortion services had been
available in Western Australia for many years. Political and legal compromises
like the above never suit all parties but they are common practice in any modern
pluralist democracy. Because this issue is controversial the ideological debate will
continue for many years and it is always possible, in a liberal democracy, that a
community consensus could develop that might overturn political and legal
protocols that allow for safe termination.

The rule of law trades on a concept introduced earlier in Chapter 1, Walzer‘s ―thin
consensus‖ or ―thin moral motivation.‖ A liberal democracy allows people to hold
57
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divergent views, even over what for some are life and death issues (abortion, war,
or poverty). This thin moral consensus is often overlooked because practical
ethics so often focuses on the issues that divide people. Walzer argues that thin
moral minimalism provides a powerful bridge, both for people with divergent
views within a culture and for people separated by culture and language. The next
section will explore this thinness, particularly as it applies to agreement within the
confines of particular practices such as law, medicine and education.

3.5 Thick and Thin Moral Evaluation

The lack of agreement in moral philosophy is problematic if, as MacIntyre seems
to think, it results in a series of rival moral traditions on which no consensus is
possible. However, this view ignores the consensus over thin universals that many
theories of ethics share (religious and secular). A thin universal maxim such as, ―It
is wrong to cause deliberate suffering,‖ has explanatory power because
consequentialists and non-consequentialists interpret the maxim in roughly similar
ways. A moral agent who makes decisions based on some form of utilitarian
calculus and a moral agent who makes decisions based on a categorical imperative
will concur that the rational thing to do is to avoid causing deliberate suffering
whenever possible.

This thesis defends a practice-guided approach to moral enquiry primarily because
MacIntyre‘s thick concept of a practice can be usefully employed in a pluralist
society without the need for the practice to be necessarily linked to a thick
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teleological account of the type that he offers (Aristotelian Thomism). The
primary justification for this distinction is that a thick agreement in a practice,
such as medicine, has sufficient explanatory power, or practical consequences for
human conduct, because the practitioners (doctors, surgeons, nurses, etc.) share a
thin sense of the teleological imperative (health) from which this practice derives
its internal goods. In other words, the practical internal goods of a discipline like
medicine are sufficiently clear and have sufficient explanatory power when the
practitioners share a thin Aristotelian sense of human flourishing. The thick
Thomistic account of flourishing that MacIntyre advocates is appropriately
tentative in After Virtue because Aristotelian Thomism is part of his thick (storyfilled) explanation of a narrative that best supports the rational nature of human
beings.58

Walzer suggests that moral thinkers often agree on thin moral universals even
when they interpret these universals through a thick historical narrative. He refers
to this type of moral agreement as ―thin moral agreement‖ or ―moral
minimalism.‖59 Moral minimalism is not foundational because a minimalist
expression, such as ―slavery is wrong,‖ is grounded in an already thick narrative
understanding of human life which varies from one tradition to another.60 A
rational justification that explains why slavery is wrong is already a thick moral
claim, either because slavery is inconsistent with broader religious concerns, or
because it is inconsistent with the universalisable expression that all humans have
58
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rights, or because it is inconsistent with various forms of preference satisfaction,
or some other moral claim.

Walzer argues that a thin agreement against slavery is predicated on a thick view
of the moral life, a type of ―moral maximalism.‖61 He argues that a moral term,
such as justice, is understood first as a thick description from within a particular
tradition before it becomes a thin concept that is shared by people from different
traditions. For Walzer, the concept of justice is thick from the beginning because it
is ―culturally integrated, fully resonant, and it reveals itself thinly only on special
occasions, when moral language is turned to specific purposes.‖62 This thick view
of justice is referred to by Walzer as a form of moral maximalism because it is
already thick with a narrative history of ―qualification, compromise, complexity
and disagreement.‖63 For Walzer, this thick view is not a better view of justice,
simply the first view with which a moral agent is confronted. The thin view of
justice is a second order concept, but it is more crucial for Walzer because it is as
close as one can get to a moral universal.

For Walzer, a thin or minimalist view of morality acknowledges that a common
thread exists between different thick traditions. There are ―rules of engagement‖
for a thick principle like justice because ―minimalism leaves room for thickness
elsewhere; indeed, it presupposes thickness elsewhere.‖64 Thus, in a pragmatist
sense, a thin moral universal has greater cash value because it transcends the
61
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limitations of thick traditions so that people can agree on the practical application
of a principle even if they disagree over its justification. The example he uses to
show the difference between thick and thin moral argument is the 1989 Velvet
Revolution in Prague where news coverage showed people carrying signs which
simply said ―truth‖ or ―justice.‖

Walzer claims that a serious thinker who watched this revolution unfold via news
coverage, as he did, would share a thin perception of what the marchers were
appealing to with their signs.65 For Walzer, the Prague marchers were entirely
unfamiliar to him and he could neither speak their language nor know what they
had experienced. Yet he could conceivably stand in solidarity with them, and had
he been there, he too would carry the same signs. The reason this is the case,
according to Walzer, is that the march had nothing to do with epistemology. The
marchers were not defending a correspondence or coherence theory of truth, and
they were not marching in defence of one ethical theory rather than another.66
Walzer claims that they were marching for mainly pragmatic reasons; they did not
want to be lied to and they wanted their political leaders to end arbitrary arrests
and to abolish the privileges of the few.67

This thin, common or ―garden variety‖ sense of justice was immediately
recognisable to Walzer because his own tradition (Jewish-American) is thick with
a concept of justice that resonates with ideals similar to those expressed in
65
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Prague.68 From a pragmatic perspective, consensus is broadly possible on a
concept like justice because thin recognition is all that is necessary to unite people
from diverse moral traditions. The history of social activism contains numerous
examples of the type of thin application of moral thickness to which Walzer
refers. For instance, many moral agents would reject the theological argument that
Martin Luther King Jr. used to justify nonviolent direct action during the 1960s
civil rights movement. King‘s justification for civil protest in the ―I have a dream‖
speech was consistent with his theological stance and was gleaned primarily from
Thomas Jefferson‘s defence in the Declaration of Independence (1776).69

King follows Jefferson in declaring that it is a self-evident truth that ―all men are
created equal‖ and therefore all people, the ―negro‖ included, have unalienable
rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The epistemic problem here is
that nothing in this justificatory claim is as self-evident as King or Jefferson
presumed, neither God the creator, nor human equality, nor even the unalienable
rights that continue to provide justification for practical ethics and civil policy in
the USA. The Christian tradition that undergirds both the Declaration of
Independence and King‘s own theology is thick with a narrative account of what it
means to be human. Many who took part in the civil rights movement were not
Christians and they supported the appeal for justice during the Washington
campaign for different epistemic reasons.
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A contemporary Australian example of a thin moral consensus derived from
diversely thick traditions was the Australia-wide rally against the second Gulf
War, a month before conflict began in March 2003. At the Perth rally,
approximately twenty thousand people gathered in the city square to voice
disapproval at the decision of the Australian government to become involved in
the conflict. The people who attended the rally came from diverse philosophical,
religious, and political traditions, but they shared a thin solidarity that something
was wrong with the political justification for war being offered by the federal
government. This ―garden variety‖70 sense of wrongness, to use Walzer‘s term, is
all that is necessary for serious thinkers to stand together in a demonstration for a
common purpose. No participant in protests such as those outlined above is ever
asked to justify claims over thin moral universals because solidarity has already
been achieved and debate over epistemic issues would serve no useful purpose.

Examples like this show that a moral concept like justice has both a maximal
moral value that is thickly contingent on a set of shared assumptions and a
minimal moral value that is thin enough to be a shared universal principle. This
thin concept of universalisation provides the boundary conditions within which
ethical discussion takes place in a pluralist society because it promotes the idea
that there is something to be discussed about ethics that goes beyond both selfinterest and the interests of a particular moral tradition. The next section will
argue that the attempt to slide from thin universals to thick application is the
mistake most often made in practical ethics. Practical ethicists often begin by
70
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advocating a thin universal principle but they then slide too easily into a thick
application of the principle without acknowledgement that this application is
tradition-dependent.71 It is at this stage that consensus breaks down, at least in a
pluralist society, because there is no shared method for evaluating the application
of principles; ethics at this thick end of decision making is already dependent on
specific philosophical, religious, or cultural assumptions.

3.6 Practical Ethics: The Limitations

Practical ethicists often overstate what rational enquiry can achieve when they
apply thin moral universals to thick particulars. John Harris exemplifies this overconfidence when he declares that the interest of a rational agent in medical ethics
is to resolve problems and not simply to understand them.

Just as the proper business of medicine is not merely to
understand the nature and causes of illness but to try and
prevent or cure it, so the proper business of medical ethics
is not merely to understand the nature of the moral
problems raised by medical practice but to try and resolve
them.72

Harris defends his optimistic comparison between medical practice and medical
ethics by arguing that skepticism about his view is not justified:

all people who think that it is possible either to do wrong,
or for that matter to do what‘s right, depend upon and use
moral argument. This reveals a very important fact about
the nature of morality and hence about the nature of ethics.
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It is simply that if something is right or wrong, morally
right or wrong, there must be some reason why this is so.
And reasons can always be scrutinised for their
adequacy.73

While one can appreciate Harris‘s concern that the proper business of medicine
involves the prevention and cure of disease, his further claim that the proper
business of medical ethics is to resolve moral dilemmas is not straightforward.
There are strong reasons to be skeptical of the comparison between medical
practice and medical ethics. Medical practice is based on a thick agreement that
has been forged within the discipline. This is what is meant whenever the term
―practice‖ is used, such as in general practice, or orthopedic practice, or nursing
practice, because the concept of a practice in medicine involves a thick historical
consensus over what a doctor or nurse ought to do. A practitioner who habituates
the internal goods of the discipline, in an Aristotelian sense, replicates the
standards of excellence that have been forged within the discipline over
generations.

The level of agreement that one finds in medical practice is missing in medical
ethics, however, and Harris slides too easily from the thin consensus on health to
the application of moral principles. When Harris claims that ―reasons can always
be scrutinised for their adequacy‖ he assumes that there is some standard test to
show why one argument is more adequate than another. Clearly a poorly
constructed argument is inadequate, but this is not usually the cause of a moral
stand-off in complex moral debates. For complex moral debates, the main
73
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problem is not the adequacy of the various arguments but the inability to reach
agreement on why one valid argument trumps another. This is the point referred to
earlier when MacIntyre claims ―there are no moral scales‖ that can be used to
evaluate why one reasonable argument trumps another.74

It is the epistemic differences that lead to a moral impasse in the first place. Thus
the comparison between solving a medical problem and solving a moral problem
is forced. Health practitioners share a thin teleological awareness about the goal of
medical practice (health), but they also share a thickly articulated understanding
about how that goal ought to be achieved (internal goods). Aristotle makes this
point when he says that for ―a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist … the good and
the ‗well‘ is thought to reside in the function.‖75 So excellence in flute-playing can
be compared with excellence in medicine because both flute-playing and medicine
share a thin sense of purpose and a thickly articulated understanding of the
activities or habits of action (internal goods) that are directed toward that purpose.
A similar consensus between thin universals and thick practices is not possible in
practical ethics because when moral agents agree on a thin moral maxim, such as
―It is wrong to kill an innocent person,‖ they often disagree over whether that
moral maxim applies in particular cases (e.g., abortion, war, euthanasia). Moral
solutions cannot be drawn from a thin consensus on health because moral
philosophers come from diversely thick traditions. Thus a moral dilemma exists at
the thick end of medical practice because no agreement is possible given the
diverse traditions to which philosophers and theologians belong.
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Aaron Ridley also glosses over the epistemic differences between rival moral
arguments when he says that the motivation for practical ethics should be to avoid
bloodshed, resist relativism, and sidestep religion. He argues that this approach
avoids the ―deadlock and futility characteristic of religious disagreement‖ because
philosophical argument attempts to discover ethical principles that can be used by
anyone, and he wants to avoid the emotional and angry stand-off common to
ethical debate.76

The problem for Ridley is that while reasonableness in discussion and charity in
listening is commendable, this does not imply that rationality qua rationality can
do all that Ridley thinks it can. He initially claims that problems in ethics offer no
final solutions and that his approach only provides a strategy for clarification and
discussion.77 He further claims that any philosophy that pretends to clear up all
problems is guilty of oversimplification and misrepresentation, and on this he is
surely right.78 However, while he begins with a fairly standard appeal to thin
universal principles, his explanation for how these principles ought to be applied
is immediately thick with philosophical presuppositions that are themselves
disputed.
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Ridley‘s chapter on abortion, for example, is typical of the type of slide referred to
earlier that begins with a thin consensus over a universal principle but then applies
the principle without acknowledging that consensus in a pluralist society may not
extend this far. For instance, Ridley states that both defenders and opponents of
abortion have powerful arguments but that the consequentialist or utilitarian
character of the legislative framework supports decriminalisation.79 Ridley is right
that the consequentialist or utilitarian character of the legislative framework
supports decriminalisation because, as previously noted, there is a clear trend in
liberal democracies toward this outcome. However, Ridley is wrong to assume
that utilitarian justification avoids the ―deadlock and futility‖ that he claims is
characteristic of religious disagreement because the lack of consensus in moral
philosophy is well documented.

Ridley‘s attempt to justify the moral efficacy of utilitarian decision making also
seems forced. He argues that because actions such as lying and adultery are
―surely morally wrong‖ but not illegal, we can extend this idea to the abortion
debate because making abortion illegal would not make it go away. 80 Ridley
misrepresents utilitarian thinking here, however, because a utilitarian ethicist
would dispute the claim that adultery and lying are ―surely morally wrong.‖ For
utilitarian thinkers, no actions are intrinsically wrong because, as Singer states,
―the utilitarian will judge lying bad in some circumstances and good in others,
depending on its consequences.‖81 The strength of utilitarian calculus is that it
79
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purports to rely on demonstrable facts, but this is also its greatest weakness
because moral facts are elusive. In a pluralist society, rational agents will often
disagree on how one ought to determine utilitarian efficacy in complex cases.82

Ridley is right that harm minimisation policies are routinely used in Australia‘s
legislative and healthcare networks, but this does not diminish the problematic
account that he offers for how they work. Some harm minimisation policies are
straightforward and do not provoke much discussion either because the factual
basis of the policy is not in dispute or because the policy is not disruptive. In the
case of car seatbelts it is straightforward to show how harm is minimised by
seatbelt legislation. Countries in which seatbelt laws are enforced have lower
mortality and morbidity rates among car users. The ―harm‖ done by compelling
people to wear seatbelts is not significant, particularly as the legislation allows
exemptions on health grounds. A greater total benefit is gained by a statute that
requires people to wear a seatbelt when driving.

Other harm minimisation policies, however, are not so straightforward. For
instance, a motorcycle helmet policy does save lives but for several reasons it is
more difficult to show that it reduces the overall amount of human suffering. First,
wearing a motorcycle helmet is a more significant inconvenience than wearing a
seatbelt. Second, the helmet policy may actually increase rather than decrease the
total amount of human suffering because more people will survive motorcycle
82
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accidents but with permanent injuries. Because only living people can suffer, the
combined suffering of bikers who don‘t like wearing helmets and injured
survivors who would previously have been killed could, at least theoretically,
outweigh the suffering of those injured when helmets were not compulsory. Were
this shown to be the case, a harm minimisation policy should conceivably reverse
the helmet policy.

While most liberal democracies instituted helmet wearing legislation, supported
by medical research,83 the US Congress repealed State-based laws that required
motorcyclists to wear a helmet on the grounds that the laws impinged a biker‘s
constitutional rights.84 At least in the mind of legislators of the Congress, the
constitutional right to freedom of interference outweighs the State concern for
harm minimisation strategy. The problem in this case is that the concept of harm
minimisation is already a thickly laden term because the National Coalition of
Motorcyclists (NCOM) in the USA was able to convince the legislature that their
civil rights or ―biker‘s rights‖ were being violated. This example shows that the
type of harm minimisation strategies that Ridley advocates are not straightforward
because what might be considered legitimate harm minimisation for one group of
people is illegitimate for another.

This is the case when Ridley argues for harm minimisation in relation to abortion.
Whether his conclusion should be accepted or not depends on a set of
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presuppositions about the abortion issue that are not of themselves self-evident.
Ridley makes two claims to demonstrate why prohibition leads to a greater
amount of human suffering: first, a ban on abortion would not lead to a reduction
in the number of fetuses killed; and second, the ban would increase the sum total
of human misery.85 Neither of these two claims is as straightforward as Ridley
claims. The claim that a ban on abortion would not lead to a reduction in the
number of fetuses killed is misleading. While it is true that prohibition would lead
to more women dying while trying to procure the so-called ―backyard‖ option,
there does not seem to be any evidence to suggest that the number of fetuses killed
would remain the same under prohibition conditions.

The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) estimates that
abortion-related deaths have declined dramatically among the approximately
70,000 terminations that occur annually in Australia since prohibitions against
termination were removed in 1971.86 Ridley‘s claim that prohibition does not
reduce the number of fetuses killed seems counterintuitive and nothing in the
literature suggests anywhere near 70,000 terminations occurred in Australia at any
time during the prohibition years, primarily because abortion was unsafe and
therefore a decision of last resort. Women‘s Health Victoria estimates that
termination of a pregnancy is now the second most common surgical procedure
experienced by women in Australia.87
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Ridley‘s second claim, that a ban on abortion would increase the sum total of
human misery, depends on how one calculates human misery. While it is clear
that unsafe or backyard abortions causes harm to women, it is not possible to
calculate the total amount of human misery on utilitarian grounds. How much
harm consideration, if any, ought to be allocated to fetuses, or to people opposed
to abortion? Utilitarian calculus straightforwardly advocates that a large number
of minor harms can trump a smaller number of major harms, but there is no
agreed-upon formula for how a moral agent does this calculus in complex
situations.

Singer, a philosopher who advocates using utilitarian calculus for many issues in
ethics, argues that harm minimisation arguments for abortion are inadequate
because this type of justification fails to deal with the primary concern of
opponents to abortion, namely, that termination of a pregnancy involves killing an
innocent human being. He points out that because opponents of abortion claim
that a fetus counts as a moral agent, they can and do argue that the weight of harm
is against termination.88 Singer thinks that the moral justification for abortion has
little to do with harm minimisation because a fetus is not an innocent human
being.89 Once a fetus develops the capacity to feel pain, however, harm
minimisation might actually restrict the technical aspects of a termination if the
process causes pain to the fetus.90 In short, the type of consequentialism that
Ridley advocates does not avoid ―deadlock and futility‖ because it relies on a
88
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consensus over facts that are not self-evident. On the basis of harm minimisation
alone, proponents and opponents of termination weigh the facts of harm in a way
that is consistent with a position they already hold.

3.7 Conclusion

Two issues predicated the emergence and rapid growth of practical ethics over the
last several decades. The first was the conceptual incommensurability of rival
moral theories highlighted in Chapter 2, and the second was the level of anxiety
over modern technical developments highlighted in this present chapter. Early on
the focus on decision making rather than ethical theory seemed attractive, and
early bioethics texts proved to be influential. However, the focus on decision
making in practical ethics was short-lived because the various protocols slide too
easily between thin principles or rules for which there is a consensus and the thick
application of those rules to particular situations where consensus is not possible.

In 1994, Edwin R. DuBose, Ronald Hamel and Laurence J. O‘Connell edited a
series of essays entitled A Matter of Principles? Ferment in U.S. Bioethics, in
which the contributors are described as a second generation of bioethicists.91 Their
assessment of the present state of bioethics exemplifies the shift away from
principles and rules toward a more creative and complex approach to bioethics.
They argue that the discipline of bioethics needed major rethinking because the
principlism that had come to dominate the clinical scene had failed to produce a
91
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method of decision making that was any more capable of solving moral dilemmas
than the theory-centred approaches it sought to supplant. Albert Jonsen, who
wrote the foreword, called for a second-generation alternative approach to
bioethics that recovers traditional forms of analysis such as ―phenomenology,
hermeneutics, narrative ethics, casuistry, and virtue ethics.‖ 92

In Australia, the two most influential decision making models used in practical
ethics are the four-principle approach advocated by Beauchamp and Childress and
the preference-utilitarian approach advocated by Singer. Both models begin by
arguing for thin foundational or universal principles and then construct a rational
decision making protocol by applying the principles to particular cases. It is this
transition between thin universals and thick particulars that has proved
problematic. The next two chapters will reconstruct and evaluate these two
decision making protocols in order to show that appeal to common morality
principles is justified on a more limited basis than its adherents advocate. The
evaluation will show that application of principles in decision making does not
provide an impartial prescriptive solution to moral dilemmas. Rather, the
application of principles will be shown to be useful but not definitive for moral
enquiry.
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Chapter 4: Principle-Guided Enquiry

4.1 Introduction

Now in its sixth edition, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress‘ text, Principles of
Biomedical Ethics (PBE),1 is known colloquially as the bible of biomedical ethics,
but the principle-guided method has also been used extensively for several other
forms of practical ethics.2 The Beauchamp and Childress account of practical
ethics appeals to four prima facie principles: autonomy, nonmaleficence,
beneficence, and justice. They argue that the four-principles can be used by
people with little training in moral philosophy, using what they refer to as a
―common morality‖ approach to ethical decision making.3

Chapter 1 of this thesis stated that the Beauchamp and Childress model of
practical ethics is useful because the four-principles (autonomy, nonmaleficence,
beneficence, justice) are thin enough to provide moral agents with a common set
of terms. However, the principles on their own are not definitive for complex
cases in ethics because moral agents apply the principles according to their own
thick narrative account of the moral life. This chapter will introduce the
Beauchamp and Childress‘ four-principle model for biomedical ethics and assess
the main criticisms associated with this approach.
1
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4.2 Common Morality Theory and Reflective Equilibrium

The strength of Beauchamp and Childress‘ four-principle approach to practical
ethics is that it is constructed around a relatively simply model of decision
making, but this simplicity is also its greatest weakness. Over the six editions the
authors have engaged with their critics and provided with each new edition a more
rigorous defence for using principles in ethics. At the heart of their model is a
theory of common morality that has evolved over the six editions. This common
morality theory involves an acceptance of rules and standards together with an
understanding of how these rules and standards enable a moral agent to utilise the
four-principles of biomedical ethics. In the most recent edition of PBE
Beauchamp and Childress continue to defend a set of norms that they argue are
―shared by all persons committed to morality‖ and are ―applicable to all persons in
all places.‖4 Their list of norms is not fixed but it illustrates the type of ―standards
of action‖ that they think a common morality theory ought to employ.5

1) Do not kill
3) Prevent evil or harm
5) Tell the truth
7) Keep your promises
9) Do not punish the innocent

2) Do not cause pain or suffering to others
4) Rescue persons in danger
6) Nurture the young and dependent
8) Do not steal
10) Obey the law

It seems reasonable to presume, as Beauchamp and Childress have done, that the
above list represents the type of thin moral maxims that most theories of ethics
appeal to when describing the concept of universals or norms in moral enquiry.
4
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However, there are limitations to the concepts of universals in the PBE model of
decision making: first, they link the concept of common morality to a coherence
version of justification in a way that is itself problematic; and second, the
application of the four-principles is not derived directly from the universal
norms.6

The second feature of the common morality theory is a series of standards that are
employed alongside the rules of obligation.7

1) nonmalevolence
3) integrity
5) trustworthiness
7) gratitude
9) lovingness

2) honesty
4) conscientiousness
6) fidelity
8) truthfulness
10) kindness

Once again, there is not much that is problematic about the list itself. However,
the list of standards is usually associated with virtue ethics, a non-prescriptive
form of moral deliberation. In the Aristotelian sense, moral virtues are states of
character or habits of action that describe the mean behaviour between excess and
deficiency. In the PBE model, the virtues are action guides, so a moral agent is
virtuous by doing honest things rather than by being honest in the Aristotelian
sense. Beauchamp and Childress justify this alternate version of the virtues by
appropriating a common criticism of virtue ethics, namely, that virtue ethics
6
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―provides little, if any, guidance for actions,‖ and the concept of the virtues as
action guides overcomes this inadequacy.8
The third feature of Beauchamp and Childress‘ common morality theory involves
a cluster of four prima facie principles – autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence,
justice – and two subsidiary rules – confidentiality and veracity.9 The principles
are used in the Beauchamp and Childress model as placeholders for the actions
that a moral agent ought to take in order to satisfy the universal norms and
standards listed previously. This is done by juggling the four-principles according
to the specifics of a given case. The theory that Beauchamp and Childress now
refer to as common morality (editions 4-6) was originally referred to as a
composite theory (editions 1-3) because it appealed to several prima facie moral
principles that combine deontological, teleological, and, to a lesser extent, virtuebased criteria. Beauchamp and Childress originally stated that they defend a
composite theory, in opposition to the monistic absolutism of act utilitarianism,
Kantianism and Libertarianism, for the following reason:

The composite theory permits each basic principle to have
weight without assigning a priority weighting or ranking.
Which principle overrides in a case of conflict will depend
on the particular context, which always has unique
features.10
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The switch to using ―common morality‖ rather than ―composite theory‖ in the
fourth edition was to strengthen the link between the theoretical understanding of
ethics and the practical application of the four-principles:

A common morality theory takes its basic premises
directly from the morality shared in common by the
members of society—that is, unphilosophical common
sense and tradition.11

Beauchamp and Childress also argued in the fourth edition that principles provide
a universal or common morality starting point that can be extended to a consensus
in particular cases via a process they refer to as reflective equilibrium (first
advocated by John Rawls), a type of coherence theory of justification.12 Following
Rawls, the concept of reflective equilibrium is used by Beauchamp and Childress
as a method of justification for the pruning and adjustments that are made to
moral judgments so that ―they are rendered coherent with the premises of
theory.‖13 From the fifth edition Beauchamp and Childress make this link more
explicit:
Our method … is to unite principle-based, common
morality ethics with the coherence model of
justification… This strategy allows us to rely on the
authority of the indispensable principles in the common
morality theory, while incorporating tools to refine and
correct its weaknesses and unclarities and to allow for
additional specification.14
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The application of the four-principles (autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence,
justice) is based on a presupposition that they have prima facie validity. A prima
facie moral principle takes its place within a network of basic principles rather
than as a single moral absolute that can never be broached. Any one of the
principles can be overridden by another by juggling the principles according to the
circumstances of a given case. Beauchamp and Childress defend this juggling
process as follows:

Prima facie duty indicates that duties of certain kinds are
on all occasions binding unless they are in conflict with
equal or stronger duties. An agent‘s actual duty in the
situation is determined by an examination of the weight of
all the competing prima facie duties.15

Each principle has face-value validity but in an actual situation any one of them
may take precedence over the others. Beauchamp and Childress are incorporating
the concept of prima facie principles first advocated by W. D. Ross (1930). Ross
advocates using a set of prima facie principles for decision making in order to
avoid the problems associated with both the absoluteness of moral duty promoted
by Kant and the lack of action-guiding principles in Bentham‘s utilitarian
calculus.16 The main difference between Ross‘ use of prima facie principles and
that of Beauchamp and Childress is that Ross viewed the principles as a means to
a more important end, the promotion of general welfare.17 Ross was first and
foremost a translator and interpreter of Aristotle, and he uses the principles as
tools to promote a higher teleological purpose, the formation of a morally good
15
16
17

Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1989), 52.
William David Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), 1-20.
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person, whereas Beauchamp and Childress use the principles as problem solving
tools.18 Beauchamp and Childress‘ justification for using the four-principles in
practical ethics is relatively straightforward. In every edition of their text a chapter
is devoted to each of the four-principles, and each chapter involves an historical
account of why each principle is an important but not absolute principle of moral
evaluation.

Respect for the principle of autonomy in the PBE model seems self-evidently to
be an important moral consideration.19 Respect for individuals as autonomous
agents is integral to Kant‘s second formulation of the categorical imperative
referred to as the Kingdom of Ends: ―Act in such a way that you always treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply
as a means, but at the same time as an end.‖20 Similarly, from the consequentialist
perspective, Singer illustrates the importance of the principle of respect for
persons when he says, ―Utilitarians, from Jeremy Bentham to J. J. C. Smart, take
it as axiomatic that in deciding moral issues ‗each [person] counts for one and
none for more than one‘.‖21 This is even more crucial in Singer‘s version of
utilitarian calculus because he advocates counting individual preferences or
interests, not simply units of pleasure.22 Clearly the appeal to autonomy,
particularly in health care, is not a moral absolute, and therefore the prima facie
status of autonomy in the PBE model is appropriate.23
18
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The PBE model of decision making also places the principle of nonmaleficence
(primum non nocere – ―above all do no harm‖) in the appropriate historical setting
of health care.24 This principle, which forms the basis of the Hippocratic tradition
in medicine, is the default position in medical practice. Obviously, the principle of
nonmaleficence is not meant to be taken as an absolute because in some cases
harm (surgery) is done for a greater health benefit (removal of a tumour). It seems
reasonable to assume, therefore, as Beauchamp and Childress do, that health
practitioners should always avoid doing harm to patients if possible. There are
some circumstances, however, such as physician-assisted euthanasia, or the
treatment of patients in a persistent vegetative state, where the principle of
nonmaleficence is in dispute.25

The principle of beneficence in the PBE model serves as a positive obligation to
do good rather than simply to avoid harm.26 Once again, there is little to object to
here if beneficence is understood as a thin moral principle. The concept of social
welfare pivots on the idea that public beneficence is an obligation of a State
toward poorer members of a community. State sanctioned beneficence, however,
has sometimes been used to justify unwarranted paternalism, and Beauchamp and
Childress acknowledge this as part of the prima facie status of the principle of
beneficence.27 Tragically, as the Australian ―stolen children‖28 saga shows, A. O.
24
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Neville, the so-called ―Chief Protector of Aborigines,‖ presumably elevated
beneficence over nonmaleficence because of the prevailing orthodoxy that
removing Aboriginal children from their parents was done ―for their own good.‖29
The fourth principle in the PBE decision making toolkit is justice. Here too
Beauchamp and Childress provide a reasonable introduction to show the nonspecialist how the principle of justice is an important but not absolute moral
obligation. The concept of justice resonates with rational moral agents because
most theories of ethics attempt to universalise moral maxims or rules. Justice is
closely linked to the principle of fairness or desert, and Beauchamp and Childress
provide the appropriate historical setting for different types of justice and an
explanation of how this prima facie principle is incorporated into various theories
of ethics (utilitarian, libertarian, communitarian, and egalitarian).30 The strength of
the PBE model is that it provides general standards and rules for its target
audience, health professionals. People working in the health sector rarely have
extensive knowledge of the theoretical background to practical ethics, even
though they may be engaged in decisions that require ethical analysis on a regular
basis. In a pluralist society, the general introduction to ethics that Beauchamp and
Childress provide is useful at a thin level of moral evaluation because people in
the health sector come from diverse religious and cultural traditions, and the PBE
model provides this diverse group with a thin common language.
29

See Anna Haebich, For Their Own Good: Aborigines and Government in the South West of
Western Australia 1900-1940 (Perth: University of Western Australia Press, 1992). Auber
Octavius Neville was the Chief Protector of Aborigines from 1915 to 1936.
30
Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), 245-247.

123

4.3 Common Morality and Institutional Ethics Committees

The PBE model is also useful for the numerous institutional ethics committees
that are now standard in both government and private sector institutions in
Australia.31 It seems appropriate in a pluralist society that research involving
humans or sentient animals ought to be constrained by ethical protocols, and the
PBE method can be usefully employed for this purpose. Australia has a highly
developed set of protocols that provide a necessary cross-check for treatment and
research involving humans and animals. There are also several acts of parliament
that provide guidelines, limitations, and, when necessary, punitive protocols for
medical practice and research.32 The primary statutory body responsible for
administering research protocols in Australia is the National Health and Medical
Research Council (NHMRC). Since the establishment of the NHMRC in 1937,
numerous protocols have been developed that protect both researchers and
subjects (human or animal). The stated aim of the NHMRC is:

developing health advice for the Australian community,
health professionals and governments; and for providing
advice on ethical behaviour in health care and in the
conduct of health and medical research.33

31

Peter Drahos, ―Ethics Committees and Medical Research: The Australian Experience,‖ Medicine
and Law 8 (1989): 1-9.
32
For example, Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991, Human Tissue Act 1983, Emergency
Medical Treatment of Children Act 1960, SA.
33
National Health and Medical Research Council, accessed 10 December, 2008,
http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/about/index.htm.

124

Institutional ethics committees (IECs) play a key role in the NHMRC research
policy. An IEC often includes people with professional expertise other than in
health (e.g., legal, religious, philosophical) and also a range of non-specialists
(patients, indigenous representatives, etc.). The strength of the PBE model is that
it provides this diverse group of people with a common set of principles and rules
that are relatively straightforward to understand.
In Western Australia, for instance, the IEC that administers the Human
Reproductive Technology Act (1991) is the Reproductive Technology Council
(RTC). The RTC consists of the following: a Chair, a nominee of the Royal
Australian and New Zealand College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, several
clinicians involved in obstetrics and gynaecology (but not IVF), one legal
nominee for the Law Society, one nominee from the Health Consumer‘s Council,
and several nominees of the Minister for Health that include a philosopher or
ethicist, a religious representative, and some health researchers. In such a diverse
group the PBE model is useful because it enables people to appreciate their
differences and to articulate their concerns via a common set of terms.

For instance, the current religious appointee to the RTC is a Catholic priest and
theologian. His objection to stem cell harvesting from embryos is based on the
sanctity of life principle, derived in Catholic moral philosophy from the doctrine
of creation and the philosophical tradition of natural law. 34 This view stands in
contrast to the common scientific view that embryos are not persons and therefore
34
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the usual constraints of the Human Tissue Act do not apply.35 In the language of
the PBE model, the Catholic theologian can explain why he thinks the principle of
nonmaleficence ought to be primary, because harvesting stem cells from a viable
embryo does harm to the embryo. Alternatively, the scientist can argue that the
principle of beneficence ought to be primary. The process of harvesting stem cells
does destroy embryos, but embryos are not persons and major health benefits may
well flow from stem cell research.

This ideological impasse between the theologian (nonmaleficence) and the
scientist (beneficence) illustrates MacIntyre‘s claim, referred to earlier, that there
are no moral scales for weighing the relative merits of moral principles in relation
to complex cases.36 In the RTC case above, the theologian‘s concern for the
protection of embryos (nonmaleficence) is set against the scientist‘s concern for
medical benefits (beneficence), but there is no objective system of measurement
to show how or why one principle trumps another. Clearly MacIntyre is right
about the impasse but he seems to overstate the problems that flow from this lack
of agreement. The thick moral disagreement among members of the RTC over the
moral status of the embryo does not negate the role of the RTC to administer the
Human Reproductive Technology Act (1991). Members of the RTC are in
agreement that the activities of IVF clinics and other research institutions that
utilise embryos ought to be constrained by the thin consensus on reproductive
issues contained in the Act. The Act was derived from a process of consultation
35
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that was consistent with the rule of law in a pluralist society. Hence, thin
agreement about process transcends thick disagreement over specific moral issues.

If, as a pragmatist like Williams argues, a liberal society involves a complex mix
of moral traditions, the impasse over stem cell harvesting in the RTC case is
precisely what one ought to expect. In Williams‘ words,

We use a variety of different ethical considerations, which
are genuinely different from one another, and this is what
one would expect to find, if only because we are heirs to a
long and complex ethical tradition, with many different
religious and other social strands.37

In the context of an ethics committee such as the RTC the conversation over stem
cell harvesting is not primarily concerned with the resolution of the moral issues
involved. The broader conversation over stem cell harvesting arose in Australia
because scientists requested access to the thousands of spare embryos left over
from IVF procedures. The birth of the first IVF baby in 1978 initially provoked a
wave of protest, directed primarily at Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe, the two
primary collaborators in the IVF process. In the early years, one of the main
critics of Edwards and Steptoe‘s method was Robert Winston, one of Britain‘s
most high-profile reproductive specialists.38 However, as each new IVF birth
diminished the anxiety over the projected birth defects, Winston became a vocal
champion of IVF.39 Now, after thirty years of research on children born via the
37
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IVF process, various studies have shown that IVF children exhibit only a slightly
higher percentage of the range of abnormalities that naturally conceived children
are born with.40 By 2008 approximately 3.5 million babies had been born using
IVF techniques, and most Australian states now have several IVF clinics that
operate free of the initial angst that Edwards and Steptoe experienced.
Later developments, such as the ability to freeze embryos, a technique for
injecting sperm directly into the ovum, and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis
were seen as positive by IVF clinicians and their clients. Embryo freezing meant
that the process of superovulation, which carries an inherent health risk, could be
reduced because embryos not used in the first IVF treatment cycle could be stored
for later use; sperm injection increased the number of embryos available for
implantation; and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis allowed clinicians to select
embryos free of some of the major genetic abnormalities. Once the anxiety over
birth defects diminished, the clinical and social benefits of IVF seemed selfevident to people working in IVF and their clients. This success does not imply
that the IVF process is free from ethical concerns or free from controversy, so the
IVF process in Australia remains strictly regulated. Much of the public anxiety
over IVF has diminished, however, because the technique has proved to be
relatively safe.

For people opposed to IVF, the fact that this technique has turned out to be
relatively safe for woman and babies born via IVF has not diminished their
40
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concerns about some aspects of this form of reproduction. Recent developments
such as embryo freezing, sperm injection, and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis
has heightened concern because these new techniques encourage clinicians to
produce embryos that are surplus to the immediate reproductive purpose. From
this perspective, the fact that there are now thousands of frozen embryos in
Australia available for stem cell harvesting remains a secondary problem. The
primary moral problem, if one grants a high moral status to the embryo, is any
activity that causes harm to an embryo.

When moral principles are used as tools in moral debate, the Beauchamp and
Childress approach seems valid even if all they do is to aid conversation. Much of
the criticism directed at the PBE model concerns the transition between thin
agreement over principles and rules and the thick application of these principles
and rules to particular issues through the process of reflective equilibrium.
Beauchamp and Childress slide too easily from common morality agreement over
thin moral rules to the application of these principles and rules to thick moral
dilemmas. The following section will highlight some of the problems associated
with the process of reflective equilibrium.

4.4 Thin Principles and Thick Problems

The popularity of the PBE model, particularly in the USA, led to a generation of
health professionals being taught how to apply principle-guided decision making
to specific cases. After a generation of its application, however, the role of
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principle-guided ethics in medicine is being challenged. In spite of its popularity,
there are strong objections to both the common morality theory and the principleguided method of decision making that Beauchamp and Childress advocate. In the
1994 collection of studies entitled A Matter of Principles: Ferment in U.S.
Bioethics, all but one was critical of this type of common morality theory. 41 In the
introduction the editors claim that despite the widespread concern over bioethical
issues, the discipline of bioethics needs to be reformulated and broadened, but the
dominance of principlism in the United States has restricted this widened
perspective.42

Now routinely referred to pejoratively as ―principlism‖ or ―the Georgetown
mantra,‖43 principle-guided ethics, according to Warren Reich, ―sought to create a
consensus based on shared arguments that were divorced from the horizons of
meaning and the meaningful narratives that initially inspired them.‖ 44 The lack of
consensus on the application of the PBE model in complex situations is why
Jonsen and others argue for a ―second generation‖ of bioethicists whose ―ethics
consists of more than principles‖ by incorporating other methods like
―phenomenology, hermeneutics, narrative ethics, casuistry, and virtue ethics.‖45
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The major criticism of the PBE model is that it is too simplistic for the type of
complex moral issues that arise in bioethical debates. The most common
objections relate to the process of reflective equilibrium. Beauchamp and
Childress argue that wide reflective equilibrium drives rational agents together
because it incorporates principles and rules from ―all plausible moral judgments,
principles, and relevant background theories‖ and from ―as wide a variety of kinds
and levels of legitimate beliefs as possible.‖46 They contend that this type of
reflective thinking is analogous to hypotheses in science, but this comparison is
misleading.47 The PBE method trades on accepting that the four common morality
principles are foundational and that the process of reflective equilibrium enables a
moral agent to sort out how and why one principle trumps another.

Beauchamp and Childress state that their proposal is ―fundamentally Rawlsian …
and it escapes categorization by labels such as foundationalism and
coherentism.‖48 They mean by this that their method is not a true coherence theory
because it appeals to principles justified by wide reflective equilibrium and that
this process gives the principles a foundational validity. This claim, however, is
not straightforward. While it is possible to use a Rawlsian type reflective
equilibrium justification in science, there is extended debate about the validity of
this process in the context of the realism/anti-realism debate in epistemology.49
Beauchamp and Childress acknowledge this when they state that ―we cannot here
46
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engage the tangled issue of whether coherentism is to be preferred to
foundationalism.‖50 Given the target audience for the PBE model, one can
understand why Beauchamp and Childress steer clear of this debate. The link
between the four foundational principles is not epistemologically problematic
when they are used as common morality principles because the appeal in this case
is to general moral rules. When these principles are linked to reflective
equilibrium, however, as they are in the PBE method, the point and purpose is to
solve particular cases. This requires some form of intuitive understanding of how
and why one principle trumps another in the same manner that Rawls‘ theory
requires people to share a common intuition with respect to justice.51

The PBE method fails to acknowledge the shift in emphasis that Rawls himself
made. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that moral agents find common
ground through the process of reflective equilibrium.52 However, in a later
publication, and in response to criticisms of the ―common ground‖ hypothesis in
A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that a diversity of views is ―a permanent
feature‖ of a liberal democracy.53 Beauchamp and Childress cite Rawls‘ change of
mind over the limitations of the common morality thesis in the fifth and sixth
edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, but only in a footnote,54 and there is no
indication that Rawls‘ shift in emphasis has impacted on their common morality
thesis.
50
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The appeal to reflective equilibrium is problematic in moral theory because it does
not sufficiently account for the reason why complex moral issues are often
intractable. Moral debates often end at the beginning because no agreement is
possible on the premises or foundations that rational moral agents bring to the
discussion. When consensus does occur it is often coincidental. This coincidence
of agreement is because moral agents acknowledge a thin minimalism that may
have nothing to do with the moral debate. This thin agreement is not because the
discussants reach some common framework to which diverse moral agents can
ultimately appeal. Moral minimalism is not foundational. As Walzer argues ―it is
not the case that different groups of people discover that they are all committed to
the same set of ultimate values… Often enough, what goes deepest for one group
… is likely to mean little to another.‖55

The earlier example of the RTC‘s deliberations on stem cell harvesting illustrates
what Walzer means by thin moral minimalism. It is clear that the theologian‘s
concern over stem cell harvesting was based on deeply held views concerning the
moral status of an embryo. It is equally clear that the scientist held no such views;
thus the destruction of embryos for stem cell harvesting caused him no moral
qualms. At the start of this chapter the four-principle approach was described as a
useful but not definitive guide for decision making, and this impasse illustrates
this point. In the stem cell debate, the principle of nonmaleficence can be usefully
employed by the theologian in ways that the scientist can appreciate, primarily by
55
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showing why the Hippocratic principle ought to apply to embryos in the same
way that it is applied to babies or infants. Similarly, the scientist can appeal to
beneficence in ways that the theologian can appreciate, primarily by showing the
potential for stem cells to be utilised in medicine. No amount of reflective
equilibrium can produce a shared agreement between the theologian and the
scientist in regards to the status of the embryo.

Walzer argues that ―the value of minimalism lies in the encounter it facilitates, of
which it is also the product,‖ but such encounters do not ―produce a thick
morality.‖56 In other words, the RTC encounter does not produce thick moral
agreement about stem cell harvesting because the rational discussants involved
share incommensurable views about the moral status of embryos.

The role of the RTC in Western Australia is to regulate a series of protocols that
had already been decided upon via rule of law agreements that form the basis of a
liberal democracy. After extensive deliberation, the Australian Federal Parliament
decided in favour of stem cell harvesting (2002) and a few years later also voted
to allow therapeutic cloning of embryos for research purposes (2007).57 For both
the theologian and the scientist, the encounter is the RTC process itself. The fact
that they participate shows that they share a thin minimalist appreciation for the
role that an ethics committee plays in a liberal democracy.

56
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The PBE method is usefully thin and provides enough coherence for a consensus
over general issues but it is too thin to provide consensus in cases that involve
diverse and thick narrative accounts of the moral issues at stake. In other words, a
thin consensus between diverse moral agents over some moral issues is possible
because the diverse theories of justification coincide in such a way that the moral
agents can align themselves to a common position. However, this consensus
breaks down in complex issues because not enough similarities in the justificatory
process exist to allow for a common position to be held. So in the RTC case, the
agreement is about process because the role of a regulatory body such as the RTC
is to cross-check the IVF clinics in WA. This involves making sure that clinics do
not succumb to economic pressure by ignoring the strict regulatory requirements
over IVF protocols (age, health, relationship status, etc.).58

The Beauchamp and Childress model breaks down in complex cases because the
choice to elevate one principle over another is not a self-evident outcome of
reflective equilibrium. Even in a simple case, the decision to elevate one principle
over another is not because it is self-evident that one ethical principle trumps
another. Rather, it is because the case is simple enough that no real juggling needs
to take place and because the decision makers agree on which principle best
supports their own teleological or ideological objectives. A case in point is the
routine decision that health professionals make to override the decision of a drunk
but injured patient who says he does not want to be treated. If asked to justify the
decision, using the four-principles, the health workers could argue that they
58
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elevated beneficence over autonomy because patient autonomy is diminished by
drunkenness. In this simple case, the principles provide a descriptive justification
for a decision that has already been made, rather than a prescriptive justification
for a decision that ought to be made. The consensus among health workers about
this type of action is not because medical beneficence self-evidently trumps
patient autonomy. Rather, the consensus among health workers exists because
treating such a patient in this manner is consistent with the promotion of patient
health. In complex cases the application of principles is fraught with difficulties
because each of the stakeholders in a difficult case would have their own reasons
for arguing why one principle is more crucial than other.

4.5 Nonmaleficence or Beneficence: The Quinlan Case

The case studies in the first five editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics are
appropriately used as discussion starters and appear, without commentary, at the
back of the book. In the sixth edition Beauchamp and Childress weave the case
studies into the chapters devoted to an explanation of the four-principles. They
have done this with the now famous Karen Quinlan case,59 which involves issues
of medical nutrition and hydration (MN&H) and physician-assisted death. This
case is woven into the justification of the reason why a rational moral agent ought
to elevate the principle of beneficence, in some cases, over the normal ―do no
harm‖ prohibition in medicine. Beauchamp and Childress conclude their analysis
of this case with a statement that is appropriately thin: ―healthcare providers may
59
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legitimately withhold or withdraw MN&H under some conditions.‖60 There is not
much to argue about in such a general statement because even in a Catholic health
system, where MN&H is normally obligatory, withdrawal of artificial nutrition
and hydration is permissible for dying patients.61

Beauchamp and Childress think that the withdrawal of MN&H should be
considered a legitimate option for some non-dying patients, such as in the Karen
Quinlan case, and in doing so they argue that the principle of beneficence
overrides the normal medical principle of nonmaleficence in such cases. The
problem here is that even if one agrees with the removal of MN&H in the Quinlan
case, what aspects of this case can be used to highlight the same response in other
cases? The Quinlan case involved an intricate mix of familial, medical, and legal
issues unique to that case. The decision to withdraw treatment in the Quinlan case
involved medically-assisted death because the patient was eventually allowed to
starve to death more than ten years after artificial respiration was removed.

The final court decision to allow the removal of the feeding tube provided parity
in the USA over the type of medical intervention that constitutes life support, so
that both hydration and nutrition could now be considered an optional form of
life-support in the same manner that artificial respiration is optional. In the USA
the Quinlan case served as a persuasive precedent in common law. However, the
beholding obligation for anyone who appeals to this case as a precedent is to show
60
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how and why the Quinlan case satisfies the persuasive precedent requirement.
Using the legal process to resolve complex cases has its own drawbacks, not the
least of which is the length of time for the process to take its course. Some
philosophers argue that decisions ought to be made much earlier because once the
decision is made to choose death the ten-year wait for passive euthanasia to take
its effect is unreasonably burdensome. In connection with the Quinlan case Singer
argues that once the decision is made to allow a person to die, the medical
professionals should actively ensure ―that it comes in the best possible way‖ 62 and
therefore mercy killing ought not be ruled out for some cases. The old legal
maxim, ―hard cases make bad law,‖ applies to complex ethical issues as well and
for roughly the same reasons. Complex cases are rarely so similar that the
justification for elevating beneficence over nonmaleficence in one case
necessitates the same decision in another. The following section will show that
when advocates of the PBE model use particular cases to illustrate why one
principle ought to trump another they presume that both the facts of the case and
the decision to elevate one principle over another emerge impartially from the
process of reflective equilibrium.

4.6 Principle-Based Health Ethics in Australia

The Beauchamp and Childress model has been incorporated into Australian health
care primarily through the work of Kenneth R. Mitchell and Terence J. Lovat.63
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Mitchell and Lovat substantially borrow the Beauchamp and Childress
justification for the PBE model and similarly focus on decision making for
medical and health professionals. They presume the efficacy of Beauchamp and
Childress‘ model of decision making and refer to the ―fundamental bioethical
principles‖ when they state that ―such an approach … will bring order and
coherence and enable generalization across issues from diverse areas of
medicine.‖64 They further state that ―bioethics is not a matter of beliefs, emotions
or opinions‖ but rather an ―intellectual inquiry motivated by a concern for what
should be decided‖ and ―guided in this search for the ‗right and wrong of it‘ by
the fundamental values and moral principles which come from inquiry into
general normative ethics.‖65 This strong series of claims about the objectivity of
the PBE model is not defended in the text other than by showing how the
principles are applied to particular cases.

In a subsequent publication, but with a new contributing author,66 these authors
make more explicit the distinction between moral philosophy and ethics, primarily
because they want to distinguish ethical analysis in health care from the type of
ethical analysis in psychology, sociology, and theology.67 The authors make
several bold claims that they think distinguish practical ethics from the broader
concerns of morality found in psychology, sociology, and theology. They claim,
first, that practical ethics is of ―greater significance than law, politics or selfinterest‖; second, that principles used are universalisable; third, that practical
64
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ethics is broadly concerned with ―human well-being and the maintenance of a
peaceful society‖; fourth, that practical ethics is concerned with the role of reason
and moral justification; and fifth, that practical ethics is prescriptive of what moral
agents ―should do‖ rather than ―can do.‖68

The claim that ethics is of greater importance than law, politics, or self-interest
requires further explanation if it is to be accepted at all. Aristotle, for instance,
disputes the separation of ethics from politics primarily because ethics
presupposes a cooperative polis. Politics, in the sense that Aristotle understood it,
is the most authoritative science because the purpose of the other disciplines is to
contribute to the flourishing of the polis itself. Thus for Aristotle practical ethics is
primarily concerned with social habituation, and the role of reason is not therefore
a purpose-independent concept.69

The claim that ethics uses principles that are universalisable is qualified by the
statement that ―moral concepts, principles, and action-guides apply to all persons
equally.‖70 Few moral philosophers accept this view of universalisability as its
stands. Universalisability, in a Kantian sense, applies to the strength of the moral
imperative, and, in the utilitarian sense, to the impartial motivation of the decision
maker.71 Neither of these two concepts of universalisability imply that a
universalisable argument ought to apply to ―all persons equally.‖72
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When Mitchell et al. suggest that health care professionals can no longer rely on
traditional values or professional codes of practice, because modern medicine has
changed, they appeal to something that is supposedly more basic or foundational
than what professional codes can offer. They want to deal with the changes in
medicine by accepting a basic level concept of principles and then apply the
principles to particular cases in what they describe as a ―more rational manner.‖73
This supposedly more rational approach to ethics involves the application of the
PBE model to particular cases. To make this explicit, Mitchell et al. provide case
studies for each of the chapters devoted to the four-principles. This has the effect
of guiding the reader to adopt a particular type of case study for the principle that,
in the authors‘ view, is the most appropriate. However, while the PBE model does
provide action guides for decision making in simple cases, it provides no
objective test for determining why one principle fits a case better than another,
particularly in complex cases.

In the first edition of their text Mitchell and Lovat used a famous medical case to
illustrate why the principle of nonmaleficence ought to be overridden by the
combined weight of autonomy and beneficence in some cases of end-stage
disease.74 The case involves a young woman dying from ovarian cancer and a
resident in a gynaecology-oncology ward. In 1988, the Journal of the American
Medical Association (JAMA) published a report on this case written by an
unnamed medical resident entitled ―A Piece of my mind: It‘s over Debbie.‖75 The
73
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report recounted the resident‘s decision to euthanise (with a morphine drip) a
young woman dying of ovarian cancer. The report was primarily his personal
account of dealing with her request when she said, ―Let‘s get this over with.‖
After being published in JAMA the case was subsequently recorded on several online pro-euthanasia websites to show how the compassionate side of medical
practice can sometimes justify voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted death.
Mitchell and Lovat appear to have used this case in this context because most of
the case studies in the chapter on nonmaleficence are devoted to physicianassisted death. In the commentary on the ―It‘s over Debbie‖ case, Mitchell and
Lovat state, ―Other medications could have been used to relieve the patient‘s
suffering and enable her to rest comfortably.‖76 This commentary seems to be
directed at the resident‘s decision to euthanise the patient using morphine. Given
that the patient was already on a morphine drip, the clinical decision to overdose a
dying patient using morphine is unwise. In this case the resident achieved his
desired result but this was more by good luck than good clinical practice. 77 The
morphine issue, however, is one of several clinical issues that this case raises, all
of which go unacknowledged in the Mitchell and Lovat account.

Mitchell and Lovat appear unfamiliar with the furor that this case attracted when
the anonymous resident‘s article was first published in JAMA. Rather than being
76
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seen as a compassionate doctor‘s response to patient suffering, many surgeons and
oncologists saw it as a classic case of malpractice. Most blamed the editor, Dr.
George Lundberg, for publishing an anonymous report by a resident doctor.
Doctors also objected to the flippant and simplistic presentation of a complex
medical and ethical issue. Clinical objections focused on the actions of the
resident, primarily because a medical resident should not be euthanising a patient
he has met only recently and of whom he has no medical history other than a bed
chart. Furthermore, the decision to euthanise the patient was not discussed
thoroughly with the patient, or with the older woman that the article refers to as
being in the room at the time. The furor over this case was significant enough for
the New York Times to publish a special supplement that questioned the ethics of
both the physician and the medical journalists involved in the case.78 In this
supplement, Dr. Mark Siegler, Professor of Medicine and Director of the Center
for Clinical Medical Ethics at the University of Chicago, argued that the report
―did a disservice to the medical profession by giving the appearance of
sanctioning the physician‘s behavior.‖ Similarly, Dr. Arthur Caplan, Director of
the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota, suggested that
the action of the resident was a severe indictment on the training residents were
receiving. He rejected the actions of the resident primarily because it was an
irresponsible abuse of power that was done without consultation.79
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Even more disturbingly for the anonymous author and the editor, the State
Attorney‘s office in Chicago, where JAMA is published, issued a grand jury
subpoena requesting that the editor hand over all documents associated with the
case because the state prosecutor wanted to indict the author on a charge of
manslaughter.80 JAMA in turn sought to establish legal protection for itself and the
author by challenging the grand jury subpoena and claiming journalistic privilege,
a stance highly unusual in medical publishing where peer review is dominant.

Clearly this case does not allow for the straightforward juggling of principles that
the PBE model promotes because the facts of the case were interpreted by the
resident in ways that are incompatible with good medical practice. Mitchell and
Lovat removed this case from the subsequent edition of their text, but this
omission also illustrates the main problem with principle based decision making.
The principles are thin moral concepts that are useful for helping a health
professional to understand the issues involved, but they do not combine readily
into a uniform process of reflective equilibrium. One reason for this is that the
individual observer will bring his or her own thick interpretation of both the
principles and how they should be applied to a particular case. A second problem
is that the facts of the moment may not necessarily tell the whole story, as
highlighted by the JAMA case.

A complex case such as the one above challenges Mitchell and Lovat‘s claim that
principles enable ―order and coherence‖ because the impartial decision maker can
80
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generalise across diverse disciplines of medicine.81 There is no order or coherence
here because there is no independent method of juggling principles. When
Mitchell, Lovat, and Kerridge argue that ethics is not about professional codes but
about principles, they present an impoverished view of practical ethics.82 Dr.
Siegler and Dr. Caplan objected to the actions of the resident so vociferously
because his actions were inconsistent with professional practice. If and when
doctors decide to alleviate the suffering of a dying patient they ought to be
constrained by professional standards of medical practice. This means that the
treatment options that the resident can choose from should be comparable to that
offered by another resident doctor for a similar patient under the same conditions.
In the JAMA case the patient would have been under the supervisory care of an
oncologist or palliative care specialist. At the very least, the resident should have
consulted a senior clinician to seek advice, and it is entirely possible that the
consultant may have suggested a process with a similar outcome. Furthermore, a
patient should be consulted whenever a proposed intervention might result in
death.

The JAMA case illustrates why complex cases are rarely amenable to the PBE
model of decision making. A similar problem arises in the chapter that Mitchell,
Kerridge, and Lovat devote to the abortion issue. The authors acknowledge the
complexity of the abortion issue and they also acknowledge that they differ in
their respective positions.83 They suggest that even with this complexity they can
81
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make one important point, that the ―moral, legal, social and political division‖
within society is unlikely to be resolved by legislation because it is difficult ―to
see how such diametrically opposed viewpoints could ever reach consensus.‖84
The presumption here is that legislation is designed to resolve opposing points of
view, but this misconstrues the role of legislation. Legislation on abortion does
not resolve the moral question on abortion but it does resolve the impasse that
results from this division.

When presented with the four-principles, people opposed to abortion will
inevitably elevate the principle of nonmaleficence over autonomy because they
preface the debate with the claim that protecting the life of an innocent human
being is a defensible rational position. Similarly, those who think that abortion
should be decriminalised inevitably elevate either beneficence (for reasons of
harm minimisation) or autonomy (for reasons of choice). The PBE method offers
no mediation in complex cases because a rational observer is not impartial and the
decision to elevate one principle over another is not the product of reflective
equilibrium.

4.7 Conclusion

The criticism of principle-guided ethics is not directed at principles per se. Rather,
it is because critics of principle-guided ethics think that Beauchamp and Childress
overstate the applicability of principles in complex situations. Toulmin, for
84
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instance, argues that principles are often not that necessary in debates over
complex moral issues.85 Writing as a staff member on the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
Toulmin writes that agreement on a case by case basis is possible even when
people disagree over the ethical principles. Toulmin and Jonsen (also a member
on the above Commission) are critical of principle-guided ethics, suggesting
instead a return to casuistry:

Increasingly, then, over the last twenty years serious
discussions of the moral problems that arise out of social
conscience and public policy have moved in a taxonomic
direction. As in the days of Ciceronian and Christian
casuistry, a feeling for the features of moral experience
that led Aristotle to put ethics in the realm of praxis and
phronesis, not theoria and episteme ... has reentered the
moral debate.86

The attempt to turn the PBE decision making protocol into the standard model of
bioethics has failed because it lacks the explanatory power of the standard model
approach used in the sciences. A standard model in science involves three major
characteristics.87 First, it acknowledges a consensus of rational discussants
(scientists) over the foundational premises and boundary assumptions on which
evidence derived from the scientific method is evaluated. Second, a standard
model has vast explanatory power and can therefore be used to evaluate other
models or theories. Third, a standard model is always open-ended, capable of
being refined or even overturned.
85
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It is clear from the sixth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics that
Beauchamp and Childress remain committed to the idea that practical ethics is
based on an epistemologically valid form of foundationalism: ―applied ethics … is
the attempt to interpret general norms [the four-principles] for the purpose of
addressing particular problems and contexts… General norms are usually only
starting points for the development of concrete norms of conduct.‖88 The PBE
method is meant to act like the standard model approach used in other disciplines
but it lacks the three characteristics outlined above. First, there is no consensus
among moral philosophers that the PBE method is the preferred method of moral
decision making. Second, it lacks the explanatory power of a standard model.
Beauchamp and Childress make the bold claim that the function of common
morality and reflective equilibrium is to ―provide a basis for the evaluation and
criticism of groups or communities whose customary moral viewpoints are in
some sense deficient,‖89 but there is no indication in recent literature on the PBE
model that this foundationalist goal has been reached. Third, the PBE method is
too remote from the type of moral evaluation that Toulmin and others advocate.
The major criticism of the PBE model is not that it is not useful but rather too
grand. As Oliver Rauprich points out with respect to the Beauchamp and
Childress common morality model:

It is neither convincing as a moral foundation nor well
compatible with a standard coherentist justification. I
suggest that the authors should give up the foundational
account for a more modest account of common morality as
88
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a resource of well-established moral insights and
experiences, which have proved generally valid but neither
sufficient nor infallible.90

Clearly Beauchamp and Childress‘ contribution to the discussion of complex
ethical issues has been extensive, but Rauprich‘s more limited expectation for
common morality reflects the thin acceptance of common morality principles. The
fact that principles are thin does not mean they are insignificant. Thin minimalism
provides moral agents with what Walzer calls ―the rules of engagement that bind
all speakers,‖91 or what Stuart Hampshire has called ―a thin notion of procedural
justice … the conditions of mere decency.‖92

Jonsen makes a similar point in his criticism of Singer‘s preference utilitarian
equality principle:

the ethics of bioethics is not a clean, closed system of
rational argument. No theory dominates bioethics, and no
methodology has one universal acceptance. While a few
bioethicists, such as Princeton professor Peter Singer,
adhere to such a system (in his case to a strictly logical
utilitarianism), most bioethicist today are improvisers,
drawing from various forms of philosophical and
theological ethics the elements that seem suitable for the
argument at hand.93

From an Aristotelian perspective, the right thing to do in a given case is to allow
oneself to be constrained by the praxis of the teleological activity (medicine, law,
90
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politics, etc.) and the phronesis or practical wisdom of time, place, and
circumstance (habituation). As Jonsen says above, this is not a ―clean, closed
system of rational argument‖ because it does not provide black and white answers,
but it does provide a thick level of practical guidance within particular practices.
The next chapter will reconstruct the meta-narrative of practical ethics advocated
in Singer‘s version of preference utilitarianism.
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Chapter 5: Preference-Guided Enquiry

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter argued that the PBE model is a useful but not definitive tool
for decision making in practical ethics. This chapter will make the same claim
about Peter Singer‘s version of practical ethics. In Australia, Singer‘s contribution
to the discipline of practical ethics has been even more influential, due primarily
to the legacy of British utilitarianism. Singer began writing not long after the birth
of the practical ethics revolution, and his main contribution to practical ethics is
the principle of equality, a decision making protocol based on a type of preference
calculus. He is a serious thinking social activist and few philosophers seem to be
as committed to social change as he is.1 In his most recent publication he argues
that moral agents ought to extend their care for the poor, using the principle of
universalisation, to all people who are suffering, irrespective of where they live.2

Following his utilitarian predecessors, Singer argues that rational moral agents
ought to extend their circle of moral consideration to all sentient animals, those
that can feel pain, and then give higher moral consideration to humans and
1
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animals that are self-aware, ―capable of abstract thought, of planning for the
future, of complex acts of communication.‖3

In the PBE model a rational decision maker is encouraged to use common
morality principles. This is not the case in Singer‘s version of practical ethics
because he does not appeal to moral principles that are knowable or real. Singer‘s
practical ethics promotes the role that reason can play in sorting out moral
dilemmas by advocating a decision making protocol that he calls the ―principle of
equality‖ or ―equal consideration of interests.‖4 An impartial moral agent uses this
principle of equality to calculate both quantitative and qualitative interests of all
stakeholders in order to achieve preference or interest satisfaction.

Singer‘s form of practical ethics pivots on the facts of a given case being
knowable and therefore capable of being adjudicated from a preference utilitarian
standpoint. As with the PBE model, this simple formula is both a strength and a
weakness. In order for the equality principle to work as Singer posits, the facts of
a given case must be knowable ―real-world‖ facts, facts that are self-evident to an
impartial observer. Herein lies the main problem with this model of decision
making. Far from being self-evident, the facts in complex cases are often in
dispute.
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This chapter will reconstruct the decision making protocol advocated by Singer by
showing, first, why he thinks ethics should be grounded in evolutionary altruism
and the principle of universalisation and, second, why he thinks that the role of
reason implies preference consideration. The reconstruction will show that, as
with the Beauchamp and Childress principle-guided model of decision making,
Singer‘s version of practical ethics is a useful but not definitive method of ethical
decision making. The shifts in Singer‘s thinking over the principle of equality also
serve to illustrate how difficult it is to formulate a standard theoretical approach
that solves problems in a complex discipline like ethics.

5.2 Ethics and the Principle of Universalisation

Singer‘s analysis in Practical Ethics begins with a thin recognition of the
principle of universalisation. He then extends this out to a thick explanation of the
role that reason plays in decision making, via the principle of equality and the role
of the impartial observer. Singer appropriately describes this new method of
decision making as ambitious and tentative.5 The tone of Practical Ethics, apart
from comments directed against rule-based6 and religious perspectives on ethics,
provides a tentative exploration of how preference calculus and the principle of
equality can be consistently applied to specific issues. With the publication of The
Expanding Circle, however, Singer revises his dismissive attitude toward rules.
He now recognises that equal consideration of interests, on its own, does not
5
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provide a workable model for practical decision making because ―we lack the
time and information‖ for the ―long and involved calculations‖ required.7

This change in attitude toward rules is one example of how Singer‘s argument for
a practical ethic has evolved.8 Another shift in emphasis occurs over his initial
appeal that the principle of universalisation serves as a basis or foundation for
ethical decision making. In Practical Ethics the starting point for moral evaluation
is the principle of universalisation, primarily based on a broad recognition among
philosophers and other thinkers.9 A few years later, in The Expanding Circle,
Singer argues for a biological explanation of why we have ethics, based on the
emerging idea that some ethical behaviour might be hard-wired into the human
genome through the process known as evolutionary altruism.10 Singer argues in
Practical Ethics that the rational agent builds on the inherited evolutionary
altruistic tendency by applying the principle of equal consideration of interests. In
The Expanding Circle he modifies this somewhat to argue that the rational
extension to evolutionary altruism is the principle of impartial consideration.

For Singer, this new ―simpler idea‖ is that ethics ―evolved out of our social
instincts and our capacity to reason,‖ and once rational thinking takes over, the
principle of equality expands the circle of consideration to all self-aware beings.11
This new look at ethics shows, first, why altruistic behaviour provides an
7
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explanation of why ethics exists in human society and, second, why the principle
of equality offers the best model for applying rational thinking to this basic
starting point.12 In The Expanding Circle three propositions support this new look
at ethics. First, ethics is rooted in the altruistic behaviour of our human
ancestors.13 Second, the capacity for rational thinking enabled humans to extend
their own self-interestedness into a set of behaviours that takes into consideration
the interests of all stakeholders.14 Third, there is now no justification for limiting
this type of ethical analysis to humans, so the circle of consideration should be
expanded to include other sentient and self-aware animals.15

Singer argues that because ethics is part of our biology, the tendency for humans
to codify ethics is therefore a natural outgrowth of biological altruism. 16 However,
once humans begin to make rational choices, the principle of equality trumps
altruistic choices because altruistic behaviour can lead to discrimination against
others. A rational agent must go beyond evolutionary behaviour and simple rulefollowing to the point where the good for one self-aware being (qualitatively
calculated) should be considered as having no greater value than the good for
another.17 Singer maintains that this new way of thinking provides a scientific
explanation for ethics that is now necessary because religious and non-religious
thinkers agree that solutions to ethical dilemmas should be sought ―outside
religion and independently of belief in God.‖18
12
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5.3 Ethics and Reciprocity

Singer begins his justification for a scientific solution to ethical dilemmas with an
introduction to E. O. Wilson‘s sociobiological justification for ethics.19 He accepts
Wilson‘s explanation regarding the foundation for ethical behaviour but rejects his
further suggestion that ethical premises can be derived from biological
foundations, as this step involves a naturalistic fallacy.20 Singer argues that the
science of sociobiology has something to offer the study of ethics because it
provides an explanation of how altruism began to manifest in different species and
also why ethics evolved in human social interaction.21 Sociobiology explains why
rules or canons of behaviour prohibit some actions and allow others, but it cannot
determine the ethical efficacy of these actions.22 Singer explains how acts of
reciprocity have produced several types of altruistic behaviour among social
animals – kin altruism, non-related reciprocal altruism, and group altruism –
although he thinks that group altruism plays only a minor role.23 These tit-for-tat
relationships seem to be a necessary survival instinct for social animals, and this
instinct is now commonly referred to as the principle of reciprocity.
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The genetic tendency to help kin can be extended to a reciprocal relationship
between non-related members of a species, or even of a different species, if for
some reason a benefit is gained from working together. For instance, reciprocal
altruism occurs when monkeys groom each other. Altruistic instincts might also
help to explain the human motivation to help a stranger in trouble. Reciprocity
does not mean that the groomed monkey or the human stranger will one day
return the favour. Rather, because reciprocal altruism is so widely practised
among long-lived social species such as apes and humans, an individual who acts
altruistically can reasonably expect this level of cooperation from another member
of the same group if he or she is caught in a similar situation.24 Altruistic
behaviour in animals appears similar to types of behaviour affirmed among
humans (self-sacrifice, heroism, generosity, cooperation). Singer is probably right
that human cooperative behaviour provides a precursor for the prescriptive
―ought-type‖ language of ethical theory. The moral prohibition against murder,
for instance, came a long time after the pragmatic recognition that this type of
killing was ultimately self-destructive.

Singer makes the forceful claim that because human social behaviour parallels
forms of altruism observable in other social animals, it is therefore implausible to
deny that ―human ethics has its origin in evolved patterns of behavior [altruism]
among social animals.‖25 According to Singer, animals act altruistically, humans
act altruistically, and so by inference human ethics must have derived from human
altruism. This strong claim is not without difficulties, however, because it is
24
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indeed plausible to deny the proposition: ethics if and only if altruism. While it
seems true that ethics includes altruistic behaviour, to argue that ethics has its
origin in altruistic behaviour seems too strong given present knowledge of geneshaped human behaviour. The attempt to establish a link between genes and
behaviour produced an early form of genetic determinism such as the alleged gay
gene26 and the psychopathic gene.27 More recent work reveals a more nuanced and
complex relationship between genes and human behaviour.28

Singer acknowledges another problem that arises from claims about altruism: ―we
can understand why reciprocal altruism should prosper after it gets established, it
is less easy to see why the genes leading to this form of behavior did not get
eliminated as soon as they appeared.‖29 Known as the paradox of altruism, this
problem presents a difficult challenge for any theory that links altruism with a
genetic explanation for ethics because altruistic behaviour contradicts some
aspects of natural selection.30 For example, animals that act altruistically by
warning of approaching danger would get killed first, and thus the biological drive
towards altruism should diminish due to natural selection.
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A further problem arises with the way evolutionary altruism in animals is
assessed. Even a careful researcher can read altruistic characteristics into animal
behaviour when it might not be warranted. A recent study of meerkats, the pin-up
species for altruistic behaviour in animals, reported very different findings than
previous meerkat studies.31 This report found that after 2000 hours of observation,
not one example of warning-call altruism was observed. This group of researchers
argues that guard-duty among meerkats was not an organised activity but
something that meerkats did when they were not eating. In short, basically they
were watching out for themselves.32 If this is the case, then perhaps the
evolutionary drive towards this type of behaviour is driven by selfish genes, not
altruistic ones.

The discipline of sociobiology has itself only recently emerged as a distinct
discipline, and two of its main proponents, E. O. Wilson and Richard C.
Lewontin, are in sharp disagreement about what conclusions should be drawn
from sociobiological studies.33 The study of the connection between the evolution
of genetic tendencies and sociobiological behaviour is too inconclusive to draw
strong conclusions about ethical behaviour among humans.

Singer‘s argument therefore, that altruistic behaviour provides the foundation for
why we have ethics, seems to be a reasonable hypothesis, but it belongs to a field
31
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of study that is still in its infancy.34 Twenty-five years after the publication of The
Expanding Circle, debate over the evolutionary basis of ethics still has a long way
to go.35 There is no consensus among scholars about how altruism works or even
whether it does form the basis of ethics as Singer posits.36 Singer acknowledges
that even if some consensus does develop concerning evolutionary altruism, it will
only explain why we have ethics, not why one explanation of ethics is better than
another.

Although the argument for ethical altruism takes up half of The Expanding Circle,
it is tangential to the main argument that Singer promotes. He recognises that
central questions about ethics and values are untouched by the biological
explanation for why ethics exists.37 For Singer, the development of rational
thinking eventually opened up the possibility that humans could make ethical
choices. Initially these choices were driven by customary morality or cultural
preferences, but then the extended use of the principle of universalisation
expanded this circle of consideration to included all human stakeholders,
regardless of geography or culture.
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Singer argues in The Expanding Circle that further progress is possible by
converting the concept of moral impartiality into a formal decision making
protocol that gives equal weight to the interests of all stakeholders, human and
non-human:

We can progress toward rational settlement of disputes
over ethics by taking the element of disinterestedness
inherent in the idea of justifying one‘s conduct to society
as a whole, and extending this into the principle that to be
ethical, a decision must give equal weight to the interests
of all affected by it.38

This passage is a bit clumsy because Singer does not mean that equal weight
should be granted to the interests of all the stakeholders. In his model, some
interests do outweigh others, and the justification for this different weighting is
more cogently presented in Practical Ethics.39 However, before he sets out why
the equality principle explains what ethics is, when reason is allowed to play its
legitimate role, he begins Practical Ethics by showing firstly what ethics is not.

5.4 What Ethics is Not: Four False Assumptions

Singer states that many people make false assumptions about ethics. First, they
assume that the study of ethics is a ―set of prohibitions particularly concerned with
sex‖; second, they assume that the study of ethics is ―noble in theory but no good
in practice‖; third, they assume that ethics is ―intelligible only in the context of
religion‖; and lastly, they assume that ethics is ―relative or subjective.‖40 These
38
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four false assumptions about ethics provide the background to Singer‘s fuller
account of what practical ethics ought to be according to the principle of equality.

The first false assumption that people make, according to Singer, is to think that
ethics is a set of prohibitions particularly concerned with sex. He says this
misconception about ethics and morality is still defended by Bishops and
―traditional moralists.‖41 He refers here to the preoccupation of some bioethicists
with issues of sexual morality such as promiscuity, homosexuality, and
pornography. Singer argues that there are more important moral issues. On this he
is probably right, but this does not mean that one can dismiss religious concern for
sexual morality so arbitrarily. For instance, a Bishop‘s concern regarding sexual
morality might be theologically thick but still be consistent with a thin concern for
general human wellbeing. A serious thinking Bishop‘s concern for sexual
morality could be part of an intricately argued theory of natural law. Or perhaps,
following Kant, the Bishop‘s concern over sexual issues could be driven by
standard categorical imperatives. It is even possible that the Bishop‘s concern
could have a utilitarian basis, such as harm minimisation, because promiscuity
does increase HIV infection rates. The Bishop‘s concern for sexual morality is
also consistent with a latter claim made by Singer himself:

We found that we must concede that those who hold
unconventional ethical beliefs are still living according to
ethical standards if they believe, for any reason, that it is
right to do as they are doing.42
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Singer‘s claim that ethics is not simply a set of prohibitions particularly concerned
with sex seems justified, but one should not assume that these concerns are devoid
of rational thinking. Singer could argue that the Bishop‘s views are unpopular
(perhaps by showing how sexual freedoms have changed) or he could highlight
what he considers to be more important matters, but using the Bishop to illustrate
a narrow sex-based focus of moral deliberation is disingenuous and unfairly
caricatures religious scholarship.

The second false assumption that Singer challenges is that ethics is an ideal
system that is noble in theory but no good in practice. This seems to be the
primary motivation behind his advocacy for the principle of equality. Singer is not
content to argue points of moral theory in the classroom, and few modern
philosophers practise what they preach as consistently as he does. Utilitarian
philosophers, at least well-known ones, seem committed to making a practical
difference. Bentham made significant contributions to civil government and the
legal profession, and he was actively involved in both the abolitionist movement
and in the elevation of women in British society. Similarly, Mill also advocated
strongly on behalf of women, he was active in developing proportional
representation, and he argued strongly that the state should be constrained from
asserting undue control over the liberty of an individual.

Singer sets the scene for Practical Ethics by suggesting that the failure of an
ethical system based on rules does not necessarily lead to the failure of ethics as a
practice. He argues that doing ethics by simple rule following is not justified
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because sometimes rules need to be broken. The weakness of deontological or
rule-based ethics seems obvious to utilitarian philosophers. A theory that
incorporates conflicting moral duties contains a theoretical weakness because a
rational agent cannot apply one moral rule without overriding another. Singer
cites the familiar Jews in the attic scenario to show that when rules conflict,
rational consideration becomes consequentialist. His point is that when those he
calls ―traditional moralists‖ defend rules, they are really defending a particular or
subjective moral code, rather than one that is both universalisable and objective.43

For Singer, a system of ethics that does not work in practice suffers from a
theoretical defect, because ―the whole point of ethical judgments is to guide
practice.‖44 These are important observations because they set a substantial goal
for a theory of ethics that has proved difficult to achieve in the past. Significantly,
the latter part of this chapter will show that Singer‘s equality principle suffices as
a thin moral principle but fails when applied to complex moral issues.

The third false assumption, that ethics is intelligible only in the context of religion,
is a familiar criticism, and Singer cites Plato‘s Euthyphro to defend the claim that
ethics must be rationally justifiable, not simply an appeal to the gods. Singer‘s
explanation of why the study of ethics should be treated independently of religion
is misleading, however, because he again presents an unfair caricature of the
religious position. He states that the motivation for being ethical, according to
43
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religious ethics, is to avoid roasting in hell.45 This claim might be an appropriate
description for a television evangelist, but it is not appropriate for the scholarly
thinking about ethics found in many religious traditions. The Bishop, for instance,
if he is Catholic, is unlikely to use the concept of hell as justification for moral
behaviour. Catholic tradition does acknowledge rules and principles, but this is
done on the basis of a long tradition of natural law theory in both philosophy and
theology.46

According to Singer, the fourth false assumption that people make is to think that
ethical claims are either subjective or relative. The bulk of Practical Ethics is
devoted to explaining how rational thinking thwarts claims that ethical decision
making is either subjective or relative. Singer rejects the traditional meaning of
subjectivism, namely, that judgments about human conduct are limited to personal
perception. He is, however, a subjectivist in the utilitarian sense because he agrees
with the claim that humans have a subjective motivation to pursue pleasure and to
avoid pain. But this form of subjectivism is rationally extended to a form of
ethical egoism.47 This motivation promotes an initial desire for preferences or
interests to be satisfied on a subjective basis. However, once humans begin to
think ethically, the motivation to have one‘s own preferences satisfied ought to be
extended to all relevant stakeholders. Singer does not defend ethical objectivity in
the traditional sense because he claims that:
45
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Ethical truths are not written into the fabric of the
universe: to that extent the subjectivist is correct. If there
were no beings with desires or preferences of any kind,
nothing would be of value, and ethics would lack all
content. On the other hand, once there are beings with
desires, there are values that are not only the subjective
values of each individual being. The possibility of being
led, by reasoning, to the point of view of the universe
provides as much ―objectivity‖ as there can be.48

Singer agrees with Sidgwick that a rational moral agent ought to make decisions
from the detached point of view of the universe:

The ethical point of view does, as we have seen, require us
to go beyond a personal point of view to the standpoint of
an impartial spectator. Thus looking at things ethically is a
way of transcending our inward-looking concerns and
identifying ourselves with the most objective point of view
possible – with, as Sidgwick put it, ―the point of view of
the universe.‖49

Having outlined what Singer thinks ethics should not be overly concerned with,
the next section will reconstruct the way he thinks ethics should be done, once
reason is allowed to play its proper role. This reconstruction will show that
Singer‘s three-step process for preference-based decision making provides a
useful but not definitive method of moral enquiry. It will also show that the most
significant weakness of the principle of equality is that it exhibits aspects of a
noble theory that does not work in practice, at least for many complex issues.
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5.5 What Ethics Is: The Role of Reason

In both Practical Ethics and The Expanding Circle Singer argues that solutions to
moral dilemmas are possible by appreciating the role that reason plays using what
he calls a new understanding of ethics.50 He tackles some of the most intractable
issues in practical ethics using this decision making method, and his statement on
abortion below illustrates his confidence in the process.

In contrast to the common opinion that the moral question
about abortion is a dilemma with no solution, I shall show
that, at least within the bounds of nonreligious ethics,
there is a clear-cut answer and those who take a different
view are simply mistaken.51

This is a bold claim because among the various arguments for and against
abortion, no argument has achieved the statues of being the solution based on
rationality qua rationality. Later in this chapter, Singer‘s solution will be shown to
be plausible within the confines of preference calculus, but it also contains several
basic assumptions that undermine his bold claim.

According to Singer, resolving ethical disputes is done by taking the impartial
point of view and extending this to a type of equality that gives equal weight to
the like interests of all relevant stakeholders.52 This new understanding involves a
three-step process of moral enquiry. Rational agents should, first, universalise
self-interestedness by acknowledging the interests of other stakeholders; second,
50
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determine both the quantity and the quality of these interests; and, third, act in a
way that promotes preference satisfaction overall. Singer‘s explanation for the
role of reason in ethics is kept simple because his primary concern is to show how
the principle of equality works. This is partly due to his target audience, but it is
also because he thinks that the ―proof of the pudding lies in the eating‖ as far as
preference utilitarianism is concerned.53

Step 1: Ethical Action and Universalisation

Singer‘s first step of moral deliberation defends the claim that ethical conduct is
acceptable only from a point of view that is universal. He cites Moses‘ version of
the golden rule, the Stoic concept of a universal natural law, Kant‘s categorical
imperative, and the utilitarian ideal that every stakeholder counts as one as
justification for the claim that ethics involves universalisation of some sort.54 The
principle of universalisation is also referred to appropriately as the principle of
fairness because it expands the consideration of ethics to all humans, such as in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

If Singer is right to suggest that some non-human animals exhibit self-awareness,
then it would also seem reasonable to expand the circle of ethics to include them
as well. The practical difficulty is how one decides where to draw the line
between those animals and humans who are only sentient (cats, dogs, human
fetus) and those animals and humans who are self-aware (humans over 2 years,
53
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chimps, dolphins). A pig, for instance, is not technically self-aware, although this
may be due to a human preference for visual self-awareness. If, as seems to be the
case, pigs, dogs, and cats differentiate themselves using their sense of smell, then
the self-awareness circle might include many different species of animals. Singer
does acknowledge that trying to calculate the qualitative interests of animals and
humans is a difficult problem, and this issue will be dealt with later in this
chapter.55

Singer explains that while most ethical theories take universalisation for granted,
no single form of universalisation has been agreed upon. He is right that the
principle of universalisation provides a boundary condition for ethical thinking
that is removed from local or particular concerns. To this extent, the oldest
expression of universalisation, ―treat others only as you consent to being treated in
the same situation,‖ is as timeless as moral theory gets. Harry Gensler describes
the Golden Rule as ―wisdom of the ages‖ because it has been replicated in
numerous and diverse human communities.56

Taken literally, however, the golden rule is absurd, which is why both Kant (a
non-consequentialist) and Sidgwick (a consequentialist) sought to formalise this
basic principle of fairness into a philosophical maxim. So, the principle of
universalisation is best understood as a tool that philosophers use to identify the
boundary of ethical theory, rather than as a means to solve moral problems. A
major thinker like Kant uses three different formulations of the categorical
55
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imperative in an attempt to provide a prescriptive or formal approach to
universalisation. His explanation of the categorical imperative illustrates the
problems associated with pushing the principle of universalisation too hard. As a
descriptive principle of fairness, universalisation remains a useful concept because
it connects a moral claim with all the relevant stakeholders, but as a prescriptive
tool it is incapable of solving complex moral dilemmas.

The failure of theories of ethics to agree on how to apply the principle of
universalisation does not dissuade Singer from attempting an equally bold
initiative.57 He argues that precisely because ethics takes a universal point of
view, a rational agent can accept that a moral action is never justified if it attempts
to argue from the standpoint of a partial or sectional group. Therefore, the first
step in Singer‘s version of moral enquiry is to accept that ethical actions have to
be universalisable. Singer argues that deontological forms of universalisation are
too demanding and that the only way to resolve Kantian-type rule conflicts is to
formulate a complex hierarchy of rules or commands. He claims that the
consequentialist approach is untouched by complexity problems because the
emphasis is on goals.58 Significantly, he does not say, at this early stage, why
emphasising goals rather than duty reduces complexity. Later in this thesis this
claim will be shown to be too bold, largely as a result of Singer‘s subsequent
recognition of the impractical complexity of preference calculus in The Expanding
Circle.59
57
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Singer argues that universalisation is a useful first step in ethics because it helps to
differentiate claims about ethics from claims about personal or cultural preference.
He illustrates this by showing how racism is thwarted by the principle of
universalisation. Both consequentialists and non-consequentialists provide cogent
arguments against racism, and the connecting principle for Singer is the principle
of fairness or universalisation, even though the respective theoretical traditions
may share almost nothing else in common. In other words, the principle of
universalisation provides a thin justification for extending the boundary of ethical
consideration to all humans – and perhaps some non-humans. From a historical
perspective, this seems appropriate because many moral philosophers have used
the principle of universalisation as the starting point of moral evaluation, even
though they have had different perspectives on what constitutes universalisable
moral argument.

However, the idea that one should universalise ethical deliberation in this way
does have its critics. Toulmin argues that the Modern shift from particular
concerns toward universals was a retrograde step because it rejected important
Middle Age and Renaissance conceptions about ethics that followed Aristotle in
claiming that the Good lacked universal form. Toulmin says the move toward
principles of universality had its genesis in the seventeenth-century hope that
ethics might achieve a formal theoretical status.60 He claims that the
Enlightenment shift toward universals was part of a general shift away from four
60
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different kinds of practical knowledge advocated in Renaissance humanism: the
oral, the particular, the local, and the timely. He further claims that the focus of
philosophical enquiry during the Modern period ignored particular and local
concerns because philosophers were searching for a higher-order foundation for
ethics, one that was abstract, timeless, and universal.61 Toulmin further argues that
this search for an epistemic foundation for ethics was misguided precisely because
practical philosophy should give timely consideration to oral, particular, and local
concerns.62 In effect he advocates a conception of rationality that targets the
pragmatist concern for appropriate reasonableness between rational discussants,
rather than one that is disconnected and impartial. Toulmin agrees with Rorty that
strong foundationalist claims need to be rejected because they preclude a type of
thinking that fits the practical rationality necessary for disciplines like medicine
and law.63

Dancy is another philosopher who rejects the focus on moral universalisation. He
claims that grounding ethical decisions in moral universalisability is mistaken
because it ignores the difference that new knowledge can make to a given case.64
Because this new knowledge may be sufficient to cause a change of mind about
moral action, it calls into question what were previously thought to be sufficient
reasons for moral judgment. Dancy claims that we should not be driven from case
to case by universalisable moral judgments because we cannot be certain about
the particular facts of a case on which moral action is judged. 65 In the same way
61
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that an experimental scientist can never be certain that experimental probability
leads to facts, a moral agent will not be sure that a universalisable moral rule
should be applied to a particular case. Dancy argues that ethics does not need ―a
suitable supply of moral principles‖ because practical rationality is about
particular cases and should always be open, revisable, and conditional to the
complexities involved.66

This is the problem Kant overlooks when he tries to justify how one categorical
imperative can be used to trump another. In his essay, On a Supposed Right to
Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives, Kant defends the moral duty to be truthful to a
murderer, even when lying could prevent harm. He states that honesty and
truthfulness are a ―sacred and unconditional command of reason, and not to be
limited by any expediency.‖67 Kant is responding to critics who claim that moral
imperatives are not absolute. Modern philosophers also reject the absolute
commands of reason that Kant attached to the principle of universalisability. For
example, MacIntyre argues that as long as one is creative, absurd propositions
such as ―let everyone except me be treated as a means‖ can be turned into
categorical imperatives.68 This proposition seems blatantly immoral but it is
consistent with all formulations of Kant‘s categorical imperative.

In Singer‘s case, however, he does not use the principle of universalisation in this
formal sense. Rather, he uses it as a principle of fairness, to show how ethical
66
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thinkers differentiate between ethical claims that are universal and other claims
that are not. The fact that they universalise is Singer‘s justification for taking this
first step in moral enquiry. Given this limited understanding, it seems to provide
an appropriate boundary for articulating moral claims.

Step 2: Ethical Action and Preference Utilitarianism

After grounding ethics in the principle of universalisation, Singer‘s second step of
moral enquiry is to adopt what he calls a broadly utilitarian position.69 He follows
Sidgwick in claiming that from the ―point of view of the universe,‖ it is selfevident that the good of one individual counts the same as the good of another.70
In so doing, Singer argues that we can no longer limit ethical consideration to
humans and that the circle of ethics should therefore be expanded to include all
sentient beings at one level and self-aware beings at another.71 He explains that
the motivation to include sentient and self-aware animals in ethical consideration
is simply an extension of the type of arguments now used to oppose racism. When
rational thinking eventually acknowledged that the colour of a person‘s skin was
irrelevant to ethical concerns, treating people differently for that reason was no
longer acceptable. For Singer, the time has come to expand the circle of ethics as
far as the sentience boundary, because this is the only reasonable comparison that
can be made between humans and other species.72
69
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In many institutions this recognition has already taken place. In Australia,
research institutions are required to consider the suffering that animals may
experience in the process of the research. It is routine now for animal research
ethics committees to reject applications that fail to take animal suffering into
consideration. When Practical Ethics was written, Singer had in mind
pharmaceutical and cosmetic companies who, until relatively recently, gave no
serious consideration to the suffering caused to their animal research subjects.
Singer‘s method of explanation, however, seems unnecessarily provocative, and
this sometimes masks the point he is trying to make:

If experimenters are not prepared to use orphaned humans
with severe and irreversible brain damage, their readiness
to use nonhuman animals seems to discriminate on the
basis of species alone.73

Singer is not suggesting that experimenters ought to start using disabled humans
as research subjects. He is making the point that a severely disabled child has less
capacity to suffer (sentience) than many research animals. Singer‘s thought
experiment highlights a significant problem associated with preference calculus.
The child in the case above must be orphaned because Singer appreciates that a
non-orphaned child has parents whose interests need to be considered. This
accommodation to the loss felt by parents provides a key to appreciating why
Singer‘s disabled infant illustration fails on utilitarian grounds. If one takes into
consideration the interests of parents then one ought also to take into
73
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consideration the interests of unrelated members of the community who feel
uncomfortable about using disabled children in this way. If so, then the interest
calculus is weighted against using disabled children. A fuller account of the
problems associated with the principle of equal consideration of interests will
follow later in this chapter, but the following description highlights the problem in
the above case:

The principle of equal consideration of interests acts like a
pair of scales, weighing interests impartially. True scales
favour the side where the interest is stronger or where
several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of
similar interests; but they take no account of whose
interests they are weighing.74

The capacity to suffer is used by Singer as a short-hand category for sentient
beings. Because the capacity to suffer is not restricted to humans, a rational agent
ought to accept that the subjective human preference to avoid suffering must, in
some sense, also be accepted for all sentient beings.75

The essence of the principle of equal consideration of
interests is that we give equal weight in our moral
deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by
our actions. This means that if only X and Y would be
affected by a possible act, and if X stands to lose more
than Y stands to gain, it is better not to do the act. We
cannot, if we accept the principle of equal consideration of
interests, say that doing the act is better, despite the facts
described, because we are more concerned about Y than
we are about X. What the principle really amounts to is
this: an interest is an interest, whoever’s interest it may
be.76
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The reason that Singer‘s thought experiment about using disabled orphans as
research subjects can be rejected, on preference utilitarian grounds, pivots on the
last sentence in the quote above. When Singer claims both that ―true scales favour
the side where the interest is stronger or where several interests combine to
outweigh a smaller number of similar interests‖ and that ―an interest is an interest,
whoever‘s interest it may be,‖ he seems not to appreciate how this impacts on his
animal suffering argument. At some stage, the amount of preference satisfaction
achieved by causing animals to suffer could conceivably be overridden by a
greater number of people who benefit from the research. Were this to be the case,
preference calculus justifies animal suffering.

Singer‘s description of a sphere or circle of interest77 is similar to cost-benefit
protocols commonly used in a stakeholder analysis.78 The aim of stakeholder
analysis is to map the stakeholders and then to give equal consideration to their
concerns. Equal consideration does not imply that the interests of all stakeholders
are granted equal value. There are often valid reasons for overriding the interests
of a small number of stakeholders if the benefits gained from doing so are
substantial, so equal consideration does not necessarily imply equal treatment.

The difference between Singer‘s preference circle and other stakeholder models is
the recognition of the individual interests of non-human stakeholders. In other
stakeholder models, animals are lumped together in species groups. In Singer‘s
77
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version of interest calculation, the individual cow, sheep, or chicken has interests
that ought to be given equal consideration in the same way as that offered to
individual humans.79 A chicken counts for something because it can suffer and
therefore the decision to use a battery-hen model of egg production must weigh
the amount of individual chicken suffering against the amount of interest
satisfaction from farmers and people who eat eggs. If eggs can be harvested from
hens not held in cages, for little extra cost, then it seems reasonable to choose this
method. A method of egg harvesting that does not require a battery of hens
appears to diminish only marginally the interest of egg eaters, whereas the
suffering of the battery hens appears significant. Because hens are sentient
creatures, Singer‘s second step of moral evaluation seems valid, at least to some
extent.

The idea that one should expand the circle of ethics to include animals is a
reasonable extension to traditional arguments that limit ethics to human concerns
only. Singer argues that because there is no justification for refusing to take any
interests into consideration, the ―limit of sentience (using the term as a
convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity to suffer or
experience enjoyment or happiness)‖ is the only defensible boundary of concern
for a moral agent.80 The difficulties associated with implementing this aim might
diminish its impact, but it still seems a reasonable goal to pursue. Bentham‘s
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claim, that if a being can suffer, it should be given ethical consideration is
arguably still the best formula for the ethical consideration of animals.81

Step 3: Ethical Action and the Principle of Impartial Concern

Singer‘s third step of moral enquiry requires a moral agent to calculate interests or
preferences in a manner that achieves the most preference satisfaction for all
stakeholders on an impartial basis. It is this third step toward preference
satisfaction that brings into focus the calculus problems referred to earlier. The
practical problem of calculating equal consideration of interests is critical, and
Singer‘s initial contention that ethics must work in practice is seriously
compromised, at least for complex cases.

This section will reconstruct Singer‘s explanation of how equal consideration is
applied by an impartial rational agent. Using his own examples, the reconstruction
will show that the equality principle is not straightforward. According to Singer, a
rational agent ought to acknowledge the principle of universalisation, expand the
circle of ethics to include all stakeholders (human and non-human), and then
apply the principle of equality to the stakeholders on an impartial basis. Singer
describes his position as both ―ambitious‖ and ―tentative.‖82 It is indeed ambitious
to think, given several millennia of moral thinking, that a new version of
81
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utilitarian calculus can achieve what other theories of ethics have thus far failed to
accomplish.

In Practical Ethics Singer is appropriately tentative because he is attempting to
show how a consistent utilitarian position deals with ethical issues unresolved
using traditional methods of ethical decision making. He states that the principle
of equality is a basic ethical principle, not an assertion of fact, because it takes
seriously the interests of the stakeholders for their own sake.83 The defence of this
claim takes up only four clearly argued pages in Practical Ethics. Singer argues
that the principle of equality, or equal consideration of interests, has four
characteristics:

Equal consideration of interests gives equal weight to the like interests of all
affected by an action because an interest is an interest, no matter whose
interest it might be.
Equal consideration of interests acts like a pair of scales, weighing interests
impartially and favouring the side on which the interests are stronger
[qualitative calculus] or on which several interests combine to outweigh a
smaller number of similar interests [quantitative calculus]; but it takes no
account of whose interests are being weighed.
Equal consideration of interests prohibits making our readiness to consider the
interests of others depend on their abilities or other characteristics, apart from
having interests.
Equal consideration of interests is a minimal principle of equality because it
does not dictate equal treatment.84
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At one level, this minimal description serves as an appropriate introduction to the
type of preference calculus Singer advocates. He introduces the equal
consideration of interests model by arguing that ―the universal aspect of ethics …
does provide a persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly
utilitarian position.‖85 He also provides an appropriately tentative epistemological
limitation on the role that equal consideration of interests plays in rational ethical
deliberation:

This tentative argument for utilitarianism corresponds to
the way in which I shall discuss practical issues in this
book. I am inclined to hold a utilitarian position, and to
some extent the book may be taken as an attempt to
indicate how a consistent utilitarianism would deal with a
number of controversial problems.86

Given these limitations, Practical Ethics achieves this limited aim because the
bulk of the book is devoted to explaining how a preference utilitarian applies
equal consideration of interests to complex issues. Singer‘s tentative defence of
preference utilitarianism mitigates the calculus problems referred to earlier. With
the publication of The Expanding Circle, however, Singer provides a more
nuanced philosophical defence of the principle of equality, and he is bolder about
equal consideration of interests as a decision making protocol.87

In The Expanding Circle Singer also changes the name of the calculus required in
preference utilitarianism. In Practical Ethics the focus is on equal consideration of
85
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interests but this phrase is confusing because, as Singer says, ―Equal consideration
of interests is a minimal principle of equality in the sense that it does not dictate
equal treatment.‖88 This confusion is partly due to the imprecision of Singer‘s
description of equal consideration of interests. For instance, in The Expanding
Circle the principle of equality is described as a decision making protocol that
gives ―equal weight to the interests of all affected by it.‖89 This statement implies
that all interests have equal weight, but this is not what he means. The essence of
the principle of equality is expressed more cogently in Practical Ethics where he
states that an impartial decision maker should give ―equal weight‖ to the ―like
interests‖ of all stakeholders.90 This is because some stakeholders have stronger
interests than others. However, the epistemological problem here is that a decision
that involves both quantitative and qualitative evaluation of interests requires
inside knowledge of the stakeholders. This requirement bears directly on the
concept of impartiality, which Singer claims is indispensible for preference
satisfaction.

In The Expanding Circle Singer describes the process of impartial ethical
consideration in several ways: as ―the principle of impartial consideration,‖ as ―an
objective point of interest of all,‖ as an ―imperative of impartial reason,‖ as the
―viewpoint of an impartial spectator,‖ as an ―appeal to impartial rationality,‖ as a
―standpoint of impartial reasoning,‖ and as ―the standpoint of impartial
88
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concern.‖91 The following reconstruction will use his phrase, ―principle of
impartial consideration,‖ to mean the process of applying equal consideration of
like interests from an impartial perspective. In The Expanding Circle Singer
combines the biological explanation for ethics with a revised account of impartial
consideration of interests.92

As discussed earlier Singer defends evolutionary altruism as the basis for rational
thinking in ethics. He then argues that reason progressed from altruistic acts to
acts defined by customary rules and traditions. For Singer, the principle of
equality is the next logical step that reason must take if it is to progress. In The
Expanding Circle Singer makes a series of bold assertions concerning the
practical application of the principle of impartial consideration. For example,

We can progress toward rational settlement of disputes
over ethics by taking the element of disinterestedness
inherent in the idea of justifying one‘s conduct to society
as a whole, and extending this into the principle, that to be
ethical, a decision must give equal weight to the interests
of all affected by it.93

Inherent in this bold claim is that if rational agents use the principle of impartial
consideration in ethical thinking then progress can be made towards resolving
complex ethical issues. This argument resembles the appeal to a standard model
approach referred to previously. This resemblance is strengthened when Singer
further argues that the principle of equal consideration of interests stands
91
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―alone‖94 and is ―unique‖ as a ―rational basis for ethical decision making.‖95 In
short, ethical behaviour evolved out of our social instincts and progressed, once
the capacity to reason developed, to give a rational agent a broader point of view,
which allowed interest calculation to be done on an impartial basis.96 By
combining the altruistic origin of ethics with an understanding of impartiality, one
arrives at what Singer calls a new understanding of ethics.97 This is the same
position he advocates in Practical Ethics, but he makes it more assertively in The
Expanding Circle. He is now convinced that progress toward rational solutions for
moral issues is possible by taking the idea of impartiality and extending it to give
equal weight to the like interests of all affected stakeholders.98

Singer makes a further strong claim when he argues that ―wherever there are
rational, social beings, whether on earth or in some remote galaxy, we could
expect their standards of conduct to tend toward impartiality, as ours have.‖99 The
claim that a rational social being in another galaxy would also give equal weight
to the like interests of all affected stakeholders seems overstated. There is no
obvious evolutionary requirement that a rational social being in another galaxy
would have a sense of self at all, let alone one similar to humans. It is quite
possible that a rational being, without a sense of self, would have an evolutionary
advantage. For instance, a rational being with a strong social network, but without
a sense of self, would probably be more efficient in its decision making because
94
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its evolutionary fitness would be driven by goals associated with a collective good
rather than the privatised good associated with individuals. If life on Earth serves
as a type-case for how life evolves generally, then Singer‘s claim seems
overstated because social animals with a sense of self are rare. The most common
and successful evolutionary model of social cooperation on this planet is the type
of cooperative behaviour found among non-self-aware beings.

Singer‘s other claim, that equal consideration of interests is the only ―rational
basis for ethical decision making‖ is also overstated. This bold assertion is strange
given the acknowledgement in The Expanding Circle that preference calculus has
several practical difficulties, an acknowledgement confirmed by the case studies
in the next section of this chapter.

The new understanding of ethics promoted in The Expanding Circle provides a
different set of conditional statements associated with the principle of impartial
consideration than that offered in Practical Ethics. For instance, in Practical
Ethics Singer is dismissive of the need for rules, but in The Expanding Circle he
recognises that rules are necessary for social interaction. In Practical Ethics he
says that a system of rules breaks down because it has to develop an increasingly
hierarchical structure of complex rules to resolve conflicts.100 In The Expanding
Circle, however, Singer now acknowledges that the principle of impartial
consideration is too demanding so that some common morality rules are now
required.101 Because a rational agent could always do something more, impartial
100
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consideration is too demanding or, in Singer‘s words, the principle of impartial
consideration is an ―ethic for saints‖ when most of us are sinners.102 Singer seems
to recognise, with his saints and sinners analogy, that a fully impartial rational
being is not going to be found among humans. An impartial rational thinker with a
sense of self also seems like a contradiction in terms because a being with a strong
sense of self will have desires and motivations that inhibit its capacity for making
decisions solely on the basis of the principle of impartial consideration.

The new understanding of ethics defends the need for a set of rules for the
following reason. Common morality rules are necessary because they trade on a
―feeling for others‖ rather than on an ―impersonal concern for all.‖ 103 This is a
significant shift given the ―proof of the pudding‖ justification for equal
consideration of interests in Practical Ethics.104 This conditional application for
impartial concern has its own set of problems. For instance, on what basis does an
impartial agent decide which common morality rules to obey and which not to
obey? The following case studies used by Singer illustrate how the application of
the equality principle fails the ―proof of the pudding‖ test.
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5.6 Impartial Consideration of Interests: Practical Case Studies

Case 1: Battery Hens or Economic Profit

Even in simple cases preference calculus can be complicated so that establishing
objective criteria on which to assess the quantitative and qualitative interests of
the stakeholders is challenging. The battery hen example, referred to previously,
illustrates this point. For instance, it is not clear how an impartial agent can decide
what criteria to use for both quantitative and qualitative preference satisfaction
between the farmer and the hens. According to Singer, self-aware beings are
normally entitled to greater consideration within the circle of interest because selfaware beings can fit the experience of suffering, or even the potential to suffer,
into an extended awareness of their own lives.105 For example, it could be the case
that the loss of production to the farmer is so substantial that it would bring a
significant level of suffering to himself, his family, and his employees. Because
farmers, employees, and other family members have qualitatively greater capacity
for suffering than hens, the process of preference or interest satisfaction must be
weighted in their favour, at least on an individual basis.

If this is the case, then the farmer‘s extended awareness of his own suffering, the
loss of his livelihood, and the impact on his family may lead to preference
satisfaction (qualitatively considered) in their favour, even when compared to
hundreds of caged battery hens. Although it seems counterintuitive, it also seems
105
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possible that hens in cages are not as stressed as humans think because research
on battery hen stress cortical levels is ambiguous.106 However, even if one grants a
significantly higher stress level to battery hens, at what point do combined hen
interests outweigh combined human interests, impartially considered?

Case 2: A Case of Competing Loyalties

A similar calculus problem arises in the sick father illustration that Singer uses to
show how impartial consideration ought to be applied.107 He describes a situation
in which he has an existing dinner appointment with three friends but his father
phones and tells him that he is sick. Singer acknowledges that the decision to visit
his sick father or to keep his dinner appointment is a matter of judgment, because
the preferences of the various stakeholders ―do not come with labels attached.‖108
He claims, however, that an impartial observer can arrive at a ―reasonably
confident verdict‖ by imagining himself in the position of each of the various
stakeholders. He can then weigh up the respective preferences and take the action
that provides the most preference satisfaction.109

There are several practical problems in this apparently simple case that impact on
the efficacy of the principle of impartial consideration as a method of rational
decision making. For instance, Singer does not consider the relationship between
himself and the other stakeholders to be morally significant, because the element
106
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of disinterestedness precludes this.110 However, he also says that because he
knows his father and his friends well, he can confidently say that his father‘s
preference to be visited outweighs the combined preferences of the other four
stakeholders (himself and his three friends). If inside knowledge of the
stakeholders is necessary for preference satisfaction, however, in what sense is the
decision disinterested?

A further problem arises with the application of the principle of impartial
consideration because it is not clear how or why Singer‘s decision to visit his own
father provides practical guidance in similar cases. In Singer‘s example, he is
convinced that the regret of his friends is less significant than the disappointment
of his father. Even if one concedes that Singer is right because he knows his sick
father and his friends well, the process of impartial consideration does not take
seriously enough several other factors that can influence rational decision making.
For instance, it ignores issues of projection and manipulation that can and do take
place within familial relationships. It ignores the impact a domineering father
might have on the son‘s decision making capacity. For example, the son knows
from past experience that his father gets angry if he does not visit when asked to,
and this could influence his decision making. In this scenario, the father‘s
preferences are strong-type preferences, but they are also selfish and
manipulative. According to the principle of impartial consideration, the son would
have to concede to this selfish behaviour because ―true scales‖ favour the stronger
interests without taking into account whose interests are being weighed.111 Singer
110
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appreciates the difficulty of establishing the facts on which to base the principle of
impartial consideration, but he still maintains that impartial consideration can ―test
the soundness‖ of ethical choices.112 Given the practical problems highlighted
above, it is difficult to know what it might mean to ―test the soundness.‖ The
decision to ignore emotional, psychological, relational, and historical alliances in
favour of preference satisfaction is both a theoretical and practical problem with
the principle of impartial consideration model of rational decision making.

Case 3: Warriors and Nut Gatherers

In another illustration Singer uses a dispute over scarce resources between
warriors and nut gatherers. He contends that the respective claims of the warriors
and the nut gatherers can only be evaluated by appealing to something other than
self-interest (such as the warriors need more energy for fighting than nut gathers
do for gathering nuts).113 He argues that a warrior is entitled to a larger share of
nuts, and that this decision is impartial because it compares energy requirements
necessary for fighting and for nut gathering. This justification is impartial as far as
energy requirements are concerned because all warriors get the same amount of
nuts.114

Singer then argues that because both warriors and nut gatherers make a claim for
more nuts, a valid decision would be one that can be justified to warriors, nut
112
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gatherers, and the community in general. Customary morality in this sense,
according to Singer, is a ―system of rules and precepts guiding our conduct
towards one another, supported by widely shared judgments of approval … and
disapproval.‖115 Here again we see a significant shift in thinking between the
justification for equal consideration of interests in Practical Ethics and the
justification for the principle of impartial consideration in The Expanding Circle.

Anne Maclean rightly shows that Singer‘s warrior/nut gatherer consideration is
compatible with the recognition of warriors‘ requirements, but this type of
impartiality is different from that required by the principle of impartial
consideration.116 Maclean argues that Singer equivocates on the meaning of
impartial consideration, between the decision to accept that moral standards must
be disinterested or impartial and the suggestion that impartiality implies equal
consideration.117 She argues that when Singer makes a moral judgment between
the respective needs of warriors and nut gatherers he argues for a decision that is
acceptable to all members of the group, a type of customary morality.118 McLean
is right here because customary rules are impartial in one sense, because they
apply to every situation of the same kind, but they are also partial in another,
because they are derived from a particular communal understanding of why
warriors ought to get more nuts than the nut gatherers. The type of impartial
judgment necessary for the principle of impartial consideration is not like this
115
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because the moral agent places herself in the role of all the stakeholders in order
to work out which action provides the most preference satisfaction.119

Case 4: Earthquake Triage

Singer offers a further justification for the equality principle with two illustrations
of what one ought to do when confronted by victims of an earthquake when one
has limited resources. In the first case Victim A has a crushed leg and is in agony
while Victim B is in slight pain.120 In this case Singer argues that equal treatment
(one shot of morphine each) will not do because A will still be in great pain after
only one shot of morphine. More pain is relieved by unequal distribution because
A is in considerably greater pain than B. Singer states that this type of assessment
―is in line with the principle of declining marginal utility,‖ a guiding principle that
―for a given individual, a set amount of something is more useful when people
have little of it than when they have a lot.‖121 When coupled with the principle of
equal consideration of interests, more weight is granted to individual preferences
if greater overall preference satisfaction can be achieved by unequal treatment.
Thus, in this case Singer suggests that the preference value of A is greater than
that of B.

There is not much to argue about in this case as long as the facts of the case are as
given. It does seem reasonable to give A all the pain relief, but whether one needs
119
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the justification of preference calculus, or any ethical justification at all, is a moot
point. One could argue that this case illustrates a practical rather than an ethical
dilemma. If the decision maker decided to give one shot of morphine to each
patient, she could hardly be described as committing an unethical act, given the
emergency setting.

To illustrate how preference satisfaction works in a more complex setting, Singer
alters the scenario so that Victim A has now lost a leg and is in danger of losing a
toe while Victim B has an injured leg that can be saved.122 Once again, the
rational decision maker only has enough medical resources to treat one patient.
Singer argues that the rational impartial observer should treat the less seriously
injured person first, Victim B, because it is worse to lose a leg than it is to lose a
toe.123 In this case Singer claims that one should not use the principle of declining
marginal utility because treating the less serious patient provides more preference
satisfaction. This is because the more seriously injured patient has already lost a
leg and the scarce resources can only be used to save a toe, whereas, by devoting
the resources to the less seriously injured person, a leg is saved.

This account is obviously a thought experiment, which Singer uses to illustrate
how complex situations require different types of reasoning. The problem with his
account, however, is that it relies on the facts of the case being known to the
impartial rational observer. Ethical decision making using equal consideration of
interests involves a subjective analysis by the rational agent of the qualitative and
122
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quantitative preferences of individual stakeholders. The subjective nature of equal
consideration and the difficulty of consistency are symptomatic of problems
associated with the predictive calculations necessary in all forms of utilitarianism.
Utilitarian theories in general pivot on the ability of the rational agent to ascertain
correctly the product of the calculus: for Bentham it is the pain/pleasure calculus;
for Mill it is the quality of happiness; and for Singer it is preference satisfaction. It
is for this reason that Singer refers to himself as a cognitivist, at least as far as
ethics is concerned, because preference calculus requires that the facts of a given
case are in some sense knowable by the impartial observer.124

Singer uses the two cases above to illustrate what an impartial observer ought to
do in an emergency. His rational solution is not what would happen in a real
emergency, however, because in a real emergency the person with scarce
resources is a paramedic who by definition is not an impartial observer. A
paramedic trained in emergency medicine knows that facts of triage medicine can
be elusive. It is for this reason that the actions of an individual paramedic ought to
be governed more by training and precedent than by rational preference
satisfaction.125

This case illustrates the practice-guided type of enquiry that will be advocated in
Chapter 7 because the paramedic works within the tradition of medicine or, more
specifically, emergency triage, so that she is guided by established ―internal
124
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goods‖ of emergency practice.126 As a paramedic, she is not the arbiter of what
constitutes ―good‖ decision making in emergency situations. She is responsible
for making the decision about who to treat and not to treat, but even here there are
specific action guides within the practice of triage medicine. Hence, a paramedic
does not make impartial decisions based on facts but acts according to standard
triage protocol. The most common form of triage uses a colour-coded
prioritisation system. A triage officer in charge might already have tagged
patients. The triage officer makes a judgment call about the severity of injuries
and tags each patient with a card folded in one of four ways.127

1. RED

Top priority: Casualties whose injuries are
considered life-threatening.

2. YELLOW

Second priority: Casualties whose injuries are
not considered life-threatening but need
treatment prior to transport.

3. GREEN

Walking wounded: Casualties who are able to
walk and can be transported from the scene.

4. BLACK

Dead: left for certification by a medical officer.

Good decision making in triage medicine conforms to good practice, and good
practice is determined over time by generations of people trained in emergency
medicine. Triage (sorting) is thus a pragmatic tool used by paramedics to make
emergency medical decisions because the concept of good medicine is a
126
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historically extended practice and therefore not amenable to the impartial
consideration of a rational agent.

If the facts of the first simple case are taken for granted, then the decision maker
using either the equality principle or medical triage would probably do the same
thing. In the second, more complex case, however, the rational preference
decision maker risks making a wrong decision, on utilitarian terms, because
Victim A may in fact be more seriously injured than first thought. If, for the sake
of explanation, the diagnosis of A is wrong, because he has an aortic tear as well
as having lost a leg, then his life-saving treatment would trump, on preference
utilitarian terms, the leg-saving treatment that Victim B requires. In a complex
situation, the predictive requirements of utilitarianism necessitate that the rational
agent make sound judgments about preferences on an impartial basis when it is
probably not possible to do so.

The paramedic using triage protocol, on the other hand, would be considered to
have followed good practice even if she misses the aortic tear and treats Victim B
first. All that the paramedic need do is to act in a way that is consistent with
standard triage practice. Diagnosis at emergency sites must of necessity be based
on professional judgment, and if the judgment of the triage officer turns out to be
wrong, this does not make the actions of the triage officer bad practice; it simply
means an unfortunate decision was made in a difficult situation. Adding
complexity to the simple scenarios that Singer uses is not an exercise in pedantry
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because complexity provides a more realistic boundary for the types of ethical
decision making common in medicine.

5.7 Conclusion

Several problems arise in relation to Singer‘s argument for preference calculus,
primarily because he overstates the efficacy of his version of preference
utilitarianism in a pluralist society such as Australia. If one accepts both Singer‘s
initial argument in Practical Ethics that the study of ethics should not promote
noble theories that do not work in practice and also his latter concession from The
Expanding Circle that the decision to take ―seriously the idea of impartial concern
for all would be impossibly demanding,‖128 then the only conclusion one can draw
from this is that the principle of equality should not be promoted. Certainly one
should not be as assertive as Singer is when he claims that the equality principle
allows progress towards settling disputes over ethics,129 that impartial
consideration is the only rational basis for ethics,130 and that the principle of
impartial consideration is a uniquely rational basis for ethical decision making.131

These overstated claims for the role that reason plays in practical ethics serve to
illustrate Williams‘ concern that simplification in ethics is a mistake, because
moral deliberation is necessarily complex and engages human characteristics other
than the capacity for rational thinking. In this regard, Singer‘s version of practical
128
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decision making suffers from a problem similar to the Beauchamp and Childress
model. The moral life is too complex for the type of decision making model that
Singer promotes. While it is certainly a good idea to give serious consideration to
the interests of all relevant stakeholders, Singer‘s claim that impartial
consideration allows progress towards solving complex moral dilemmas is
overstated.132

The focus of this thesis is the cash value or practical consequences for human
conduct of decision making protocols in practical ethics. From this pragmatist
perspective, Singer‘s preference utilitarian decision making protocol has
diminished cash value in a pluralist society. When Singer presents his version of
preference utilitarianism as something like a standard model of ethics for rational
agents, he overstates its efficacy, at least in a pluralist society. There is no
consensus among philosophers, the primary rational discussants in moral
philosophy, that Singer‘s principle of impartial consideration is as efficacious as
he contends. Moreover, in a pluralist society, the equality principle lacks the
explanatory power necessary for it to trump other theories of ethics.

Another significant problem with Singer‘s equality principle is that it is
ambiguous. This ambiguity relates to whether Singer is a cognitivist or a noncognitivist, as far as ethical truths are concerned. In a series of essays published in
1999, Singer responded to Frank Jackson‘s claim that he was a non-cognitivist in
relation to moral truth because Jackson assumed that Singer‘s version of
132
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preference utilitarianism has the same non-cognitivist basis as Richard Hare‘s
moral prescriptivism.133 For Hare, a utilitarian conclusion can be achieved so long
as one knows the facts of a given case and is prepared to universalise ought-type
statements to maximise the preferences of all concerned. Jackson interprets
Singer‘s explanation in Practical Ethics as a non-cognitivist appeal to inferences
that are not true in the epistemic sense but which do contain prescriptive force or
ought-status.134 In reply, Singer says that Jackson is wrong to refer to him as a
non-cognitivist. While he does agree with Hare that moral statements contain
imperatives, Singer states that he follows Sidgwick in claiming, ―it is a selfevident truth that from ‗the point of view of the universe,‘ the good of one
individual is of no greater significance than the good of another.‖135 Thus, as far
as Singer is concerned, there is at least one important ethical judgment that is selfevidently true, which is why he would not call himself a non-cognitivist.

Singer‘s appeal to ―the point of view of the universe‖ was addressed in Chapter 1
so it suffices to repeat here Williams‘ point that the disengaged or impartial moral
agent is precisely what one does not want when dealing with complex moral
issues.136 The four case studies above illustrate this point. In the first case, while it
seems counterintuitive, it is possible that healthy hens in battery cages are less
stressed than healthy free-range hens. In the case of competing loyalties, Singer
133
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ignores the emotional and psychological issues that impact on the strength of
preference satisfaction. A strong preference can result from being selfish, or
narcissistic, or even cruel, so a rational agent should not satisfy these preferences
simply because they are strongly held. In the triage case, the complexity of the
second scenario diminishes the ability of a rational agent to provide the most
preference satisfaction because the facts of the case are too complicated. In this
case the practice of triage medicine offers a superior decision making protocol
than the principle of impartial consideration. In the long run, moreover, the utility
of triage medicine is superior to preference calculus because it is driven by a
teleological imperative (health) that is useful in many different settings.

Perhaps the major difficulty with Singer‘s position is one he recognises. Toward
the end of The Expanding Circle he acknowledges that ―taking seriously the idea
of impartial concern for all‖ is ―impossibly demanding,‖ because there is always
something else we could have done better, and so some common morality rules
are required because an ―ethic of rules‖ places appropriate limits on what is
expected of a moral agent.137 Further on in the same passage Singer offers another
reason for having rules, namely, that we ―lack the time and information needed‖
for ―long and involved calculations.‖138 This more realistic assessment of
impartial consideration is in stark contrast to his earlier assessment in The
Expanding Circle that ―standards of conduct‖ for self-aware beings anywhere in
the universe will ―tend toward impartiality, as ours have.‖139 Having recognised
137
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that impartial consideration of interests is too demanding, he goes full circle and
says that some ―common morality‖ rules are therefore now required.140 Rules are
now necessary for the following reasons:

To limit moral obligations
To make them more personal
To educate the young
To reduce the need for intricate calculations
To control the temptation to bend ethical calculations in our own favour
To build a commitment to truthfulness that is essential for
communication.141

Singer maintains that rules are now ―normally useful and normally to be obeyed
but always ultimately subject to critical scrutiny‖ from the standpoint of impartial
concern.142 He does not seem to appreciate that this appeal to rules that are
normally to be obeyed but sometimes can be overridden lacks rational application
unless one knows in what circumstance they ought to be overridden. This problem
is most clearly seen in his book on life and death issues, which is devoted to
debunking the traditional ethics of ―Bishops and conservative bioethicists‖ who
argue for the sanctity of life principle.143 Singer, like Kant before him, argues that
the time has come for a Copernican revolution in applied ethics, and the way to do
this is to find a new set of rules or commands that are not based on sanctity of life
principles.144 He calls this revolution ―the new approach to life and death.‖145 The
problem for Singer is that the old approach, a system of rules associated with
140
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respect for the sanctity of life, exhibits all the characteristics of a system of rules
that he claims ought normally to be obeyed. As a result Singer‘s advocacy for the
principle of impartial concern lacks application in a pluralist society because
common morality rules are too thin to be used in a way that provides progress
towards settling disputes over ethics.146 Consensus over thin moral rules breaks
down when these rules are applied to complex cases because rational discussants
derive their views from a diverse array of incommensurable moral positions. The
point of departure for the next chapter is MacIntyre‘s explanation of the
conceptual incommensurability of rival moral arguments, like those above, and
his historicist justification for an alternative tradition-guided approach to moral
enquiry.

146

Singer, The Expanding Circle, 100.

202

CHAPTER 6: TRADITION-GUIDED ENQUIRY

6.1 Introduction

The central claim of this thesis is that in a pluralist society, a practice-guided form
of moral enquiry offers greater explanatory power – over both the agreements and
the disagreements within practical ethics – than other forms of moral enquiry
because it trades on a thin consensus within practices that already exists. This
chapter will focus on one of the most strident critics of the contemporary approach
to decision making in practical ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre. In an essay with the
provocative title, ―Does applied ethics rest on a mistake?,‖ MacIntyre answers in
the affirmative.1 He claims that the basic mistake is the attempt to make decision
making impartial and disinterested, based on a construction of the self that is
independent of a moral agent‘s personal history and sense of purpose. The central
claim of MacIntyre‘s essay is that the kind of activity that is presumed in decision
making protocols used in practical ethics does not exist, at least not in a form that
can produce rational agreement.2 This lack of agreement, for MacIntyre, leaves
moral philosophy in a state of crisis.

This chapter will first outline MacIntyre‘s ―moral crisis‖ thesis directed at
contemporary approaches to practical ethics. A reconstruction of his traditionguided methodology will follow, through his three major publications on this
1
2
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theme, in which he makes the case that the crisis is so dire that the time has come
to return to an earlier from of moral enquiry (Aristotelian Thomism). Two
propositions concerning MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided methodology will be
defended in this chapter. First, it will be argued that although MacIntyre‘s case for
tradition-dependent rationality is sound, the consequences that flow from this
realisation are not as devastating as he thinks. Second, it will also be argued that
the commitment MacIntyre makes to a revised form of Thomism is not sustained,
even on his own terms.

6.2 Epistemological Crisis and Moral Enquiry

In the Prologue to the third edition of After Virtue, MacIntyre states that he has
not yet found any reason for abandoning his central thesis that the Modern
expression of ethics is deprived of context.3 By context he means an Aristotelianstyle context of ―practical beliefs and of supporting habits of thought, feeling, and
action … a context in which moral judgments were understood as governed by
impersonal standards justified by a shared conception of the human good.‖4

MacIntyre argues, following Aristotle, that practical reasoning of this sort works
because adherents to a tradition (generals, judges, surgeons or natural scientists)
recognise that skills associated with their particular practice are communicated by
case-histories and precedents rather than by set precepts. Moreover, MacIntyre
argues that ―the precepts cannot be understood except in terms of their application
3
4
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in the case-histories; and the development of the precepts cannot be understood
except in terms of the history of both precepts and case-histories.‖5 So for
MacIntyre, the ―teaching of method‖ within a tradition is ―nothing other than the
teaching of a certain kind of history‖ in which a practice has evolved.6

MacIntyre‘s historicist approach to understanding morality pivots on the idea that
human beings are essentially story-tellers and that moral principles and rules are
constituted by and constitutive of a broader narrative or tradition. He claims that a
moral agent can only answer the question, ―What am I to do?‖ once she has
established the story or stories in which she is embedded.7 Because an
individual‘s search for the moral life is conducted within specific traditions,
conclusions drawn are constitutive of, and constituted by, a particular narrative
explanation of the moral life. Objective rationality for MacIntyre is therefore
found ―not in rule-following‖ but in ―rule-transcending‖ and ―knowing how and
when to put rules and principles to work and when not to.‖8

MacIntyre‘s teleological emphasis for moral enquiry stands in contrast to his
pessimistic assessment of Modern moral philosophy. The hypothesis that
MacIntyre advances in After Virtue is that the language of morality is in a ―state of
grave disorder.‖9 In the chapter entitled ―The Nature of Moral Disagreement
Today and the Claims of Emotivism,‖ MacIntyre explains that the disorder in
5
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moral enquiry can be seen in the adversarial mode of contemporary moral debate:
militarism or pacifism, a right to bodily integrity or abortion is murder, justice as
a form of socialism or justice as defined by the free market.10 MacIntyre argues
that there are three characteristics of the disordered state of contemporary moral
debate. First, using a concept adapted from the philosophy of science, MacIntyre
suggests that rival moral arguments are conceptually incommensurable:

Every one of the arguments is logically valid or can be
easily expanded so as to be made so; the conclusions do
indeed follow from the premises. But the rival premises
are such that we possess no rational way of weighing the
claims of one as against another… From our rival
conclusions we can argue back to our rival premises; but
when we do arrive at our premises argument ceases and
the invocation of one premise against another becomes a
matter of pure assertion and counter-assertion.11

The second characteristic of contemporary moral debate, according to MacIntyre,
is that each of the moral discussants thinks that his or her respective propositions
are based on impersonal rational argument:

the appeal is to a type of consideration which is
independent of the relationship between speaker and
hearer. Its use presupposes the existence of impersonal
criteria—the existence independently, of the preference or
attitudes of speaker and hearer, of standards of justice or
generosity or duty.12

The third characteristic is that the conceptually incommensurable premises of
rival arguments all have diverse historical origins. Some appeal to ―Aristotle‘s
10
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account of the virtues,‖ some to a Marxist ―concept of liberation,‖ some to a
Lockean concept of rights, and some to a ―view of universalisability‖ following
Kant or the ―moral law‖ following Aquinas.13 In an earlier essay entitled ―Why is
the search for the foundations of ethics so frustrating?‖ MacIntyre‘s discontent
with applied moral philosophy had already been articulated:

Premises about moral law with a Thomistic and biblical
background are matched against premises about individual
rights that owe a good deal to Tom Paine, Mary
Wollstonecraft, and John Locke; and both are in conflict
with post-Benthamite notions of utility. I call such
premises incommensurable with each other precisely
because the metaphor of weighing claims that invoke
rights against claims that invoke utility, or claims that
invoke justice against claims that invoke freedom, in some
sort of moral scale is empty of application. There are no
moral scales … hence moral arguments terminate very
quickly and in another way are interminable.14

MacIntyre also encapsulates his distrust about the idea of moral progress in the
title of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Here again he argues that the attempt
to replace authority with reason should be rejected because the Modern appeal to
principles that are ―undeniable by any rational person,‖ independent of ―social and
cultural particularities,‖ is a mistake since neither the Enlightenment thinkers nor
their successors could agree on what these undeniable principles are.15 Here again
MacIntyre contends that moral philosophy of the Modern period failed to see how
connected moral arguments are to the historical tradition from which they emerge:

What the Enlightenment made us for the most part blind to
and what we now need to recover is … a conception of
13
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rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition, a conception
according to which the standards of rational justification
themselves emerge from and are part of a history in which
they are vindicated by the way in which they transcend the
limitations of and provide remedies for the defects of their
predecessors within the history of that same tradition.16

Two years later MacIntyre published the third book on the same theme with the
title, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. Once again he emphasises the
disorder of contemporary moral debate:

Debate between fundamentally opposing standpoints does
occur; but it is inevitably inconclusive. Each warring
position characteristically appears irrefutable to its own
adherents; indeed in its own terms and by its own
standards of argument it is in practice irrefutable.17

MacIntyre claims that the Enlightenment vision for a clear and distinct method of
moral enquiry has remained largely unfulfilled. Moral enquiry has instead evolved
into distinct forms of emotivism, by which he means evaluative moral judgment
based on expressions of personal preference, attitudes, or feelings.18 MacIntyre
thinks that emotivism describes the state of moral argument because it accurately
describes what happens in the search for impersonal and objective criteria for
moral action.

Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments
and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but
expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or
feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in
character.19
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It is the emotivist forms of contemporary practical ethics that MacIntyre finds
most problematic. The preoccupation with principles in practical ethics illustrates
the fragmentation of moral enquiry that MacIntyre contests. In the four-principle
approach of Beauchamp and Childress, the moral agent is encouraged to juggle
principles on an impartial basis and then to produce a rational account of the
juggling process, justifying why one principle trumps another in a given case.
Similarly, with the equality principle advocated by Singer, a moral agent takes
into account established moral rules, the qualitative and quantitative interests of
all the stakeholders (present and future), and then impartially evaluates which set
of interests trumps all others. In contrast, MacIntyre asserts ―that in [present-day]
moral argument the apparent assertion of principles functions as a mask for
expressions of personal preference.‖20

MacIntyre‘s assessment of what a moral agent ought to do, given the present state
of disorder in contemporary moral enquiry, is to reengage with a historicist
method of moral enquiry that can be traced back to Aristotle. In the Prologue to
the third edition of After Virtue, MacIntyre provides an interesting biographical
note that sheds light on a transition in his thinking between 1981 when After
Virtue was first published and 1988 when Whose Justice? Which Rationality? was
published. He states that when he wrote After Virtue he was already an
Aristotelian but not yet a Thomist, but that he became a Thomist soon after
because he became convinced that ―Aquinas was in some respects a better
20
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Aristotelian than Aristotle, that not only was he an excellent interpreter of
Aristotle‘s texts, but that he had been able to extend and deepen both Aristotle‘s
metaphysical and his moral enquiries.‖21

This transition will become clearer as the following section unpacks MacIntyre‘s
tradition-guided method of enquiry. The aim of his historicist methodology is to
reorient moral enquiry:

If the characteristics of our own moral arguments which I
have identified—most notably the fact that we
simultaneously and inconsistently treat moral argument as
an exercise of our rational powers and as mere expressive
assertion—are symptoms of moral disorder, we ought to
be able to construct a true historical narrative in which at
an earlier stage moral argument is very different in kind.22

6.3 Tradition-Guided Enquiry

MacIntyre‘s thinking on tradition-guided enquiry has evolved through the
publication of three major works on moral theory: After Virtue (1981), Whose
Justice? Which Rationality? (1988), and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry
(1990). This historicist emphasis was evident in earlier material, however, where
MacIntyre claimed that ―moral concepts are embodied in and constitutive of forms
of social life.‖23 Nevertheless, the application of this model to Aristotelian and
then Thomistic traditions evolved during the publication of the above trilogy.

21
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After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (1981, 1984, 2007)

A pessimistic assessment of moral argument provides the starting point of
MacIntyre‘s most significant contribution to moral theory, After Virtue. He
describes the language of morality as being in a ―state of grave disorder‖ because
some of the assumptions about rationality associated with the Cartesian or
Modern period are unreliable and others are simply fictional.24 However, for
MacIntyre the main weakness of the Modern period was a failure to appreciate the
role that history and tradition play in the way moral concepts are utilised.

The impartial observer status, for instance, is fictional, according to MacIntyre,
because a moral agent is already embedded in a social milieu in which the
boundary conditions of rational argument have been defined in specific ways. He
further claims that the Modern attempt to remove concepts such as truth and
reality from their teleological framework deprives these terms of the only context
in which they can be made ―fully intelligible and rationally defensible.‖25

Once these foundationalist assumptions are rejected, MacIntyre argues that the
attempt to weigh one moral argument against another, on some impartial basis,
breaks down because the so-called point of view of the universe is local, timely,
and subjective for each moral agent.26 He suggests that because protagonists in a
moral debate can draw conclusions from valid inferences, the metaphor of
24
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weighing competing moral claims against each other, such as rights against utility
or justice against freedom, does not work. The reason for this failure is that there
are no moral scales that a moral agent can use to show how one moral argument
trumps another.27 MacIntyre argues that because protagonists in a moral debate do
not often agree on the foundational premises on which the debate is conducted,
agreement is therefore either rare or accidental. The more common characteristic
of moral debate, according to MacIntyre, is that moral argument gives way to an
―increasingly shrill battle of assertion with counter-assertion.‖28

After Virtue is a dogged either/or presentation of Aristotelian teleological morality
or no morality (except on Nietzsche‘s terms). Nietzsche‘s legacy is evident in the
first chapter, entitled ―A Disquieting Suggestion,‖ where MacIntyre argues that
most of what passes for moral argument since the Enlightenment needs to be
rejected.29 The climax of After Virtue is a comparison between Nietzsche‘s
scathing attack on moral objectivity and Aristotle‘s practical telos.30 MacIntyre
argues that it was Nietzsche, more than any other philosopher, who perceived
correctly that objective moral claims were really expressions of a subjective
will.31 Richard Neuhaus describes MacIntyre‘s position as a choice between the
teleological virtues of Aristotle and the moral nihilism of Nietzsche, but this
27
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misrepresents MacIntyre.32 MacIntyre agrees with Nietzsche that the objective
status of moral concepts such as natural rights and utility is fictitious, so he is not
suggesting that a moral agent has to choose between Aristotle and Nietzsche.33
Rather, he argues that because Nietzsche is right about the epistemic failure of
Modernity, Aristotle‘s practical rationality offers a more productive alternative for
the moral life.34

MacIntyre gives three reasons why moral debate is in such disarray. First, a
complex moral argument employs specific normative and evaluative concepts,
and there is no rational way to adjudicate between competing moral claims.
Second, independently of one another, competing moral arguments falsely purport
to be based on concepts that are impersonally rational. Third, contemporary moral
debate lacks awareness of the historical transition of meaning that occurs over
time to moral concepts such as justice or moral duty.35 Given the parlous state of
moral enquiry, MacIntyre advocates a return to a type of tradition-guided enquiry,
first, by appreciating the setting in which moral precepts were first used and have
since evolved and, second, by evaluating how well a moral tradition supports what
he calls the telos of a ―whole human life.‖36 MacIntyre argues that this historicist
method is not relativistic because moral progress is possible once the Aristotelian
teleological link between the self and social identity is made.37
32
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The link between rationality and culture in After Virtue is the main reason why
MacIntyre was initially considered to advocate a type of moral relativism, but this
claim misrepresents his position. MacIntyre does advocate a form of
epistemological relativism, but he is not a moral relativist, primarily because he
agrees with Aristotle that a teleological purpose is the primary motivation for
human flourishing.38 The charge of relativism is partly due to the time MacIntyre
took to explain the distinction between moral pluralism, which he endorses, and
moral relativism, which he does not. Several years following the publication of
After Virtue he published articles that deal directly with the confusion between
pluralism and relativism, where he defends a type of moral enquiry that evaluates
the historical benefits of pluralism from a teleological perspective.39

MacIntyre advocates a teleological approach precisely because of the failure of
the Enlightenment to provide objective criteria for moral deliberation. This
teleological emphasis transcends the limited goods of particular practices because
it constitutes the good of a unified human life. MacIntyre argues that the search
for moral virtue is constituted within a particular tradition and is constitutive of a
search for the telos of the whole human life for the individual concerned. For
MacIntyre, a teleological account of ethics should involve what he calls a
fundamental contrast between ―man-as-he happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be38
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if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.‖40 As such, After Virtue involves an historical
analysis of various traditions and a tentative conclusion about which tradition he
thinks best serves the telos of the whole human life.

For MacIntyre, practical rationality in a living tradition is made coherent through
the application of internal goods over time. Rational analysis of a living tradition,
therefore, involves an ongoing socially embodied discussion between practitioners
and others about the goods that are constitutive of that tradition.41 MacIntyre
argues that a living tradition will go through various epistemological crises, and
he uses this transition stage both to examine how well the tradition deals with its
own epistemic claims and also to compare how well one moral tradition stacks up
against another.42

Changes in the methodology associated with utilitarian calculus illustrate for
MacIntyre how a moral tradition deals with its own epistemic shortcomings.
Bentham‘s hedonistic utilitarianism was reformulated by Mill primarily because
an objective standard for calculating the quantity of pleasure could not be
sustained, and thus an alternative hypothesis that recognised qualitative
differences between pleasures was required.43 Similarly, Singer‘s argument for
preference utilitarianism transcends some of the epistemic problems associated
with Mill‘s higher quality pleasure calculus. MacIntyre claims that understanding
40
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the history of justification in a moral argument is integral to a living tradition like
utilitarianism, because contemporary moral claims are derived from ―historically
extended, socially embodied‖ arguments about the internal goods that ―constitute
that tradition.‖44

Behind the teleological purpose that is integral to long-lived human societies,
MacIntyre says a central thesis begins to emerge, namely, that humans are storytelling animals. So the key question for a moral agent is not, ―What am I to do?,‖
following Kant and Bentham, but to ask, ―Of what story or stories do I find
myself a part?‖ following Aristotle.45 MacIntyre contends that because stories are
essential to understanding the unity of a person‘s life, questions about moral good
are best understood in the context of how an individual can fulfil the teleological
expectations in these stories. The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative
quest ―embodied in a single life.‖46

The narrative quest, according to MacIntyre, is a search for the final telos of
human life, a search that enables moral virtues to be understood in the context of a
teleological Good. These virtues are described by MacIntyre as dispositions that
are necessary both to ―sustain practices‖ and to form character because they
supply a moral agent with both ―self-knowledge‖ and an ―increasing knowledge
of the good.‖47
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This two-sided quest can be explained further. In the first instance, MacIntyre
acknowledges that a moral agent is involved in a quest for a set of virtues that
sustain, in Aristotelian terms, the telos of human flourishing (courage, honesty,
respect, etc.). The primary disposition towards a teleological concept of virtue
also sustains a moral agent in the secondary pursuit of a set of goods that are
internal to particular practices such as medicine, philosophy, painting, or
architecture.

The primary pursuit of human flourishing is deliberately vague in Aristotle
because he maintains that a moral virtue such as courage is the mean between
extremes of foolishness and cowardliness. According to this definition, courage is
a state of character that is conditionally measured with respect to the right time,
the right people, and for the right ends.48 MacIntyre argues that the good life must
transcend Aristotle‘s metaphysical idea of happiness. For MacIntyre, the good life
also involves a secondary pursuit that enables a moral agent to ―understand what
more and what else the good life for man is.‖49 This secondary pursuit, for
MacIntyre, involves a narrative account of the internal goods that sustain a
practice. Virtuous actions require a disposition to achieve the goods that are
internal to the practice and also to sustain the practice in its teleological quest. For
MacIntyre, the virtues ―find their point and purpose‖ in the way they define the
internal goods that sustain relationships within a practice.50
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These internal goods sustain both the form of life and the traditions in which an
individual finds him or herself engaged.51 The concept of a ―practice‖ in
MacIntyre‘s work is sufficiently nuanced and useful to warrant it being quoted in
full.
By a ―practice‖ I am going to mean any coherent and
complex form of socially established cooperative human
activity through which goods internal to that form of
activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to,
and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the
result that human powers to achieve excellence, and
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are
systematically extended.52

Tradition-constituted enquiry is therefore a type of analytic method that examines
both the primary and secondary pursuits of a tradition by focusing on its own
narrative account of its practices. A practice, moral or otherwise, is made
intelligible, according to MacIntyre, only from within a ―larger and longer history
of the tradition through which the practice in its present form was conveyed to
us‖; thus the history of a single life is therefore characteristically ―embedded‖ and
―made intelligible‖ in ―the larger and longer histories of a number of traditions.‖53

MacIntyre uses the first eight chapters of After Virtue to defend his initial claim
concerning the parlous state of moral enquiry. The centerpiece of After Virtue,
both literally and philosophically, is chapter nine, where MacIntyre explains why
Nietzsche and Aristotle, albeit in different ways, offer a way forward. The way
51
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forward in chapters ten through seventeen is based on two central premises that
tentatively point to a new method of enquiry. First, he explains how Nietzsche
perceived more clearly than anyone else why the attempt to provide a foundation
for moral enquiry based on reason alone had failed. Second, he explains why a
renewed appreciation of Aristotelian virtues is necessary to overcome this
failure.54

The eighteenth and final chapter is subtitled ―Nietzsche or Aristotle, Trotsky and
St Benedict‖ and contains an appeal to return to forms of life in which the moral
virtues can be sustained. MacIntyre argues that moral enquiry is now at a turning
point, for if his account of contemporary moral discourse is accurate, then ―what
matters at this stage‖ is to establish what he calls ―local forms of community‖ that
can sustain us through the ―new dark ages‖ that are already upon us. 55 The end of
After Virtue seems equally as pessimistic as the beginning because MacIntyre
claims that the predicament we find ourselves in will not be solved without
establishing a form of moral community that is consistent with what he calls
―another – but doubtless very different – St. Benedict.‖56

Even sympathetic readers of After Virtue found this conclusion unsatisfactory.
After strenuously arguing that reason is itself tradition-dependent, MacIntyre‘s
tentative conclusion contains an appeal to a particular tradition within
Catholicism, one he thinks offers a paradigmatic community for nurturing the
54
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moral life. Whether or not he is right about the Benedictine community carries
little significance because he does not defend the claim. This concluding sentence
of After Virtue reads like an unconvinced attempt to avoid the relativistic
comparisons of traditions. It appears that MacIntyre attempts to deal with his own
version of an epistemic crisis because once having deconstructed Modernity he
seems inclined to want more certainty about the moral life than Aristotle offers.

In the Postscript to the second edition of After Virtue, MacIntyre responds to
critics of the tradition-guided approach and reminds readers that the search for a
rational solution to moral dilemmas remains an epistemic problem, regardless of
whether one agrees with his analysis of any particular tradition, positive or
negative. MacIntyre says he is not the first to articulate that the ―evaluative and
normative concepts‖ of moral philosophy cannot be found except as embodied in
the ―historical lives of particular social groups‖ that have evolved over time.57
This evolution of moral argument is sometimes internal, because the premises on
which moral argument is conducted are themselves refined, and sometimes
external, because moral discourse interacts with other forms of argument.

Gilbert Meilaender exemplifies a common criticism of MacIntyre‘s concluding
paragraph when he claims that in the time since After Virtue was written,
MacIntyre has not ―made much progress in pointing us to actual communities of
the sort he has in mind.‖58 Meilaender‘s criticism of MacIntyre does have some
57
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initial currency because tradition-guided enquiry contains a self-limiting
condition, namely that a moral agent is characteristically embedded in several
different traditions. This criticism is not shared by more sympathetic readers of
MacIntyre‘s work. John Horton and Susan Mendus edited a series of papers
devoted to MacIntyre‘s work and they argue that MacIntyre has given serious
consideration to the two main criticisms associated with the central thesis of After
Virtue. They argue that in two subsequent publications, Whose Justice? Which
Rationality? and Three Rival Version of Moral Enquiry MacIntyre does attempt to
show how a ―dynamic interaction of rival traditions may provide room for critical
reflection on a tradition and the avoidance of relativism.‖59 Whether he achieves
this aim is the subject of the next two sub-sections of this chapter.

Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988)

MacIntyre‘s second book in this series, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, is not
technically a sequel even though he responds to some of the perceived weaknesses
of After Virtue. With the publication of this work MacIntyre continues his attack
on Modernity and provides a substantial defence of tradition-guided enquiry. The
questioning title ―Whose justice?‖ and ―Which rationality?‖ focuses on his main
assertion about practical reasoning, namely, that practical reasoning over a moral
concept like justice, and indeed the concept of rationality itself, depends on the
social milieu in which these terms are used, because both the theory and practice
59
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of justice and rationality can only be conceptualised in time and place.60 Using the
concept of justice, MacIntyre attempts to show that while the thin or common use
of the term is easily understood, its use as a thick moral maxim is not so
straightforward because there are at least three rival accounts of justice –
inalienable human rights, social contract, and some standard of utility.61 Because
there exists a basic incommensurability between these three concepts of justice,
MacIntyre argues that the Enlightenment period results in a new set of
philosophical conflicts that replaced the old religious conflicts.

The title of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (hereafter Whose Justice?) asks
two questions that encapsulate what MacIntyre thinks is the main problem with
the Modern understanding of moral enquiry. Whose form of justice should the
moral agent accept, and which concept of rationality provides sufficient
justification for overcoming other rival accounts? The fact that diverse conceptual
concepts of justice exist at all is sufficient, as far as MacIntyre is concerned, to
show that practical reasoning cannot be divorced from its own history.62

The Modern vision of moral agents who disavow allegiance to any particular
theory of morality and abstract themselves from their particular social
relationships is misleading, according to MacIntyre, because the requirement of
disinterestedness is itself already partisan to a liberal individualist account of
rational thinking. The neutrality of the Modern concept of rationality is a facade
60
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because it ignores what MacIntyre refers to as the ―inescapably historically and
socially context-bound character‖ that the theory and practice of practical
rationality must have.63

Contemporary writers in practical ethics, at least those who argue that rational
thinking can resolve moral dilemmas, seem to have forgotten that their Modern
predecessors tried and failed to achieve a very similar task.64 MacIntyre has
shown that Hume‘s appeal to passions, Kant‘s appeal to the categorical
imperative, and the various manifestations of the principle of utility were all
attempts at providing moral agents with irrefutable action guides for rational
decision making.65 The fact that contemporary consequentialists and nonconsequentialists seem immune to each other‘s epistemological claims seems to
be a source of increasing frustration for MacIntyre.

The conveners of a philosophy conference in 1991 were probably surprised or
perhaps a little disturbed by MacIntyre‘s keynote address. The conference theme
concerned the demise of abstract principles and the renaissance of tradition, but
MacIntyre claimed that nothing of the sort has happened. He argued that in spite
of numerous philosophers agreeing with the epistemological problem he presented
in After Virtue, namely, that moral claims can only be intelligible from within the
―particularities and contingencies of historical movements,‖ little has changed in
the way practical rationality is currently being portrayed.66
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The main theme of Whose Justice? is to show how moral progress becomes
possible by giving consideration to a different type of moral disagreement, a
disagreement that occurs within a tradition. MacIntyre argues that moral progress
within a tradition becomes possible via an internal form of disagreement that he
calls an ―epistemological crisis.‖67 So while the introduction to Whose Justice?
reintroduces the reader to the dire state of moral debate, the main focus of the
book is to provide a more substantial defence of tradition-guided enquiry than that
offered in After Virtue.

MacIntyre follows Kuhn and others in arguing that the history of scientific
progress provides a useful comparison for the type of tradition-guided progress he
advocates for moral philosophy.68 He claims that philosophers often acknowledge
that scientific progress is essentially linked to its history but do not seem to
recognise that a similar type of historicity is required to defend arguments in
moral theory.69 Resolution of an epistemological crisis in science enables
contemporary scientists to understand their predecessors more intelligently and
also provides a more coherent explanation of the problem at hand.

Once again following Kuhn, MacIntyre uses Galileo‘s experience with the newly
invented telescope to show what happens when a scientific crisis arises. He
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contrasts Galileo‘s link with a scientific tradition, in which previous narrative
accounts of astronomical observation played a vital role, with what he calls
―Descartes‘ assumption‖ that a rational observer can know nothing unless his
thinking is grounded in a ―presuppositionless first principle.‖70 When Galileo
observed Jupiter‘s moons over several days, he was able to confirm Copernicus‘
skepticism over what was then the prevailing Ptolemaic orthodoxy. MacIntyre
argues that this type of resolution enables science to progress, first because it
showed why the argument for a geocentric universe was no longer tenable and,
second, because it opened up the possibility of confirming the heliocentric
model.71

MacIntyre‘s point is that scientific progress rarely occurs independently of its own
tradition, so from this perspective the revolution that occurs between Kuhn‘s
normal and abnormal science is overstated. For MacIntyre, scientific progress
occurs within a tradition, and a new standard model evolves precisely because the
new model provides greater explanatory power than its predecessor. MacIntyre
thinks that the same historical links can be seen in moral theory. Moral
justification is constituted by and constitutive of a particular narrative tradition,
which implies that doctrines, theses, and arguments require historical
contextualisation.72 MacIntyre argues that tradition-guided enquiry follows a fourstage process that enables a moral agent to understand how an argument has been
70
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constructed over time and how present maxims or rules have been influenced by
interaction with other ideas.

The first stage involves recognising that moral enquiry is essentially historical and
concerns how the argument has gone thus far, particularly in relation to the often
changing status of its first principles. Second, because moral claims are advanced
linguistically, a moral agent needs to understand what moral terms meant in the
past and what they mean now. Third, tradition-guided enquiry provides a moral
agent with an understanding of the diversity of traditions and an appreciation that
each tradition has its own method of rational justification. Finally, a moral agent
using ―tradition-constituted‖ and ―tradition-constitutive‖ enquiry can only explain
how such enquiry works via historical examples.73

MacIntyre provides four sample traditions associated with Aristotle, Augustine,
Aquinas, and Hume to show that each tradition has its own historical justification
for justice and practical rationality. The choice of these traditions rather than
others reflects his main theme that an appeal to a tradition involves a moral agent
in a search for where he or she has come from. In MacIntyre‘s case, these four
traditions probably reveal his heritage and also provide the necessary historical
background for why he eventually posits that one of the traditions offers greater
explanatory power than the others.
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Having appreciated the essential historicity of a moral tradition, MacIntyre argues
that the moral agent is then in a position to compare traditions from a teleological
perspective. This teleological focus was present in After Virtue, where MacIntyre
argues, following Aristotle, that ethics is the search for the ―essential nature‖ of a
human being, but his explanation of what is meant by this is vague. 74 He states
that the teleological aspect of moral enquiry is essential because it transcends the
internal goods of a given practice or tradition and engages the moral agent in a
quest for the teleological good of a ―whole human life.‖75 However, because the
individual human cannot be divorced from his or her own history, the normative
concepts of moral philosophy are, for MacIntyre, a socially constructed
community enterprise. Given that moral argument is socially constructed and
tradition-dependent, how does a moral agent transcend this constraint in order to
fulfil his or her essential nature?76 This problem is not discussed in After Virtue,
apart from the vague reference to a new St. Benedict in the last sentence.

In the preface to Whose Justice?, MacIntyre responds to the central criticism
leveled at After Virtue and commits to making this teleological focus more
explicit. He seeks to provide an answer to two key questions that arise from
tradition-guided enquiry. First, ―what makes it rational to act in one way rather
than another?‖ and second, ―what makes it rational to advance and defend one
conception of practical rationality rather than another?‖77
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As mentioned previously, MacIntyre initially reminds readers of the
epistemological problem in moral theory and then presents the case that a moral
tradition is vindicated or not by how it responds to an epistemological crisis.
However, this internal review only explains how a moral tradition succeeds or
fails on its own terms, and it does not explain why a moral agent should choose
one long-lived moral tradition rather than another. So the major focus of Whose
Justice? Which Rationality? is to provide a tradition-guided comparison of four
distinct traditions – Aristotelianism, Augustinianism, the Scottish Enlightenment
and Liberalism – with the specific goal of discovering which tradition best
supports the telos of the whole human life.

The organisational structure of Whose Justice? is similar to that of After Virtue.
After setting the scene for the state of moral crisis in After Virtue, MacIntyre uses
the central chapter to show how Aristotle‘s practical reasoning transcends
Nietzsche‘s critique of Modernity. Similarly, in the first nine chapters of Whose
Justice?, MacIntyre sets the scene by offering a tradition-guided comparison of
the four traditions mentioned above. He then uses the central tenth chapter,
entitled ―Overcoming a Conflict of Traditions,‖78 to show how moral progress is
possible between two incommensurable or rival traditions by using a two-stage
process for moving beyond disagreement.

The first stage occurs when adherents of a tradition understand the central thesis
of a rival tradition – on its own terms. The second stage occurs when these
78
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adherents recognise that a rival tradition has resources that can help to explain
anomalies or to correct defects in its own position. MacIntyre argues that this type
of resolution is rare because adherents of a tradition rarely exhibit what he calls
the ―gift of empathy‖ that allows for such reasonable consideration.79

The rarity of this type of resolution is exemplified by MacIntyre himself because
his description of a tradition that does transcend itself is left until the final pages
of the book. In the chapters following his explanation for overcoming conflict
between traditions MacIntyre reverts to his main thesis that the perspectival nature
of practical rationality and justice can be seen by comparing three distinct
historical epochs. He begins with the period associate with Aquinas and his
synthesis of Aristotle and Augustine,80 followed by the Scottish Enlightenment
and the emergence of an educated public,81 and lastly he describes a period of
transition associated with what he calls ―Hume‘s Anglicizing subversion‖ and the
emergence of liberalism.82

As with After Virtue, MacIntyre‘s intricately woven historical account in Whose
Justice? is not without its own set of assumptions. As with all complex historical
accounts, the careful reader does not accept any single account as authoritative,
and philosophers, historians, and theologians have criticised MacIntyre on this
account.83 However, MacIntyre‘s point regarding tradition-guided enquiry is not
that his method of doing history gives a moral agent access to an authoritative
79
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narrative. Rather, he seeks to show how the authoritative narrative of a moral
concept like justice changes within and between traditions, and this realisation
allows a moral agent to understand his or her own life within the context of a
broader teleological purpose. MacIntyre begins his explanation of how one
transcends a tradition with the synthesis of Aristotle and Augustine achieved by
Aquinas. His main aim is to show how Aquinas transcended both of them.
MacIntyre argues that Aquinas shows that Aristotle‘s account is ―radically
defective‖ because it does not recognise the ―Augustinian understanding of fallen
human nature.‖84 MacIntyre states that Aquinas‘ account of practical rationality is
―only fully intelligible, let alone defensible‖ when it is understood from within
―an extended and complex tradition of argument and conflict that included far
more than Aristotle and Augustine.‖85

There is a hint here, though probably not much more than a hint, of the
psychological process that MacIntyre seems to have gone through. Long before he
converted to Catholicism, MacIntyre‘s pessimism over moral philosophy seems to
be predicated on the vagueness of Aristotle‘s explanation of the telos of the whole
human life. When MacIntyre claims that Aquinas shows how ―radically defective‖
Aristotle‘s account of the human telos is, the illustration of this defect is ―fallen
human nature.‖ This obvious theological concept is attributed by MacIntyre to
Augustine, but it also might explain the gradual transition in MacIntyre‘s thinking
toward the overt Thomism that he advocates in Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry.
84
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For MacIntyre, any historical analysis of Aquinas‘ thought that is detached from
his own tradition in the search for some neutral position of rationality or authority
does not make sense.86 Aquinas‘ great strength was that he provided a synthesis of
Aristotle and Augustine and showed how the strengths of two rival traditions can
be reformulated once the inadequacies of each tradition are appropriately
understood. Aquinas enabled moral theory to progress, according to MacIntyre,
because he was able to ―identify the limitations‖ and to ―integrate the strengths
and successes‖ of both Aristotle and Augustine into a more coherent moral
scheme.87

MacIntyre‘s next example of tradition transcendence is the Irish Presbyterian
philosopher, Francis Hutcheson, during the Scottish Enlightenment. MacIntyre
argues that Hutcheson, like Aquinas, sought to transcend the Aristotelian concept
of prudence because the Aristotelian appeal to telos required a higher sense of
moral excellence. He does this, according to MacIntyre, by arguing that a ―moral
sense‖ is required for a rational person to transcend the limitations of Aristotelian
teleology.88 This moral sense enables a moral agent to reason correctly and to
reach a consensus on what the law of nature is and therefore over what the
principle of justice requires. MacIntyre contends that the concept of ―moral sense‖
provided, at least for a short time, a new foundation for the study of moral
86
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philosophy and the philosophy of law because it articulated the idea that correct
reasoning was possible.89

MacIntyre‘s final example of tradition transcendence concerns a period he refers
to as ―Hume‘s Anglicizing subversion‖ and involves the transition from Scottish
Protestantism to liberalism.90 Hume‘s dislike of religious tradition is well
established, as is his commitment to the ―passions‖ rather than to some uniform
conceptualisation of rationality. MacIntyre states that Hume‘s account of practical
rationality is broadly compatible with Aristotle‘s, at least when it concerns the
impact of social order on rational thinking. So the individual‘s role in articulating
how a moral concept such as justice is implemented is diminished, for Hume,
because there is no neutral standpoint that shows why one appeal to justice is
better or worse than another.91

MacIntyre argues that Hume‘s Aristotelian conception of prudence was
incompatible with the ―traditional Scottish view‖ and thus caused generations of
Scottish philosophers to articulate their views with Hume‘s skepticism in mind.92
However, for MacIntyre, the fact that Hume frames his description of the passions
in ways removed from any theological justification also shows why understanding
the time and place in which he lived is so important. MacIntyre argues that Hume
distanced himself from his own Scottish heritage and began to articulate principles
of the ―dominant English social and cultural order.‖93 Thus, according to
89
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MacIntyre, understanding Hume‘s account of philosophical theorising, as with the
other thinkers, requires ―a particular type of social setting.‖94

MacIntyre‘s historicism is primarily directed at analysing how a tradition deals
with its own epistemological crises and how it interacts with rivals. He refers to
this method as ―tradition-constituted‖ and ―tradition-constitutive‖ enquiry because
it analyses a moral tradition from an historical standpoint, examining how and
when moral maxims were formed or reformed.95 MacIntyre maintains that a
central characteristic of a long-lived moral tradition is that it evolves through three
stages. The first stage of a tradition is relatively stable because the relevant
beliefs, texts, and authorities go relatively unchallenged. The second
epistemological crisis stage occurs when inadequacies of various types are
identified but not remedied. The crisis can stem from internal or external
arguments that are of sufficient strength to warrant re-evaluation of constitutive
beliefs. The third stage occurs when adherents of a tradition acknowledge the
inadequacies that prompted the epistemological crisis and begin to formulate new
ideas to overcome the problem.96 For MacIntyre, a good indicator of a moral
tradition in danger of collapse is when adherents of a tradition become
preoccupied with refuting rather than recognising the epistemological problems
pointed out by others. MacIntyre argues that a tradition that is not open to
criticism of its epistemic premises will find that ―the pressures of skepticism
94

MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 325.
MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 9-10. Michael Polanyi advocates a similar type of methodology to
MacIntyre known as ―tradition-dependent analysis.‖ Polanyi‘s use of ―tacit‖ knowledge provides a
similar practice-centred (action-oriented) analysis of knowledge claims in science. See John Flett,
―Alasdair MacIntyre‘s Tradition-Constituted Enquiry in Polanyian Perspective,‖ Tradition and
Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical XXVI/2 (1999-2000): 6-20.
96
MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 355.
95

233

become more urgent‖ and the refutation of the skeptic takes on a primary
importance.97 He further argues that a tradition that remains open to the possibility
of change can resolve an epistemological crisis, even when key facets of its
epistemic foundations are challenged. When adherents acknowledge the need to
reformulate a problem belief, while retaining substantive continuity with the
original tradition, their position is strengthened by the crisis.98

The final chapter of Whose Justice?, entitled ―Contested Justices, Contested
Rationalities,‖ sums up the argument for tradition-guided rationality and contains
a surprisingly forthright appeal to the strength of one particular moral tradition
over others. MacIntyre begins by restating his central thesis, that the ideas of
Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hume are inescapably linked to the conflicts and social
life in which they were embedded. For MacIntyre, this is not a peripheral or
accidental fact because in order to understand the ―distinctive conceptions of
justice and practical rationality elaborated by each thinker,‖ one has to appreciate
the ―historical context of tradition, social order, and conflict out of which it
emerged.‖99 MacIntyre acknowledges that if his thesis is correct, then a moral
agent can only ever speak from within his or her own tradition because of the
―story-filled‖ narrative of human formation. So when faced with a moral conflict,
MacIntyre argues that a moral agent has two choices; one can either ―begin
speaking as a protagonist of one contending party‖ or one can ―fall silent.‖100
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MacIntyre chooses the first option and argues that, for himself, a synthesis of
Aristotelian Thomism provides the most appropriate teleological answer to his
initial epistemological questions, Whose Justice? and Which Rationality? 101 His
decision to begin speaking as an apologist for Aristotelian Thomism seems to be
muted and defensive in one sense, almost as if the shadow of relativism still
haunts, but authoritative and assertive in another. He seems defensive when he
says that a book that ends by telling people where to begin does not seem to have
achieved much.102 However, he also encapsulates this new beginning in
authoritative terms in the final few paragraphs where he states that the Thomistic
tradition is able to deal with its epistemological crises better than other traditions.
Thus adherents of the Thomistic tradition can be confident that ―their tradition has
been confirmed in its encounters with other traditions.‖103

Christopher Lutz argues that understanding this personal dimension of
MacIntyre‘s work is pivotal if one is to appreciate the story-filled justification for
Thomism that emerges in his writing. Lutz thinks that MacIntyre‘s advocacy for
Thomism is the latest in a series of epistemological shifts in his intellectual
journey. Lutz argues that MacIntyre moved through distinct phases in his thinking
and writing, from a fideist Christian Marxist in his youth, to an analytic atheist
during his early academic years, and more recently to Catholicism. The shifts in
MacIntyre‘s thinking are not viewed negatively by Lutz because they are
indicative of both the story-filled character of a moral agent that MacIntyre
101
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advocates and the type of practical reasoning that deals appropriately with
epistemological crises.104 Whether or not Lutz‘s interpretation of MacIntyre‘s
personal crises is accurate, the incomplete appeal to Thomism in Whose Justice?
did make MacIntyre re-consider his position and set the tone for a third book in
which he provides a more nuanced defence of Aristotelian Thomism.

Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990)

The third book in MacIntyre‘s trilogy analyses three rival versions of moral
enquiry as background to a more nuanced defence of the closing appeal to
tradition and the Thomistic synthesis in Whose Justice? In the text of Three Rival
Versions of Moral Enquiry (hereafter Three Rival Versions), based on his Gifford
lecture series (1988), MacIntyre once again begins with a pessimistic assessment
of the current state of moral debate.105 He argues that in the hundred years since
the death of Gifford it is hardly controversial to claim that disciplines such as
astronomy and chemistry have made significant and continuing progress.
However, one cannot say this about natural theology, according to MacIntyre,
particularly as far as the foundation of ethics is concerned, because there is no
agreement over what rational progress within the study of ethics ought to be.106

Thus he begins Three Rival Versions in now familiar terms and describes Modern
academic philosophy as a means for a more accurate and informed discussion
104
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about moral problems, rather than a discipline that offers progress toward their
resolution. In Whose Justice? MacIntyre had noted that disagreement over moral
issues among professors of philosophy is as sharp and irremediable as among
others.107 Thus, the attempt to circumvent religious concepts of morality with
impartial rational enquiry failed, not because the religious concepts were correct
but because the theories of ethics based on rational enquiry turned out to be
equally tradition-dependent and disputatious. He further contended that
Enlightenment epistemology deprived the moral agent of a method of rational
enquiry in which the ―standards of rational justification‖ emerge from its own
history.108

In the first lecture, and thus the first chapter of Three Rival Versions, MacIntyre
provides a similar explanation for the problematic assumptions in contemporary
moral enquiry already provided in After Virtue and Whose Justice?, so only a brief
summary is offered here. First, he reminds his audience that in the history of the
Gifford series there had been no agreed-upon set of ―first premises or principles‖
among the contributors.109 Second, he argues that when a foundation of ethics is
advocated, the formulations and conclusions reflect the individual preferences of
the Gifford lecturer. Third, he claims that when contributors do ground ethical
theory in one conception of moral agency rather than another, they offer only a
limited set of resources for establishing what conclusions one should draw from
this foundation.110
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For MacIntyre, the level of disagreement exhibited by the Gifford contributors is
symptomatic of a lack of consensus in academic philosophy in general over what
constitutes moral argument.111 So a stark presentation of the state of moral enquiry
once again sets the scene for MacIntyre‘s justification for taking a historicist
approach. Subsequent lectures, and hence chapters, of Three Rival Versions are
devoted to restating the problem and possibilities of moral argument previously
articulated in After Virtue and Whose Justice? by showing how rival traditions can
learn from one another. The three types of moral enquiry analysed in Three Rival
Versions are different from those offered in After Virtue and Whose Justice?, but
the tradition-guided methodology is the same. Thus a brief outline will suffice to
show how MacIntyre attempts to establish the link between one tradition,
Aristotelian Thomism, and the telos of the whole human life. His idiosyncratic
style once again presents an intricately woven explanation of why some traditions
succeed or fail, on their own terms, and why Aristotelian Thomism offers a way
forward, on teleological grounds.

The first version of moral enquiry that MacIntyre explores is a way of thinking
about moral theory that he describes as ―Encyclopaedia,‖ represented by the Ninth
Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica. The second version, referred to as
―Genealogy,‖ is represented by Nietzsche‘s On the Genealogy of Morals. The
third version, ―Tradition,‖ is represented by the Thomistic synthesis and Pope Leo
XIII‘s Aeterni Patris. MacIntyre argues that tradition-guided enquiry enables
111
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moral agents to understand the internal goods of their own tradition, but also to
have a greater appreciation of the internal goods of rival traditions. For MacIntyre,
the epistemological incommensurability between the encylopaedist and the
genealogist concerning rationality and moral progress justifies his argument for
the role that tradition should play in moral enquiry.112

MacIntyre states that the encylopaedist views the history of moral philosophy as a
unity, progressing steadily from Socrates through to Descartes, Kant, and
onwards. Descartes, the archetypal thinker for the encylopaedist, presents rational
enquiry as ―impersonal, impartial, disinterested, uniting, and universal.‖113
However, this is exactly the type of rational thinking that the genealogist,
following Nietzsche, rejects. Genealogy rejects the encylopaedist concept of
rational truth and consequently the genealogist rejects the claim that rational
justification produces ethical precepts such as duty, obligation, the right, and the
good.114 MacIntyre claims that the incommensurable gap between the
encylopaedist and genealogist presents two alternatives, both of which are
unsatisfactory as far as rational thinking is concerned. Reason is either
―impersonal, universal,‖ and ―disinterested,‖ or it is the ―unwitting representation
of particular interests, masking their drive to power by its false pretensions to
neutrality and disinterestedness.‖115
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For MacIntyre, the encylopaedist concept of moral progress is unsatisfactory
because it is based on the illusion that ―the point or purpose of rational debate is to
establish truths.‖116 However, the genealogical approach is also unsatisfactory
because it is internally incoherent. The genealogist claim, that truth is
perspectival, is self-refuting because the methodology used by the genealogist to
critique the encylopaedist requires a moral agent to stand outside of his or her own
tradition.117

For MacIntyre, both the encylopaedist and the genealogist fail on their own terms.
The internal failure for the encylopaedist is evident because no agreement has
been forthcoming over what moral progress is,118 and the internal failure for the
genealogist is evident because the genealogist conception of self is itself narrativedependent and therefore parasitic on the very traditions it seeks to supplant.119

The tradition-guided alternative that MacIntyre articulates culminates in the claim
that a dialectical synthesis of Aristotelian Thomism provides a more appropriate
way forward for pursuing the telos of the whole human life, primarily because it
succeeds on its own terms whereas the encylopaedist and the genealogist do
not.120 He defends this view by arguing that Aristotelian Thomism has the
capacity not only to critique other traditions but also to be self-critical. This ability
to be self-critical, according to MacIntyre, provides the Thomistic tradition with
an inbuilt flexibility that allows it to deal with its own epistemological crises in a
116
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way that takes seriously the concerns of other traditions. 121 The Thomistic
tradition accepts that moral claims are embedded in the history of diverse social
narratives, and this realisation invokes an understanding of morality that, in
MacIntyre‘s words, ―is never more than sketched in outline.‖122

6.4 Conclusion: MacIntyre’s Teleological Vision

MacIntyre‘s commitment to the self-critical aspects of the Thomistic tradition
evolved during the process of writing the trilogy of books on moral enquiry
outlined above. The changing status of his epistemological position is consistent
with tradition-guided enquiry because it shows that he does attempt to deal with
the criticism leveled at After Virtue and Whose Justice? However, because his
style of writing includes an intricately woven historical narrative, it is difficult to
identify the link between the narrative justification of internal goods (practices)
within a given tradition and the telos of a life that realises its essence.123

With this difficulty in mind Bradley Kallenberg provides a useful simplification
of what he refers to as MacIntyre‘s ―master argument,‖ particularly in the way
narrative, practice, and tradition are linked to the central idea of moral progress
or virtue.124 Kallenberg shows that there is a triadic relationship between
121

MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 181.
MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 194.
MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 52.
124
Bradley J. Kallenberg, ―The Master Argument of MacIntyre‘s After Virtue,‖ in Nancey
Murphy, Bradley J. Kallenberg, and Mark Thiessen Nation eds., Virtues and Practices in the
Christian Tradition: Christian Ethics after MacIntyre (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International,
1997), 7-29. See also Jean Curthoys, ―Thomas Hobbes, the Taylor Thesis and Alasdair
MacIntyre,‖ British Journal for the History of Philosophy 6/1 (1998): 1-24.
122
123

241

MacIntyre‘s three key historical concepts and the idea of moral virtue.
MacIntyre‘s tradition-constituted method includes three major concepts of moral
enquiry – narrative, practices, and tradition. Narrative is the story-filled
description of what good character means within a tradition; practice is a cooperative human activity with established internal goods recognisable by
practitioners; and tradition is an authoritative account of precepts and principles
extended over time that have survived epistemic crises of the past.125

The moral self, for MacIntyre, is a socially constructed entity. Therefore, a single
life is always embedded in a longer and deeper history of moral agency than can
be supported by the various forms of emotivism that dominate contemporary
moral enquiry. Kallenberg argues that MacIntyre‘s commitment to a form of
Aristotelian Thomism is necessarily linked to a particular narrative justification of
how and why Thomism is sustained as a social practice. He argues, however, that
there was much that was unfinished in MacIntyre‘s explanation of moral agency
at the end of After Virtue and that not all of these problems were addressed in
subsequent publications.126 Kallenberg seems to be alluding here to commentators
who were not so generous in their assessment of the synthesis MacIntyre provides
between Aristotle and Aquinas. In the same way that the conclusion of After
Virtue, with its appeal for a new St. Benedict, attracted criticism, MacIntyre‘s
parting advocacy in Whose Justice? for the Thomistic tradition has been criticised
by philosophers and theologians from both the Aristotelian and Thomistic
traditions.
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MacIntyre‘s reconstruction project pivots on two key practical issues that
diminish his historicist narrative. First, the present state of moral enquiry is not as
dire as MacIntyre depicts, primarily because there is more agreement among
moral philosophers than he concedes. Second, his idiosyncratic style of writing
diminishes the historicist claims he makes against rival traditions, primarily
because it relies on a consensus regarding Aristotelian Thomism that has yet to be
realised. MacIntyre‘s pessimism over the present state of moral enquiry is
important because it provides the starting point for his tradition-guided enquiry.
However, the apparent failure of the Enlightenment project is, for MacIntyre,
focused too finely on incommensurability and difference between traditions.
When MacIntyre states that professors of philosophy disagree with each other just
as much as other people do over a concept like justice, he overstates the problems
associated with this level of disagreement.127 While it is clear that professors of
philosophy exhibit a diversity of conclusions about moral claims, this is exactly
what one should expect in a complex discipline like moral philosophy. When
MacIntyre portrays practical ethics as a shrill battle of ―assertion with counterassertion‖ and states that agreement is both ―rare‖ and ―accidental,‖ he
misrepresents what happens when moral debate is conducted among serious
thinkers, even when they do come from diverse philosophical traditions.128

Certainly some ethical disputes exhibit the shrillness that MacIntyre refers to, but
it is also common for serious thinkers from diverse ethical traditions to agree on
127
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many things. Perhaps the reason this often goes unacknowledged is that when
people have a common view on moral issues, they do not spend time debating
why they agree, whereas when people disagree the debate can be interminable.
This is the point made earlier, that a moral concept like justice has pragmatic
cash-value, when understood as a thin moral principle, because it plays out in
practical ways independent of the belief systems of the various moral agents. For
instance, there is thin agreement among serious thinkers that a moral agent should
not be deliberately cruel, that keeping another person as a slave is wrong, that
tyrannical governments should be discouraged, and that a person should be
considered innocent until proven guilty.

This thin level of moral agreement is more pervasive in moral enquiry than
MacIntyre acknowledges. For example, Singer‘s most recent book, The Life You
Can Save, bears a strong resemblance in the practical suggestions it makes for
overcoming global poverty (fairer distribution and a simplified life) to Ron
Sider‘s 1990 publication, Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger.129 When
confronted by images of global poverty, one could easily imagine the utilitarian
philosopher and the Mennonite theologian standing side-by-side because,
independently of their respectively thick philosophical or theological justifications
for alleviating poverty, they share a common thin perception that something is
deeply wrong.
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When MacIntyre asks, Whose justice? Which rationality?, he seems to overstate
the level of disagreement in moral enquiry because he is focused on the inability
of moral enquiry to reach agreement on a thick interpretation of justice. A similar
overstatement seems to occur with his appeal to the ―epistemological crisis.‖
While the warning is useful, because it shows how epistemological claims within
a tradition evolve, MacIntyre‘s evaluation of the epistemological transitions
within a tradition seems overly pessimistic. Accepting incommensurability
between rival truth-claims does not lead ineluctably to the ―failure of Modernity‖
that MacIntyre posits. The failure, if it can be called a failure at all, provided a
necessary reappraisal of epistemic limits in theological and cultural applications
of moral theory. MacIntyre does not give enough credit to the desires and
motivations behind the so-called failure. The ―Enlightenment project‖ might have
failed in an epistemic sense, as MacIntyre posits, but it has also produced
remarkable advances in almost every practical discipline of human endeavour.

MacIntyre often uses the British utilitarian tradition, particularly the transition
from Bentham to Mill, to illustrate how a tradition can be motivated to change
once its epistemological inadequacies are acknowledged. He views the
epistemological transition from Bentham to Mill to Sidgwick more critically than
he ought to. He views the history of utilitarianism as one epistemic crisis after
another, but this view does not seem to appreciate that each of the utilitarian
reformers

made

significant

socio-political

contributions.

Even

if

the

foundationalism of utilitarian philosophers did evolve in response to a series of
―epistemological crises,‖ as MacIntyre claims, it would still seem disingenuous
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not to acknowledge their achievements. From a pragmatist perspective, a more
useful option is to examine how utilitarian theory cashes out, in each of its
variations, independent of the foundationalist assumptions.

The philosophy of science provides a good illustration of this type of pragmatism.
It would be disingenuous to view the transition between Newton and Einstein
negatively simply because Einstein‘s concept of special relativity overturned
Newton‘s concept of absolute space and time. In the tradition of cosmology,
Newton‘s argument for absolute space and time is treated with respect because it
helped set the agenda for a more complete understanding of the physical universe
offered by Einstein.130 A similar claim can be made about the British utilitarian
philosophers in particular and even with utilitarian theory in general. Even if the
epistemological assumptions of Bentham and Mill are exaggerated or even wrong,
this does not necessarily diminish their contributions. Clearly this is not what
MacIntyre advocates, however, because his concern over the parlous state of
moral philosophy is intricately linked to the idea that Modern moral philosophy
has become disengaged from virtues associated with human flourishing.131 His
explanation for how a moral agent can re-engage with the virtues involves a
thickly woven narrative synthesis between Aristotle and the Thomistic tradition.
The complexity of his account creates its own set of problems, however, because
it relies on a consensus on Aristotelian Thomism that has not been forthcoming.
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In a collection of essays devoted to MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided method, the
editors describe his appeal to Aristotelian Thomism as ambiguous and lacking
clarity.132 Horton and Mendus conclude that even sympathetic scholars who
accept many of MacIntyre‘s claims about the socially constructed self are less
inclined to accept his argument that this realisation has any important normative
consequences for moral enquiry.133 For instance, Martha Nussbaum, a noted
Aristotelian scholar, was originally sympathetic to the account that MacIntyre
offered in After Virtue, but she was openly critical of the transition he made
between After Virtue and Whose Justice? In a review of Whose Justice? entitled
―Recoiling from Reason,‖ Nussbaum rejects MacIntyre‘s Thomistic turn because
she thinks that Aristotle‘s concept of moral virtue is deliberately vague. 134 For
Nussbaum, Aristotle‘s concept of eudaimonia contains a ―rough idea of human
flourishing,‖ but this provides enough guidance so that both the ―instrumental
means to that end‖ and the realisation of the ―kind of life‖ that results from this
flourishing can be fulfilled. She uses the example of medicine to illustrate this
when she says that a doctor has an instrumental end (medical school) but also a
moral end, ―What counts as being a ‗good‘ doctor?‖135 So ―good‖ refers to both an
account of the practice (medicine) and an account of the attitudes and demeanour
of the practitioner (doctor). Nussbaum‘s evaluation of Aristotle seems appropriate
132
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because it reflects his description of the telos of human activity (eudaimonia) as a
life-time project.

For Aristotle eudaimonia satisfies the criterion of the ultimate end but the virtues
that strive toward that end are left open, even vague, because they differ from one
society to another and even from one individual to another. For instance, the act of
attempting to save a drowning person is courageous for a swimmer but can be
foolishness for a non-swimmer. For Aristotle, the mean between excess and
deficiency is a broad middle-road whereby the active content of moral action
depends on circumstances. A moral agent acts ―for the right person, to the right
extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way,‖ depending
on what one is aiming to achieve.136 It is this vagueness that Nussbaum finds so
appropriate because it is deliberately not prescriptive. MacIntyre is not content
with a vague teleological end for a discipline like medicine. He agrees that good
practice is what counts for being a good doctor, but virtues expressed solely in
terms of the internal goods of a practice are not sufficient to achieve the goods
that provide individual human lives with their telos. MacIntyre is concerned that
without a unifying form of life that is itself purposeful, the individual may find
himself or herself embedded in social traditions that are harmful to human
flourishing. This is why MacIntyre states so starkly that ―without an overriding
conception of the telos of a whole human life, conceived as a unity, our
conception of certain individual virtues has to remain partial and incomplete.‖137
Thus he seeks to go beyond the Aristotelian concept of instrumental goods
136
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because he thinks that virtuous practice is necessarily linked to the telos of the
whole human life.

MacIntyre agrees with Aristotle that ―good‖ habits are derived from the telos of
being human and he makes several claims about ethics as a result. First, he thinks
that there is a fundamental contrast between ―man-as-he happens-to-be and manas-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.‖ Second, he states that the
discipline of ethics is a science ―which enables human beings to realize their
essential nature.‖ Third, he suggests that this view of ethics ―presupposes some
account of potentiality and act, some account of the essence of man as a rational
animal and above all some account of the human telos.‖138 Once he seeks to go
beyond Aristotle‘s thin concept of flourishing, with a thickly woven Thomistic
narrative, MacIntyre ends up with the same epistemological problem that he had
previously perceived as problematic in other accounts of moral enquiry. In other
words, he rejects the epistemological approach in practical ethics because there is
no consensus on what premises are foundational, but his tradition-guided account
also lacks consensus, both on the historical narrative he offers and on the claim
that the Thomistic tradition succeeds where others fail. Without this consensus, it
would seem that his version fails to overcome the assertion and counter-assertion
that he finds so problematic in moral enquiry.

MacIntyre is not content with the thin expression of human flourishing that
Aristotle provides because he thinks the normative claims of ethics are diminished
138
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if human flourishing is not thickly articulated in something like Thomistic terms.
A significant difference between MacIntyre and Aquinas is that Aquinas‘ account
is unapologetically and openly theological, whereas MacIntyre thinks the
Thomistic tradition should be accepted because it succeeds as a tradition on its
own terms, without the metaphysical assumptions. However, for MacIntyre‘s
Thomistic version of Aristotelianism to succeed, on its own terms, it needs to
achieve a level of consensus about the specific practices of the AristotelianThomistic tradition. Thus far this level of specificity between Aristotle and
Aquinas has not been forthcoming, and some of the most strident critics of
MacIntyre‘s position are Thomistic scholars. For instance, John Haldane, a
Thomistic scholar, recognises the contribution that MacIntyre made with After
Virtue but, like Nussbaum, he is skeptical of the transition to Thomism in Whose
Justice? Haldane‘s main concern with Whose Justice? is that it presents an
historical account of moral enquiry that is relativistic and internally inconsistent
with the type of metaphysical realism that Aquinas advocates. Haldane suggests
that people who were initially inclined to follow MacIntyre with the traditionguided enquiry of After Virtue, such as communitarians like Michael Sandel and
Charles Taylor, might be less inclined to take the next steps offered in Whose
Justice? and Three Rival Versions because it involves accepting the authority of
the Magisterium, an essential component of the Thomistic and therefore Catholic
tradition.139
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The problems that Nussbaum and Haldane highlight in MacIntyre‘s AristotelianThomistic synthesis relate to the same epistemic problem, albeit for different
reasons. Nussbaum is concerned that MacIntyre misrepresents Aristotle because
Aristotle‘s explanation of eudaimonia is thin enough to accommodate cultural
difference in ways that MacIntyre‘s thick explanation of flourishing does not.140
Similarly, Haldane thinks that MacIntyre misrepresents Aquinas because Aquinas‘
metaphysical realism is inconsistent with a process of rational enquiry that is
solely tradition-dependent. Haldane has two primary concerns with MacIntyre‘s
tradition-dependent or story-filled concept of truth. First, it is too relativistic and
leaves MacIntyre with no other option than to compare traditions. Second, it fails
to acknowledge that Aquinas was a philosophical and moral realist, a type of
theological foundationalist, a position MacIntyre rejects.141

Disagreement over the foundational premises of moral enquiry is the reason why
MacIntyre went down the path of tradition-guided enquiry in the first place.
However, his tradition-guided methodology ends with an epistemological crisis of
its own. If MacIntyre is right that the Thomistic principle of justice derives from a
particular type of practical rationality, then this should be self-evident to
Thomistic scholars such as John Haldane. The fact that this level of agreement has
not been achieved within Thomistic scholarship provides sufficient justification
for rejecting MacIntyre‘s further claim that the Thomist tradition succeeds when
other traditions fail. MacIntyre commits himself too strongly to the thesis that a
140
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lack of agreement in practical ethics can only be overcome once agreement has
been reached over the essence of human flourishing.

Although MacIntyre‘s conclusion about Aristotelian Thomism has not proved to
be decisive for moral enquiry, his historicist methodology is beneficial precisely
because it places the moral agent in a particular context. Rational enquiry is
possible because internal goods are understood within a narrative account of a
particular practice or tradition. The next chapter will show why a pragmatic and
practice-centred approach to practical ethics offers a more useful model for moral
enquiry in a pluralist society. Practice-guided decision making trades on (a) a thin
consensus about the telos of the whole human life together with the practices that
sustain that end and (b) a thick application of internal goods within those
practices.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION – PRACTICE-GUIDED ENQUIRY

7.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 of this thesis opened with Toulmin‘s claim that scientists often reach
agreement about common tasks, no doubt as a result of the standard model
approach to scientific research that has developed over the last century. As
Toulmin points out, however, this same level of agreement has not been
forthcoming in philosophy.1 Because Australia is demonstrably pluralist, its
religious, philosophical, and moral language is unavoidably varied. This lack of
agreement is particularly noticeable in moral philosophy because in a pluralist
society the variety of moral traditions diminishes the capacity for any one moral
claim to trump all others. Drew Leder makes this point when he links the conflict
over a practical ethics text to ―the sheer number of different interpreters reading it,
and the widely divergent training and concerns they bring to bear,‖ let alone the
lack of ―clear social consensus about how events are to be interpreted.‖2

Moral pluralism impacts on a society in various ways, not the least of which is the
diversity of seriously held views that manifest whenever a complex moral issue is
discussed. Conflict over practical ethics in a pluralistic society is to be expected,
and the tendency for some writers to simplify moral argument or to caricature
1
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another‘s line of reasoning ought to be avoided. Graham Cole contends, for
instance, that Singer caricatures Christian moral philosophy with his comparison
between the sanctity of life, which he rejects, and the principle of impartial
concern, which he supports.3 At the same time, Singer‘s own views are sometimes
caricatured or overblown to such an extent that they are almost unrecognisable.
Susan Lufkin Kranz does this when she argues that Singer‘s thinking is ―clearly
an affront to our common humanity‖ and that his views will downgrade the
central status of human beings so that ethics ―will come to an end and the values
of the marketplace or some other horror will fill the vacuum.‖4 Criticism such as
this is misplaced, first, because it fails to do justice to the serious consideration of
common morality that Singer advocates and, second, because it exaggerates the
impact that philosophers and philosophy texts have on moral engagement. Even if
Singer‘s views were as draconian as Kranz contends, his views are unlikely to
sway moral agents to such an extent that only horror remains.

The motivation that drives utilitarian philosophy since Epicurus – and he too was
unjustly maligned as a hedonist – is to make decisions that produce the greatest
amount of good, broadly conceived as pleasure or happiness. The most common
form of this type of decision making protocol is the various versions of costbenefit analysis routinely used in politics. A society that utilises available
resources for the benefit of the greatest number of people incorporates a type of
welfare socialism that seems reasonable on many grounds. Utilitarian philosophy
3
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does incorporate the type of ―complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity‖5 that MacIntyre equates with a practice. Given this, one can
appreciate how and why utilitarian thinking evolved over time. Clearly, it has not
achieved the status of a new standard model for ethical decision making that
Singer envisaged,6 because this would involve a consensus among moral
philosophers that has not been forthcoming. All moral philosophers appreciate the
role that a broadly conceived hedonic calculus plays in ethics, but most view this
type of thinking as one aspect of moral deliberation rather than the defining
principle of moral action that utilitarian philosophers advocate. The contention of
this thesis is that Singer‘s impartial consideration of interests is useful but not
definitive in a pluralist society because it takes for granted too many things on
which there is no common agreement.

Chapter 2 made the case that the lack of agreement regarding a standard model of
moral theory diminishes the capacity of any one theory to trump its rivals, at least
in a pluralist society. Problems of incommensurability arose early in the Modern
period as rival consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories sought to
replicate the success of scientific theories by finding a moral theory that all
rational people could appeal to. However, this attempt to find common ground for
moral thinking was, for many philosophers, misguided. The study of ethics in a
pluralist society ought to engage moral agents in a different type of thinking. This
is the point Williams makes in an essay entitled ―Knowledge, Science,
Convergence,‖ where he states:
5
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The basic idea behind the distinction between the
scientific and the ethical, expressed in terms of
convergence, is very simple. In a scientific inquiry there
should ideally be convergence on an answer, where the
best explanation of the convergence involves the idea that
the answer represents how things are; in the area of the
ethical, at least at a high level of generality, there is no
such coherent hope.7

This discontent with the absence of moral coherence was compared with the
relative coherence provided by standard models in science. A standard model in
science is one for which there is substantial agreement over its boundary
conditions or assumptions and, more importantly, it exhibits vast explanatory
power for linking real-world observations to currently available theories. Moral
philosophy has never had a standard model of enquiry, primarily because two key
components are missing. First, there is no unifying theoretical agreement over
how moral enquiry ought to be conducted and, second, this lack of a unifying
theory limits the explanatory power of moral enquiry in complex issues.

Philosophers from diverse philosophical perspectives argue that the focus on
epistemological issues during the Modern period was important but ultimately
proved inconclusive. From a pragmatic or non-foundationalist perspective, a
rational agent can side-step epistemology by asking questions such as, ―What does
it mean to describe something as true?‖ and ―How does this truth cash out in
practice‖? The chapter introduced several philosophers who contended that a shift
7
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in emphasis that is more open to ―phenomenology, hermeneutics, narrative ethics,
casuistry, and virtue ethics‖8 is now required in moral enquiry.

MacIntyre, one of the most strident critics of contemporary practical ethics, argues
that the conceptual incommensurability between rival moral arguments dominates
moral enquiry.9 This lack of a unifying theoretical model of moral enquiry is
seriously problematic if one thinks, as MacIntyre does, that moral enquiry ought
to deliver much more than it has thus far achieved. Several other philosophers
discussed in chapter 2 provide an optimistic contrast to MacIntyre‘s dire
assessment. Rorty, Williams, Dancy, Bernstein, and Toulmin agree with
MacIntyre that epistemological claims during the Modern period were overstated,
but they are not as pessimistic about the problems for moral enquiry that result
from this. Rorty rejected the neutrality of moral claims and suggested that a
consensus of rational discussants ought to be the goal of moral enquiry because
this is the most objectivity we can hope for.10 Williams argued that the attempt to
simplify moral enquiry was misguided, suggesting rather that ―Perhaps we need as
many concepts to describe it as we find we need, and no fewer?‖11 Bernstein
suggested that the Cartesian anxiety of Modernity needs to be exorcised so that a
moral agent can move beyond both objectivism and relativism.12 Toulmin
suggested that moral agents need to find ways of moving on from the ―received
view of Modernity‖ when he claims that the task now is ―to reform, and even
8

Albert R. Jonsen, ―Foreword‖ in DuBose et al., A Matter of Principles, xvii.
MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 6.
10
Rorty, ―Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism,‖ 719-738.
11
Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 17.
12
Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 165.
9

257

reclaim, our inherited modernity, by humanizing it.‖13 Finally, Jonsen and
Toulmin suggest that when a moral agent accepts that moral enquiry involves the
realm of ―praxis and phronesis,‖ rather than ―theoria and episteme,‖14 the
motivation for resolving complex ethical issues is less urgent.

The type of moral enquiry advocated by Williams, Toulmin, and Bernstein in this
thesis seems more appropriate for a complex pluralist society because ethical
decision making is relative, in the descriptive sense, to the stories that define us.
Williams‘ concept of ―relativism from a distance‖15 engages human beings in a
conversation about what it means to be a moral agent. For Williams, such a
conversation is more edifying because it focuses on what moral agents have in
common rather than what separates:

Morality is not one determinate set of ethical thoughts. It
embraces a range of ethical outlooks; and morality is so
much with us that moral philosophy spends much of its
time discussing the difference between these outlooks,
rather than the difference between all of them and
everything else.16

Chapter 3 argued that the motivation for attempting to make moral decision
making thicker than is either possible or appropriate was driven by both a
Cartesian anxiety over concepts such as truth and objectivity, and a technical
anxiety over developments in the sciences. These twin anxieties led to forms of
practical ethics that ignored the history of moral debate when they appealed to the
13
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role that reason ought to play. Robert Baker contends that the ahistoric and
rationalistic presentations in bioethics texts is similar to that used in philosophy of
science text books three decades ago. He takes the opening paragraph of Kuhn‘s
Structure of Scientific Revolutions and substitutes the words science and scientific
with bioethics to illustrate the ―sterility of the ahistoric, rationalist applied ethics
model of bioethics‖ that he claims is ―embraced by most standard bioethics
textbooks.‖17

History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote
or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in
the image of [bioethics] by which we are now possessed…
The aim of [contemporary text] books is persuasive and
pedagogic; a concept of [bioethics] drawn from them is no
more likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than
the image of a national culture drawn from a tourist
brochure or a language text.18

Baker‘s suggestion here is that the attempt to turn bioethics into a rational science
ignored the history of debate over rationality and science. He argues that ―moral
negotiation‖ involves a consensus ―on some conflict resolving solutions or norms‖
in a manner that ―often involves compromising with others, rather than
convincing them of the correctness of one‘s views.‖19

Robert Stern makes a similar point when he claims that historicism in ethics can
be compared to the post-Kuhnian philosophy of science that ―increasingly
abandoned the connection between truth, rationality and progress.‖20 He goes on
17
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to suggest the historicist claim that an individual human life, defined by
historically extended local practice (culture), is similar to what Kuhn, Feyerabend,
and others insist occurs amongst members of the scientific community working
within particular theoretical frameworks of understanding. Historicist claims that
rationality and moral concepts like justice are culturally dependent are similar,
according to Stern, to the claims of philosophers of science that scientific truth is
theory dependent. Science offers no neutral or transcendent basis for making
claims about absolutes. Thus the attempt to turn ethics into a science is based on
false assumptions about science itself. The neutrality of science, so appealing to
bioethics writers attempting to overcome the partial divide associated with
―traditional‖ ethical dilemmas, has turned out, according to Stern, to be neither
―neutral‖ nor ―impartial,‖ except in a highly qualified sense.21

Chapter 4 reconstructed and critiqued one of the most popular versions of moral
enquiry currently promoted. Through six editions of Principles of Biomedical
Ethics (PBE), Beauchamp and Childress promoted a form of common morality
based on four prima facie principles. The PBE method appeals initially to a set of
norms, such as ―do not kill,‖ because these norms are applicable to rational agents
everywhere.22 The second feature of the PBE method is the appeal to rules of
obligation (nonmalevolence, honesty, integrity, etc.) because, according to
Beauchamp and Childress, ―A person is deficient in moral character if he or she
lacks such traits.‖23 The third feature of the PBE method involves a cluster of four
21
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prima facie principles – autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice – and
two subsidiary rules – confidentiality and veracity.24 The PBE method also
incorporates a decision making protocol known as wide reflective equilibrium.
This process, according to Beauchamp and Childress, incorporates principles and
rules from ―all plausible moral judgments, principles, and relevant background
theories‖ and from ―as wide a variety of kinds and levels of legitimate beliefs as
possible.‖25 They go on to state that from this perspective ―moral thinking is
analogous to hypotheses in science‖ because it has the ability to ―test, modify, or
reject‖ moral arguments.26 This comparison is forced, however, because the
consensus in science trades on a level of agreement about the boundary
assumptions of the discipline that is missing in moral enquiry.

The chapter began by claiming that the PBE method is a useful but not definitive
evaluative process for moral decision making. This claim was defended by
showing how the four-principle method can be usefully employed in a pluralist
society because the four prima facie principles serve as a thin form of moral
communication for stakeholders from diverse moral traditions. However, the
chapter also showed that the principles are not definitive in complex cases. When
faced with a complex issue, weighing one prima facie principle against another,
via the process of reflective equilibrium, does not produce agreement. This is
because moral agents make decisions based on the narrative content of their own
lives, so the principles act as placeholders for a moral position that is already held.
24
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This lack of specificity is only problematic when the utilisation of principles in
practical ethics is overstated. In healthcare ethics, for instance, several critics now
refer pejoratively to the PBE model as the ―Belmont principles,‖ the ―Georgetown
mantra,‖ or simply to ―principlism,‖ because the principle-based method of moral
enquiry was presented in high-profile cases as a means of resolving complex
ethical issues.27

Chapter 5 presented a similar case against the most popular Australian version of
practical ethics, Singer‘s preference utilitarianism. As with the PBE model,
preference utilitarianism was shown to be a useful but not definitive guide to
moral decision making. Singer‘s concern for the role that reason ought to play in
practical ethics has evolved, quite reasonably, over the course of his writing.
However, this evolution has also increasingly diminished the efficacy of his
primary decision making protocol, referred to as the equality principle or the
principle of impartial concern. As with the PBE model, Singer initially overstated
the efficacy of the equality principle when he claimed that it allows progress
towards settling disputes,28 that it is the only rational basis for ethics,29 and that it
is a uniquely rational basis for ethical decision making.30

Singer‘s description of the concept of equal consideration of interest is relatively
straightforward. He argues that self-interested rational agents, using the principle
27
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of universalisation, ought to concede the same self-interestedness to others. Given
this, he then argues that the equality principle ―acts like a pair of scales, weighing
interests impartially … but they take no account of whose interests they are
weighing.‖31 However, Singer‘s preference-guided decision making protocol has
problems similar to Bentham‘s pain/pleasure calculus and Mill‘s higher quality
pleasure calculus. This chapter showed that, after initially arguing that a rulebased understanding of ethics does not work, Singer eventually concedes that
rules are in fact necessary for the moral life. He does this because he recognises
that the principle of impartial concern involves calculations that ―we lack the time
and information‖ for the ―long and involved calculations‖ required. 32 Given his
acknowledgment of the calculus problems associated with the principle of
impartial concern, the chapter closed by showing that Singer‘s initial argument,
that the equality principle is the only rational basis for ethics,33 was overstated
and that complex moral issues involve more than preference utilitarian concerns.

The conclusions drawn from the reconstruction of decision making protocols in
chapters 4 and 5 showed that both methods are useful but that neither achieves the
aim of providing definitive solutions to complex moral dilemmas. Both principleguided enquiry and preference-guided enquiry are best understood as tools that
can be used to engage moral agents in a conversation about ethics, rather than as
tools that can be used to solve complex moral dilemmas.

31
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Chapter 6 reconstructed a third and very different type of moral enquiry, namely,
the tradition-guided approach advocated by MacIntyre. As previously stated,
MacIntyre is one of the most strident critics of practical ethics. He maintains that
contemporary

moral

enquiry

fails

to

appreciate

both

the

conceptual

incommensurability between rival moral arguments and the role that history plays
in the formation of these arguments. He claims:
It was a central aspiration of the Enlightenment … to
provide … standards and methods of rational justification
by which alternative courses of action in every sphere of
life could be adjudged just or unjust, rational or irrational,
enlightened or unenlightened. So, it was hoped, reason
would replace authority and tradition.34

MacIntyre‘s solution involves a reconstructive project that acknowledges how
moral claims made in the present are part of a longer and deeper historical
narrative account of the moral life. This historicist account contrasts two questions
that impact on both the PBE model and Singer‘s preference utilitarianism.
MacIntyre claims that instead of asking, ―By what principles am I, as a rational
person, bound?‖ moral agents ought to ask, ―By what principles are we, as
actually or potentially rational persons, bound in our relationships?‖35 This link to
social relationships is integral to understanding his account of moral enquiry. He
contends that it is through the ―institutionalized relationships of established social
practices‖ that moral agents discover goods that are ―internal to those practices‖
and also ―give point and purpose to those relationships.‖36
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This teleological link to social practices is pivotal in MacIntyre‘s account because
it provides the motivation for establishing the telos of the whole human life. It
also provides a key to understanding why he thinks Aristotelian Thomism
succeeds where other traditions fail. However, MacIntyre‘s tradition-guided
method also seems to overstate what is possible and, more importantly, what is
necessary once moral philosophy is viewed as a means for understanding the
moral life rather than as a prescriptive method for solving complex ethical issues.
When MacIntyre posits that ethics presupposes three narrative steps, ―some
account of potentiality and act – some account of the essence of man as a rational
animal – and above all some account of the human telos,‖37 he constructs a
tradition-guided explanation for this narrative life that is thick at every level. A
key focus of his tradition-guided enquiry is to explain the role that practices and
virtues (internal goods) play in enabling a moral agent to understand and to
negotiate her life-situation. For MacIntyre, virtues that are necessary for
excellence within a practice must also be consistent, at least to some extent, with
the telos of the whole human life. Knight echoes this teleological link in reference
to After Virtue when he claims that:

characterization of the virtues in terms of practices is
necessary, but not sufficient for an adequate specification.
Virtues are also to be understood as qualities required to
achieve the goods which furnish individual human lives
with their telos. And I argue that the unifying form of an
individual life, without which such lives could not have a
telos, derives from its possessing some kind of narrative
structure. Individual human lives however are only able to
37
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have the structures they do because they are embedded
within social traditions.38

Furthermore, for MacIntyre, a practice that does not taking into consideration
virtues necessary for human social dependency is deficient:

no account of the goods, rules, and virtues that are
definitive of our moral life can be adequate that does not
explain – or at least point us towards an explanation – how
that form of life is possible for beings who are biologically
constituted as we are, by providing us with an account of
our development towards and into that form of life. That
development has as its starting point our initial animal
condition.39

The chapter on tradition-guided enquiry argued that MacIntyre‘s advocacy for
Aristotelian Thomism was important from a personal perspective because it
provided the latest installment of his life-story, and this is consistent with his
claim that humans are ―story-telling‖ animals.40 In one important respect,
however, the appeal to Aristotelian Thomism is inconsistent with MacIntyre‘s
earlier claim concerning the concept of a practice. For MacIntyre, a practice
involves accepting both standards of excellence and the achievement of goods that
are internal to the practice, both of which require an appeal to authority:

To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those
standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as
judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices,
preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and
partially define the practice.41
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MacIntyre‘s reconstructive project concludes with an intricately woven claim in
Three Rival Versions that a new form of Aristotelian Thomism is required to
overcome problems of moral enquiry because this tradition has been shown to
have the facilities for dealing with epistemological crises that other traditions do
not. MacIntyre‘s gradual progression towards Aristotelian Thomism, in the three
books devoted to tradition-guided enquiry, indicates how difficult his project is,
insofar as he is reluctant to make explicit his increasingly thick narrative account
of the moral life that is inherently theological.42 The problem for MacIntyre is that
academic research – in this case the study of Aristotle and Aquinas – is, broadly
speaking, a practice, because academic study involves a ―coherent and complex
form of socially established cooperative human activity.‖43 Academic research of
this type develops internal goods (virtues) about the texts that are considered
reliable, the hermeneutic issues associated with translations, and numerous other
issues. This chapter closed by arguing that if MacIntyre‘s reconstructive project
was a product of the standards of excellence within the practice of scholarship,
then Aristotelian and Thomistic scholars ought to agree with his Aristotelian
Thomistic synthesis. This level of synthesis has not been forthcoming, however.
J. B. Schneewind illustrates this when he contends that MacIntyre‘s attempt to
overcome the grave state of disorder to which he alludes at the beginning of After
Virtue, a disorder that has left moral debate unsettlable at one level and
interminable at another,44 has failed. In Schneewind‘s view,
42
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MacIntyre has failed to show that the historical study of
those traditions, to which his book is largely devoted, has
anything special to offer toward the resolution of the
current issues whose ―interminability‖ he took as his
starting point. Only the genuine use of the resources of a
given tradition, showing that it actually yields a practical
solution we can all accept, could do this. And even then
those outside the tradition would not accept the solution
because it was generated by the tradition. They would
accept it because it struck them as reasonable.45

7.2 Ethics as Conversation: Thin Universals and Thick Practices

Whatever the telos of the whole human life is – and this has proved difficult to
define – Aristotle‘s cautiously thin approach to unpacking human flourishing
seems appropriate. Clearly there are survival needs that humans need to meet
before they can flourish, and it is regrettable that two millennia after Aristotle a
third of the human population still has to focus on ―flourishing‖ at this level. For
Aristotle, human flourishing (eudaimonia) begins with a rough sketch of the good
life that is filled in with more detail depending on what activity or practice a
rational agent engages in.46 For this reason, a rational agent ought not look for
more precision than the activity or practice allows.47

Aristotle seems to have in mind here that prudence or practical wisdom involves
skills acquired over time. Young men, for instance, can become ―geometricians
45

J. B. Schneewind, ―MacIntyre and the Indispensability of Tradition,‖ Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 1/1 (March 1991): 168.
46
Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ 1098a, 343. Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe‘s
commentary on this passage states that for Aristotle ―excellent rational activity is the happymaking ingredient of a happy human life, which has to include other goods only because, unlike a
divine life, it is mortal and dependent on a physical and social environment,‖ in Aristotle:
Nicomachean Ethics, Translation, Introduction, Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), 278.
47
Aristotle, ―Nicomachean Ethics,‖ 1098a, 343.

268

and mathematicians,‖ but Aristotle thinks that a ―young man of practical wisdom
cannot be found.‖48 The reason for this is that intelligent young men can
understand mathematics because mathematics requires knowledge, but not skill.
Practical wisdom, on the other hand, requires both knowledge and skill and
therefore young men have not had the time necessary to develop the skills
associated with a complex social activity.

MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice can be usefully employed in the same prudential
sense because the standards of excellence required in long-lived practices such as
medicine, law, and politics require a thick habituation of knowledge and skills,
gleaned and developed over time, in a manner that is consistent with their
respective ends (health, justice, and civil society). This section builds on the
reconstructive project of the previous chapters by showing how thin moral
agreement allows sufficient consensus with respect to thick practices, even in the
midst of serious moral disagreement.

Conversation in a Pluralist Society

Given that Australia is a pluralist society in which no moral theory or tradition is
held in common, practice-guided enquiry provides a pragmatic alternative.
Practice-guided enquiry reconceptualises MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice within
the tradition of philosophical pragmatism associated with James, Dewey, and
Rorty. Reconceived in this way, practice-guided enquiry engages people in a
48
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conversation within a social space between the incommensurability of their
respective rival arguments. This alternative approach attempts to build on thin
agreements in a pluralist society by taking seriously Rorty‘s concept of
philosophy as conversation:

The notion of culture as conversation, rather than as a
structure erected upon foundations, fits well with this
hermeneutical notion of knowledge, since getting into a
conversation with strangers is, like acquiring a new virtue
or skill by imitating models, a matter of
rather
than
.49

For Rorty this type of consensus is not only the best that philosophical objectivity
can hope for but also, and more significantly, all that is necessary for moral
philosophy to progress. This pragmatic approach overcomes the illusion of
foundationalism because it works within established social and political
frameworks. These frameworks replace what Rorty calls the ―notion of knowledge
as the assemblage of representations‖ with a pragmatist awareness of what people
actually do.50 Practice-guided pragmatism of this type facilitates three different
types of conversation that can be edifyingly employed in a pluralist society.

The first type of conversation focuses on thin teleological agreements that people
in a pluralist society share – and also that most moral theories endorse – namely, a
shared awareness of virtues that sustain a civil community: justice, kindness,
peacefulness, civility, beneficence, integrity, respect, etc. This primary
conversation unites human beings from different cultures because the discussion
49
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is about issues that impact on all people, in every culture. Because the
conversation over thin universals transcends the boundaries of culture, it is
pragmatically useful because it invites people who are generally different from
one another to focus on a requirement they share in common, the flourishing of
civil society.

The second type of conversation builds on the first by focusing on those practices
within a pluralist society on which there is already substantial agreement. In a
stable pluralist society, people disagree over many things: religion, party politics,
sport, and, perhaps most intractably of all, moral issues. In the midst of this
disagreement, however, there is also considerable agreement that practices such as
medicine, law, education, and politics (in the Aristotelian sense) sustain a civil
society. Rorty refers to this type of pragmatism as ―epistemological behaviorism‖
because it invokes knowledge gained from social practices. 51 He further argues
that this social justification of belief, following Sellars and Quine, is the normal
conversational discourse that happens amongst knowledgeable peers in particular
social practices.52

The third type of conversation involves a discussion about the internal goods that
sustain practices such as medicine, law, education, and politics. Because this type
of discussion entails internal goods, it also entails actions, behaviours, rules,
protocols, etc., that MacIntyre rightly suggests are ―historically extended‖ and
51
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―socially embodied‖ within specific practices.53 One result of this commitment to
take history and tradition into account, according to MacIntyre, is that ―human
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods
involved, are systematically extended.‖54 Conversation such as this is, first and
foremost, a conversation among practitioners, but it engages others whenever the
internal goods of a practice intersect or clash with those of another.55

In a liberal pluralist society, the concept of philosophy as conversation involves
dialogue over the things that moral agents hold in common and also dialogue over
things that are conceptually incommensurable. Many of the contentious issues in
moral debate are incapable of resolution from a moral perspective. A liberal
society supports this diversity, but this diversity is not unrestrained because liberty
is not an absolute moral principle. The attempt to codify the relationship between
individual liberty and the prevention of harm to others is not without practical
difficulties, as shown in chapters 4–6.56 The motivation to codify practical ethics
stems from a Cartesian anxiety that the space between conceptually
incommensurable moral theories needs to be filled if we are to avoid moral chaos.

The rationale for a conversational and practice-based focus for moral enquiry is
that the moral space between rival theories of ethics in a pluralist society is not as
problematic as is often portrayed. In the same way that cultural difference does
53
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not deny common human imperatives, moral difference ought not to deny
common moral imperatives. The thin moral universals that human beings share
are often lost in the intractability associated with the focus on divisive issues of
practical ethics. Acknowledging the pluralism in a liberal society involves an
acceptance that moral agents can rarely be separated by the legitimacy or
otherwise of their respective moral arguments. Serious thinking moral agents hold
opposing views on a range of complex moral issues, but they also hold many
things in common. Pluralism invokes a conversation about shared common values
because cultural and moral difference never completes the separation between one
rational agent and another.

If Sir Martin Rees is right, our shared common values are going to be sorely tested
as this new century unfolds. Rees, Astronomer Royal in Britain and noted
astrophysicist, published in 2003 a book entitled Our Final Century: Will the
Human Race Survive the Twenty-first Century?57 in which he claims the odds for
human survival beyond the twenty-first century to be 50/50. As an astrophysicist,
Rees is acutely aware that life on planet Earth is at risk of destruction from several
natural disasters that are beyond the control of human beings. Most of his
academic work has been dedicated to understanding and explaining cosmic
catastrophes such as gamma-ray bursts, cannibal galaxies, and the destructive
power of black holes. The destructive power of these naturally occurring events is
manifestly greater than anything humans have developed or will develop in the
future. Our Final Century addresses none of these concerns, however, because the
57

Martin Rees, Our Final Century: Will the Human Race Survive the Twenty-first Century?
(London: Heinemann, 2003).

273

risk of destruction from such means is small. Rees‘ book is a restatement of the
1960s concern over technical anxiety writ large. He fears for the future of humans,
and even for a planet that is habitable for life, based on what he thinks the odds
are for an industrial accident involving genetically engineered viruses or
nanotechnology. Rees offered a $1,000.00 bet (immediately taken up) that some
time in the first twenty years of the new century a catastrophic accident caused by
biotechnology would kill more than one million people.

Few doomsayers are as well credentialed as Rees. His concern over human
technical imperatives is shared by many, but laying odds on human destruction
has caught people short before. In the 1960s Paul Ehrlich and others warned that
human population growth was outstripping the capacity of food production so that
by the 1970s and 1980s millions of people would be starving to death.58 Ehrlich‘s
dire predictions did not eventuate because farmers across the world increased
production to match the growth of human population. Although Ehrlich was
wrong about the date of population catastrophe, he was not wrong about the
problems associated with exponential population growth. The power of
exponential numbers is well known to mathematicians, but it has only recently
been seen as a problem for human populations. The human population did not
reach one billion until sometime during 1850, but it took less than two hundred
years to record the second billion. Since then the doubling ratio has been halving
so that the six billion doubling ratio for the year 1999 was down to 35 years. At
present the doubling rate of human population is approximately 30 years, but
58
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some stabilisation is occurring, particularly in wealthier countries where the rate
of natural increase is zero or below (birth rate minus death rate = rate of natural
increase).

The United Nations Population Division now estimates that if stabilisation
continues, human population will double to 9.7 billion by 2150 and stabilize at 10
billion some time after.59 Much of the debate associated with the growth of human
population has focused on the ability of the planet to sustain a set number of
people. Ehrlich was clearly wrong about 5 billion and even the 10 billion that the
United Nations predicts may be sustainable if new farming techniques continue to
develop. Because stabilisation in the rate of natural increase within a human
population occurs routinely in healthy populations, the United Nations set a series
of Millennium Development Goals, one of which was to halve world poverty by
2015.60

The qualifying condition used by the UN, if stabilisation continues, does not seem
possible, however, without the type of technical developments in farming and
agricultural genetics that Rees warns against. Genetically modified organisms
(animals and vegetation) offer great potential, but there is significant fear,
particularly in Europe, that the harms outweigh the benefits.61 Australia may
provide a case study for the future because thousands of hectares of previously
arable land are now no longer in production due to the combined effects of
59
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overuse, poor tilling methods, and a changing climate. If this scenario plays out on
a global scale, the present stabilisation of human population will diminish because
poverty drives up population. Ehrlich‘s exponential population bomb may yet
explode after 2050, doubling to 20 billion in less than 20 years.

Absolute poverty,62 therefore, is arguably the most significant crisis currently
faced by moral agents. It seems reasonable to presume now, as Singer and others
have done, that the moral concern we extend to others, via the principle of
universalisation, ought no longer to be restricted to national borders. From another
perspective, however, overcoming absolute poverty is now also a personal or selfinterested crisis because it has become a survival issue. If the population does not
stabilise by 2050, then human population growth has the potential to result in 5-10
billion people living in absolute poverty. This raises the specter of poverty-linked
transmission of viruses that are potentially catastrophic for humanity. The
potential for this to occur ought to incite moral agents, and people concerned for
their own self-interest, to engage in conversation via the thin moral considerations
we hold in common, considerations that focus on our shared humanity.

Conversation and Thin Universals

For people now living in large cities, moral enquiry as a thin conversation about
universals involves consideration of social cooperation between numbers of
people unimaginable for ancient philosophers. The level of human cooperation
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(engaged pluralism) necessary in a large city is often undervalued. Living in a city
with millions of other human beings involves a level of cooperation as significant
as living in an aboriginal village or a small isolated community of families. 63 The
social relationships are generally not as close, but the level of cooperation is as
great, or even greater, due to the amount of human interaction that is necessary
when vast numbers of humans live together. In large cities the capacity for human
cooperation is often overlooked and is probably masked by media concentration
on statistically small levels of violence and other forms of social conflict. Whether
or not large human populations are sustainable long term is yet to be determined,
but the perception that a larger population leads to more violence and dysfunction
is routinely overstated.64 Significant moral thinkers seem to recognise,
independently of time and place, that the oldest moral maxim of all, treat others as
you would want to be treated, is a necessary condition for long-lived human
cohabitation.65

Without this teleological

imperative,

slavery would

be

indistinguishable from poverty relief. More significantly, in a large pluralist city,
this eudemonic telos does not need to be prescriptive because a thin consensus
seems all that is required for the polis to function reasonably well.

Humans are a remarkably cooperative species. Therefore the thick prescriptive
telos of the whole human life that MacIntyre appeals to seems to be both an
63
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unrealisable and, more importantly, unnecessarily complicated goal to set for
moral enquiry in a pluralist society. This does not imply that a thick prescriptive
awareness of the moral life is unrealisable or unnecessary for rational moral
agents. A rational agent who thinks seriously about moral issues is going to
develop a thick understanding of the moral life, leaning toward one tradition rather
than another because the process of developing this awareness involves greater
familiarity with some moral traditions rather than others.

MacIntyre is also right to argue that acknowledgement of the telos of the whole
human life is necessary for ethics because such an acknowledgement mediates
between those practices that promote human flourishing (e.g., medicine) and those
practices that do not (e.g., racism).66 When he states that ethics presupposes
―some account of potentiality and act,‖ ―some account of the essence of man as a
rational animal,‖ and ―above all some account of the human telos,‖ he does so
because he argues that there is a ―fundamental contrast‖ between ―man-as-hehappens-to-be‖ and ―man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.‖67
MacIntyre‘s attempt to make this third account, the essential nature of human
beings, more explicit through the comparative analysis of traditions is clearly
consistent with his claim that humans are story-filled animals. However, the
justification he offers for why one thick story trumps others has proved to be
inconclusive. When MacIntyre claims that professors of philosophy disagree over
ethics as much as other people do,68 he does not seem to appreciate sufficiently
66
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that disagreement over thick moral issues does not preclude thin agreement on
many others.

The solution to competing traditions of ethics in a pluralist society, therefore, is
not to advocate how or why one tradition trumps others, as MacIntyre does, but to
recognise the limitations of moral epistemology and to set goals of sufficient
pragmatism. This pragmatic approach limits what can be said about moral
knowledge in a pluralist society to a consensus based on thin agreement about the
values that sustain human flourishing. In a modern pluralist society, a thin level of
agreement is evident about many aspects of human action in spite of the lack of
agreement over their respective epistemic justifications. Even if this thin level of
agreement is restricted to cooperative behaviour, and even if this level of
agreement was all that could be said about ethics, it remains a significant force for
human cooperation. The thin conversational approach to ethics outlined above
seems pragmatically more useful, as a minimalist starting point for moral
conversation, because it trades on common human teleological imperatives and a
common awareness shared by most forms of ethical theory. From a pragmatist
perspective, this thin moral minimalism provides sufficient social cooperation for
man-as-he-happens-to-be because of existing agreement over practices that
contribute to the flourishing of the polis.

In this context, the rule of law, highlighted in Chapter 3, provides a thin level of
moral conversation because it does not arbitrate on why one moral argument is
superior to another. The rule of law is a mediation process that involves a series of

279

political, legal, and socially established end-points that attempt to resolve conflict.
When this mediation process is used to address moral issues, it cannot arbitrate on
the rational efficacy of the arguments involved. The rule of law can and does
make rulings that have moral implications, but these rulings are primarily
procedural. In Australia, for instance, the parliamentary debate referred to earlier,
over whether spare IVF embryos ought to be made available for non-reproductive
purposes, was decided by a conscience vote of federal parliamentarians after more
than a year of public consultation. The decision to allow embryos to be used for
therapeutic purposes is not the right decision from a moral perspective because
the concept of rightness is argument-dependent. It is, however, the right decision
from the perspective of the rule of law because due process has been followed.
Moral agents who disagree with the outcome do not often object to the process
because they accept that the rule of law plays an important role in a modern
pluralist democracy such as Australia.

Another example of a contemporary conversation over thin moral universals is the
various civil and political protocols adopted by member States of the United
Nations. Historically, the language of human rights was based on foundationalist
natural law assumptions that rights are basic or universalisable to all humans. This
epistemological position has been an easy target for consequentialists and nonconsequentialists alike. Bentham famously declared, in an attack on rights
language entitled Anarchical Fallacies, that ―natural rights is simple nonsense:
natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts.‖69
69
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MacIntyre is similarly caustic when he declares that ―the truth is plain: there are
no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns.‖70

This criticism is directed at the foundationalist assumptions of rights language.
When the Declaration of Independence (1776) declares that the truth of rights
language is ―self-evident,‖ that ―all men are created equal,‖ and that humans ―are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness,‖71 it contains several epistemological
claims. However, none of the foundationalist claims, which were meant to
authenticate or validate the Declaration, is self-evident for the same reason that
belief in unicorns is not self-evident, since they are nowhere to be found. It is not
self-evident, in an epistemological sense, that all men [humans] are created or that
they are equal. Neither is it self-evident that God endowed humans with
unalienable [unchangeable] rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Clearly, from an epistemological perspective, the rhetoric of the Declaration
alludes to more epistemological certainty than it can defend.

A similar issue arises in relation to the United Nations 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR makes a strong
epistemological claim in the Preamble to ―recognition of the inherent dignity and
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family‖ as the
―foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.‖72 From an
70
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epistemological standpoint, this statement is problematic because it appeals to the
inalienability of basic rights for all humans. However, if one accepts that rights
are truly inalienable, and therefore immune from change by civil, religious, or
political whim, then the 30 articles routinely clash with other moral imperatives.
For instance, Article 3 claims that ―everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person,‖ but this is problematic because ―everyone‖ ought not to
include people who are deliberately cruel. Similarly, Article 18 claims that
―everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,‖ but once
again this ―everyone‖ ought to exclude religious practice that is demonstrably
cruel. Lastly, Article 19 claims that ―everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression … and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers,‖ but ―everyone‖ ought not to include
publically expressed opinions that are overtly racist or sexist. Once one
acknowledges that universal does not imply all humans and that inalienable does
not imply immune from change, then the strength of the UDHR claim is
diminished from an epistemological perspective.

However, if one views the UDHR as a thin rhetorical statement – a statement
forged in the midst of a post-WWII, post-nuclear, and post-holocaust conversation
about the future – then the epistemological problems are less important. Given
that the original natural law foundation of rights language is well-known to be
epistemologically problematic, the contemporary appeal to civil and political
covenants that the United Nations now use seems appropriate. Civil and political
covenants trade on an agreement about the rule of law that countries either accept
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or reject. In this sense, the UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women
(1952) is based on a thin social consensus between member States that more
could be done to elevate the status of women. In the civil and political sense, the
UDHR provides a thin moral minimalist consensus of the type referred to
throughout this thesis. This thin agreement does not imply that member States will
agree on what the Political Rights of Women entails in detail, but it does imply
that, having signed the declaration, these States do consider that this issue evokes
a conversation worth having.

When thin minimalist claims are combined with thick maximalist practices in a
pluralist society, the language of morality provides substantial explanatory power
over the moral life because it allows for a social resolution of complex moral
issues, even in the midst of serious moral disagreement. The next section will
contend that a thick moral maximalism is also possible over many practices in a
pluralist society, once agreement has been achieved that the practice itself
contributes to a thin sense of human flourishing.

Conversation and Thick Practices

Practice-guided enquiry engages moral agents in a conversation at the point at
which consensus on moral issues breaks down. This method takes for granted
Williams‘ claim, referred to earlier, that complexity and conflict is a basic fact of
moral deliberation because moral deliberation involves a complex mix of local
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and universal concerns.73 The practice-guided approach focuses on a level of
agreement that has already been achieved. This is because a practitioner, by virtue
of internal standards of excellence within a practice, accepts the authority of those
standards in a way that overrides his or her own choices, preferences, or tastes.
Practice-guided enquiry does not seek to establish whether actions are right or
wrong; rather, it seeks to establish whether actions are consistent with internal
goods as defined by the practice. For example, a good medical practitioner is one
whose actions and behaviour are consistent with the practice of medicine because
a consensus, forged over time, has already been established with respect to actions
and behaviours that conform to the telos of medicine (health).

The self-authenticating thick standards of a practice have practical consequences
for human conduct because practitioners have access to an established set of
internal goods that are historically extended in a manner that is consistent with the
teleological imperative of that practice.74 Conversation within a practice is thick
because it involves historically extended argument about the internal goods
(virtues) that define it. MacIntyre is right that an account of a practice that does
not take seriously the telos of the whole human life is deficient, but he makes too
much of this necessary evaluative condition. A rational agent can develop a thick
understanding of a practice while maintaining only a loose or even vague
connection with the telos of a whole human life.
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MacIntyre‘s description of a practice is relatively straightforward but the activities
that he thinks constitute a practice have since been broadened because his
description was too narrow. He thought that architecture was a practice but
bricklaying was not (because bricklaying is a skill).75 Hauerwas, whose father was
a bricklayer, questions how MacIntyre draws this fine distinction between a
practice and a skill.76 Hauerwas insists that bricklaying is a practice because it has
both a narrative history and a set of internal goods that constitute what it means to
be a good bricklayer.77 Perhaps MacIntyre was not sufficiently aware of internal
goods that pertain to bricklaying but those who lay brick, or have fathers who do
so, are. A pluralist society involves activities that might not normally be
recognised as practices in the formal sense, like medicine and law, because many
activities exhibit roughly the same commitment to internal goods, extended over
time, that formal disciplines do. If Hauerwas is right, that laying brick is indeed a
practice, then perhaps it is best not to differentiate too narrowly between practices
and skills. The type of habituation Aristotle has in mind is useful here because he
links the internal goods of routine activities, such as bridle-making or sitar
playing, to their historically extended goals of horsemanship and musicianship.

Rorty‘s concept of a practice is also useful because he links the concept of
practice to Kuhn‘s concept of normal science when he claims that ―we can get
epistemological commensuration only where we already have agreed-upon
75
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practices of inquiry‖; furthermore, this commensuration is not because practices
are true but because ―when a practice has continued long enough the conventions
which make it possible – and which permit a consensus on how to divide it into
parts – are relatively easy to isolate.‖78 Conversation about complex issues within
practices is necessarily thick because they are based on established conventions.
Rorty argues that participating in these thick conversations is ―normal discourse‖
and necessary for a rational agent to understand a culture, a practice, a theory, or a
language.79 Commensuration is possible at the level of normal discourse for
practices such as politics, medicine, or law because these practices have long
enough histories for the conventions which govern them to become established.

―Abnormal discourse,‖ in this constructivist sense, may call into question the
received view and, if successful, can move the conversation in a completely
different, or revolutionary, direction. Abnormal discourse is edifying, according to
Rorty, because its ―strangeness‖ can ―aid us in becoming new beings.‖80 For
Rorty, this hermeneutic dimension to knowledge is neither a new discipline nor a
new method for taking over when epistemology fails; rather, it is an ―expression
of hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled
– that our culture should become one in which the demand for constraint and
confrontation is no longer felt.‖81
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Often, the internal goods within a practice are modified or even rejected as a result
of abnormal interaction with other practices. Sometimes this happens voluntarily,
because practitioners recognise the validity of an opposing argument or
suggestion; at other times a change to an internal good within a practice will be
non-voluntary, because external rational agents provide sufficient justification to
force a change. The advocacy, rejection, and subsequent reinstatement of medical
lobotomy illustrates how normal (internal) and abnormal (external) interaction can
lead to change within a practice.

In 1949, Antonio Egas Moniz was awarded a Nobel Prize for his work on medical
lobotomy, and thousands of patients underwent a variety of procedures that
attempted to alter the personality of troubled patients by interfering with their
brain chemistry, usually by surgical means. Walter Freeman developed a
technique that included tapping an ice pick through the eye socket because he
thought that by doing so he altered a patient‘s brain chemistry which made them
more passive. Most of his work was poorly researched and after 1960 his
technique in particular, and lobotomy in general, fell into disrepute within
medicine.

Much of the criticism over lobotomy came from people whose expertise was
external to the discipline of psychosurgery, primarily people working in
psychiatry, neuropsychology, and other non-surgical behaviour modification
disciplines. Eventually research showed that psychosurgical techniques, such as
lobotomy, do not alter a patient‘s behaviour for the better and the technique was
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subsequently banned in many countries. In recent years, however, a specialised
form of temporal lobotomy was developed to treat patients who suffer from
seizures of various types. This involves destroying a part of the brain that causes
the seizure and this technique has proved to be very successful. The changing
status of a technique such as lobotomy illustrates the type of normal and abnormal
conversation that occurs within a thick practice such as medicine. The next subsection examines the role that internal goods play in practices extended over time.

Conversation and Internal Goods

MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice has been adapted and utilised by a variety of
scholars from various disciplines.82 It primarily involves a consensus among
practitioners on the internal goods which are realised in the application of
standards of excellence. MacIntyre contends that internal goods of a practice ―can
only be identified and recognized by the experience of participating in the practice
in question.‖83 Without this practical experience one is incompetent to adjudicate
which actions or behavious are internal goods and which are not. Nancey Murphy
and George Ellis use MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice to promote a cosmological
argument for ethics. They agree with MacIntyre that a moral agent needs to locate
practices within the telos of human life because ―practices and life stories … are
evaluated morally in relation to the telos of human life‖ and ―the actual content of
82
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the ethic [its internal goods] depends on the telos or purpose derived from the
theology or metaphysics at the topmost level.‖84

James McClendon similarly uses the concept of a practice for articulating the role
that stories play in religious practice for what he calls the life-shaping convictions
of practitioners. For McClendon,
There is no ―essence‖ of religion; religions are neither …
all more or less true nor … all more or less evil. It follows
that generalizations about religion are generally mistaken,
since religions differ in kind, and only concrete,
sympathetic historical and empirical study can tell us
about any particular religion. We may call this practical
theory of religion … in the sense that its concern is the
life-shaping (as I will say, the convictional) practices
religions embody. So religions are not to be identified with
their abstract teachings, far less with their ―errors.‖85

McClendon uses game playing to illustrate how religious practices can be
understood by focusing primarily on the teleological practice of ethics as defined
by its practitioners. Game playing is a teleological activity that involves players in
standards of action and adherence to rules. The game of chess, for instance, has a
long established social history in which the complex system of rules and etiquette
were developed. These rules and etiquette are the internal goods of the game, and
a chess player needs to understand them to be considered proficient. McClendon
thinks that game playing illustrates how social practices evolve and how the
84
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internal goods, extended over time, are modified.86 In chess, for instance, the rules
of the game have remained relatively static and few changes have been introduced
in several hundred years, probably because the game usually involves only two
people and very few spectators.87 Team games and games with large audiences,
on the other hand, often evolve significantly over time to take into consideration
new technical developments, greater fitness, and corporate requirements relating
to television sponsorship.

McClendon uses game playing to illustrate how MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice
can be utilised in complex disciplines. In the same way that game playing requires
some form of teleological imperative that gives point and purpose to the activity,
and also some rules of engagement that define how the game ought to be played,
McClendon argues that MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice can be usefully
employed in complex disciplines. The following section will offer a tentative
reconstruction of the thin and thick application of practice-guided enquiry for the
practice of medicine. The rationale for advocating a practice-based approach for
medicine is that it refocuses decision making toward its internal goods and its
teleological imperative.

The focus of practice-guided ethics is the actions of a moral agent from an
historical or tradition-guided standpoint. The individual moral agent is therefore
not impartial but should, if he or she has been trained sufficiently, be partial to the
86
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internal goods of medicine. Medical ethics is a co-operative behaviour in which
internal goods are determined by evolving practices over time. Relating this
practice-first approach to medical decision making involves looking at what
happens when the ―switches are thrown‖ in medicine. A practice in medicine has
a ―life of its own‖ because some things work and some things do not. Theories
about treatment of certain diseases are confirmed or otherwise by clinical trials
initially and then by practice extended over time. Procedures, diagnoses, and even
bedside manners become established as ―internal goods‖ because they have a
pragmatic history of effectiveness. In short, they seem to work.

7.3 Medical Practice: Thin Telos and Thick Internal Goods

MacIntyre argues that to enter into a practice is to accept the ―authority of those
standards‖; to accept the ―inadequacy of my own performance as judged by
them‖; and to ―subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the
standards which currently and partially define the practice.‖88 A pragmatic
practice-guided approach to understanding the internal goods of medical practice
requires three levels of competency that relate to the three different types of moral
conversation referred to previously:

1. a thin historical competency to appreciate how and why the telos of health is
consistent with human flourishing;
2. a thick practical competency that measures actions (knowledge, skill, and
behaviour) of a practitioner against the normal discourse of internal goods
associated with the historically extended telos of health; and
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3. a social competency of openness to abnormal discourse that accepts that even
the most cherished internal goods of medicine might be shown to be
inconsistent with its own standard of excellence (health) and, perhaps more
importantly, an openness to other standards of excellence.

In contemporary terms, the use of best-practice standards goes some way to
facilitating practice-guided enquiry. The concept of best practice in a clinical
situation is not always obvious because best practice for the surgeon may promote
a different action from best practice for the oncologist, and both may be restricted
by best practice of a hospital administrator working within budget constraints.
However, as long as health is the focus, the decision to provide surgery, or
chemical therapy, or even to restrict or deny treatment because of budget
constraints can all be said to be good practice if they conform to established
internal goods that have historically justified the practice concerned.

When Aristotle argues that ―every art and every inquiry, and similarly every
action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good,‖89 he uses medicine to
illustrate how this teleological imperative ought to be understood. He defends this
by suggesting that there is general agreement about the teleological imperative of
medicine because it is obvious to a rational agent, particularly when he is ill, that
health is a necessary though not sufficient aspect of human flourishing. 90 Edmund
Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma describe this teleological imperative for
medicine succinctly:
89
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the ends of medicine are ultimately the restoration or
improvement of health and, more proximately, to heal,
that is, to cure illness and disease or, when this is not
possible, to care for and help the patient to live with
residual pain, discomfort, or disability. There are many
decisions along the way to these ends, but in each decision
there is a fusion of technical and moral elements... But this
good is more than simple medical good; it includes the
patient‘s perception of good—material, emotional, or
spiritual.91

Rorty similarly states that medicine is considered a practice because it involves a
consensus on ―agreed upon practices of inquiry‖ and has ―continued long enough‖
for the ―conventions which make it possible‖ to be intelligible.92 Pellegrino and
Thomasma emphasise the purpose-driven aim of medical practice when they posit
that the chief aim of medicine ought to be a process directed at the good of the
patient. They acknowledge that medicine can be studied scientifically, but this is
not what they call the ―justifying principle‖ of medicine.93 The justifying principle
of medicine is the health of the patient or the health of a community of patients if
community health is in focus. In this pragmatic sense, the internal goods of
medical practice are constitutive of and constituted by the teleological imperative
of health. Given this teleological imperative for health, Paul Hoyt-O‘Conner
argues that MacIntyre‘s concept of practice can usefully be employed because
medicine is a historically extended practice with clearly defined internal goods
(virtues).
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Since Alasdair MacIntyre‘s landmark book After Virtue,
there has been renewed interest in the role of the virtues in
the moral life and attention paid to reappropriating the
Aristotelian notion of ‗practice.‘ Recent reappropriations
of the virtues and virtue theory in medical ethics have
contributed to conceiving more adequately the nature of
good medicine.94

Clearly medicine is a practice that has achieved this level of acceptance because it
has historically established internal goods defined by its own standard of
excellence (health) and is consistent with what MacIntyre refers to as the ―human
powers to achieve excellence‖ (his description of human flourishing).95 A less
cumbersome descriptor for medicine is to say that the telos of medical practice
(health) is consistent with the broader concept of human flourishing (eudaimonia)
and that a good practitioner requires this historical awareness in order to
appreciate how medical practice fits into the broader teleological concerns of
human flourishing.

Medicine: Normal Conversation and Internal Goods

Health practitioners cannot be judged according to the telos of a whole human life
(eudaimonia) because medicine is practised by people with different life-stories
who therefore have different views on what constitutes a flourishing life. Once
agreement has been reached that medicine is a practice consistent with human
flourishing, however, it becomes transparent that the internal goods of medicine
are those agreed-upon actions, behaviours, and rules that promote the specific
94
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telos of health. In medicine, actions of practitioners (doctors, nurses, etc.) are
judged either good or bad according to the thick internal goods of medical
practice. A second practical competency is necessary, therefore, because a
virtuous medical practitioner is one who measures her actions (knowledge, skills,
and behaviour) against the accepted internal goods of medical practice. Once
again, it was Aristotle who first articulated how the concept of an internal good
can be understood within the specific teleological imperative of a practice. For
Aristotle, the healing art of medicine does not consist solely in learning the skills
associated with applying the knife, because a prudent doctor has to learn when not
to apply the knife as well,96 and this takes time and habituation.

In this context, a practitioner is not responsible for deciding the status of internal
goods within medicine because they have already been historically extended long
before she arrived on the scene. The telos of health provides a goal of sufficient
pragmatism for a range of internal goods to be achieved without the practitioner
having to worry about the telos or purpose of the whole human life. The
pedagogical emphasis for a young medical practitioner should, therefore, initially
be focused on teaching her what to do, because it may be years before she can
fully appreciate how to connect what she is engaged in now with medicine as a
purpose-driven activity. The term general practitioner implies knowledge and
skills, but it also implies behaviour and relationships because actions of health
practitioners (internal goods) occur in a particular social context (hospitals,
clinics, etc.). The role of a practitioner is not to make decisions about what is right
96
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and wrong but to make decisions that are consistent with good practice. In a
pluralist society, actions of an individual medical practitioner, at least as far as
medicine is concerned, have already been defined by medical tradition and are
therefore not contingent upon the religion or culture of the practitioner.
MacIntyre‘s explanation of a practice is similar to Rorty‘s explanation, following
Kuhn, of normal discourse. Likewise, MacIntyre‘s concept of an epistemic crisis
that leads to a change of practice is similar to Rorty‘s use of abnormal discourse.
Rorty‘s abnormal discourse is a hermeneutic study ―from the point of view of
some normal discourse,‖ a ―line of argument‖ in which conversation is an
essential component because it is not possible to ―understand the parts of a strange
culture, practice, theory, language, or whatever, unless we know something about
how the whole thing works.‖97 So the focus in practice-centred enquiry is to use
historicist analysis of actions that pertain to the case from the point of view of the
internal goods or normal discourse that pertain to the practice concerned.

Medicine: Abnormal Conversation

Because medicine is a practice with an established understanding of internal
goods, the telos of human flourishing is all that is required for the individual
practitioner to recognise with some humility that his or her current practice is
linked to those who have gone before, both the good and the bad. She should also
exhibit a social competency of openness because the history of medicine is replete
with examples of malpractice where health professionals failed to live up to the
97
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teleological imperative for the patients or for their profession. It is for this reason
that abnormal conversation is necessary when evaluating a practice because
people within a practice often fail to see, or do not have the ability to see, wider
implications of their actions.

In Australia, one method of keeping a cross-check on medical professions is by
legislation in the form of professional practice Acts of parliament. In Western
Australia, for instance, the recently revised Medical Practitioners Act runs to 156
pages and covers numerous aspects of professional behaviour. Its stated objects
are as follows:

(a) to ensure that only properly qualified and competent
persons practise medicine and to regulate the practice of
medicine by those persons; and
(b) to establish, maintain and promote suitable standards
of knowledge and skills among medical practitioners, for
the purpose of protecting consumers of medical services
provided by medical practitioners in Western Australia.98

Codification of medical practice though Acts of parliament is necessary due to the
scale and diversity of roles that health professionals have. The professionalisation
of medicine also comes at a price, however, as practitioners have to devote a
significant proportion of their income to membership in professional associations
that protect their interests. Medical practice is under closer scrutiny than most
practices, which is appropriate for a complex and diverse discipline that impacts
on people so directly. Several layers of peer review process, the focus on
98
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―evidence-based‖ practice, epidemiological studies, macro-economic issues, the
privacy act, and even the threat of legal action can all lead to changes being made
to medicine as a practice. The actions of a practitioner must be consistent with the
internal goods of medicine but at the same time be open to, and constrained by,
other forms of moral enquiry. This places emphasis on the action itself (good or
bad) rather than the reasons behind the action (right or wrong). A consensus is
possible because good and bad actions are objective when one is working within a
thick practice such as medicine.

7.4 Conclusion

This thesis began by stating that a practice-guided approach to moral enquiry
enables theory to touch practice by focusing attention on a type of consensus that
transcends traditional theological and philosophical conflicts. In a pluralist
society, a practice-guided approach to complex ethical issues provides a greater
level of accountability and transparency because actions of stakeholders are
judged against the history of a practice. This approach argues that moral pluralism
should be embraced because diversity in a liberal democracy is to be expected.

When conflicts arise in moral enquiry, particularly in practical ethics, it is
common for debate to stagnate because rational discussants hold conceptually
incommensurable views over the moral issues concerned. This thesis has
highlighted several issues where practice-guided enquiry examines the space
between rival moral arguments. First, it takes seriously the narrative history of
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competing moral traditions because moral debate of any note occurs between
serious-thinking rational agents. Second, it acknowledges the importance of the
history of decision making within traditions to which moral practitioners belong,
or find themselves for a time. Third, it recognises that decisions are not arbitrated
by the individual moral agent, thereby diminishing the role of the impartial
observer so crucial in theory-centred practical ethics. Fourth, the narrative of
particular traditions, those practices and internal goods or virtues that constitute
―good‖ behaviour, provide guidelines against which the actions of a particular
moral agent can be judged. In a pluralist society, practice-guided enquiry offers a
more practical model for decision making than ethical rule following.

Practice-guided enquiry trades on MacIntyre‘s explanation of the role that practice
plays as an evaluative tool for comparing one tradition with another. However, the
comparative analysis of practices from a pragmatist perspective has a more
restricted emphasis. This restricted emphasis for practical ethics is because
consensus at the level of practice is possible even when there is none at the level
of religious belief or philosophical argument. This is an important distinction in a
pluralist society because it trades on a thin consensus about long-lived social
practices such as medicine, law, and politics. This thin consensus over the value
of such practices is possible even in the midst of thick religious, philosophical,
and cultural disagreement.

Pluralism brings with it many benefits and challenges. Learning to live peaceably
in the midst of serious disagreement can be a struggle but it is a struggle worth
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having. Bernstein contends that learning to live with and among people of rival
incommensurable traditions is ―one of the most pressing problems of
contemporary life.‖99 He further states,

There are no algorithms for grasping what is held in
common and what is genuinely different. Indeed,
commonality and difference are themselves historically
conditioned and shifting… In this sense the plurality of
rival incommensurable traditions imposes a universal
responsibility upon reflective participants in any tradition
– a responsibility that should not be confused with an
indifferent superficial tolerance where no effort is made to
understand and engage with the incommensurable
otherness of ―the Other.‖100

One way of dealing with the universal responsibility to which Bernstein refers is
to bypass the thick conceptual incommensurability of rival moral arguments by
appealing to what Walzer refers to as thin moral minimalism. This thin moral
minimalism has been appealed to throughout this thesis to show that rival moral
arguments that are conceptually incommensurable at one level can be
commensurable at another. Further, even when moral arguments are conceptually
incommensurable at the level of practical ethics, a resolution of complex moral
debate is still possible by focusing on the relationship between thin universals and
thick practices.
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